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ABSTRACT
What do the signs “identity” and “alterity” point to within the economy of representation and
the logic of simulation that govern the present era? How does the visual saturation of a
screen-mediated life affect the study of identity? Where does the information overload within
which we operate leave the production of knowledge about otherness? My goal in this project
is not to resolve these questions, but rather to linger in them. Focusing on various portrayals
of categorical identities in film, photography, and digital media, I utilize a semiotic analysis
to examine the formulaic, repetitive maneuvers of signification practices that reproduce
essentializing notions of racialized, gendered, or classed subjectivities. Threading through the
work is the notion that not only is it impossible to know or accurately represent the other, but
that for alterity to hold any meaning it must remain out of reach, foreign, inexplicable, and
even threatening. Only then, I propose, does the significance of otherness shift from a
surface-level difference to a mirror that reflects ethical inquiries in regard to our own
existence and our place as a species on a rapidly changing planet.
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Introduction

In the science fiction novel Solaris, written by the Polish author Stanislaw Lem in 1961, a
group of scientists attempt to explore the planet Solaris, whose orbit around two suns and
between two polar gravitational pulls presents a baffling challenge to the known laws of
physics. Observations and studies are made from a space station that can only hover above
Solaris’s surface, as the whole planet is covered in thick, flowing, ocean-resembling plasma.
Unlike water, however, this plasma is made of unstable particles, so in addition to
undulating, gushing, and rising in waves like any common fluid, is can also change form,
consistency, and molecular structure. It is capable, for example, of arranging itself into
spectacular, enormous formations that take the shape of landscapes, built environments, and
living creatures (at times magnificently beautiful, at times grotesque and terrifying), and it
often (but not always) responds to the stimuli generated by the space station’s scientific
experimentations with many such great displays. However, the spectacular arrangements are
erratic, at times extremely violent, and at other times there is no response at all, and the
“ocean” remains perfectly still, placid, and opaque. Despite decades of enthusiastic research
and unprecedented volumes of collected data, Solaris remains an unfathomable mystery to
the curious human mind. Repeated experiments yield inconsistent results, no patterns are
ever established, and the more material accumulates, the more questions remain
unanswerable. Does the plasma present a new form of life? Is there any kind of order or logic
behind its capricious reactions? Is it conscious? Is it capable of reasoning? Of
communicating?
This dissertation takes as its starting point the suggestion that alterity is a mystery so
great that its potency lies precisely in the unanswerable questions it poses, rather than in the
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answers the inquiring subject sets out to procure. Inspired by the allegorical elements in
Lem’s novel, which point to the pitfalls and blind spots of the scientific method and
systematic knowledge production, it engages in a deconstruction of the basic paradigms of
formal academic epistemologies and examines identity and alterity as they interact and clash
with one another in a world that is being transformed by technological advances. The project
explores the radical instability of a current “reality” dominated by machines and computers,
devices and apps, virtual communication and artificial intelligence. What do the signs
“identity” and “alterity” point to within the economy of representation and the logic of
simulation that govern the present era? How does the visual saturation of a screen-mediated
life affect the study of identity? Where does the information overload within which we
operate leave the production of knowledge about otherness?
My goal in this project is to highlight the artificiality of popular visual and rhetorical
representations that insist on divisions between “self” and “other” when those categorical
definitions are in fact being increasingly voided of their legitimacy. Focusing on various
portrayals of otherness in film, photography, and digital media, I utilize a poststructural
aesthetic analysis to examine the formulaic, repetitive maneuvers of signification practices
that reproduce essentializing notions of racialized, gendered, and classed subjectivities.
Threading through the analyses is the notion that not only is it impossible to know or
accurately represent the other, but that for alterity to hold any meaning it must remain out of
reach, foreign, inexplicable, and even threatening. Only then, I propose, does the significance
of alterity shift from a surface-level difference used to substantiate the self to a mirror that
reflects ethical inquiries in regard to our own existence and our place as a species on a
rapidly changing planet. Probing representational narratives as they emerge in a human
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environment that is saturated with, defined through, and ruled by advanced technology and
mass media, by the endless circulation of refracted, pixelated, regurgitated formations that
are far removed from any point of origin, is it possible to concretize subjecthood and various
subjectivities and to determine what makes them “real”? In the context of our contemporary,
postmodern mediated existence, I suggest, even “real” must be put in quotation marks and
can be critically probed and reexamined, as what the term means is no longer clear.
How are presumably undeniable distinctions between sameness and otherness
created? As Edward Said (1978) argues, a careful examination of representational practices is
necessary for comprehending the cultural, political, and epistemological mechanisms by
which the “reality” of otherness is not only recognized but is, in fact, produced. The
systematic dividing of the human species into dramatically divergent societies, cultures,
races, or traditions has generated, over time, such a convincing, seemingly genuine certainty,
that apart from entertaining idealistic theories of freedom and justice for all it is nearly
impossible to bring a more unifying perspective into practice. But to operate according to the
dominant logic of categorical distinctions between groups of people is to disregard the
individual in favor of the collective and thus to automatically dehumanize not just the other
but the self as well, for to underline group affiliation as what delineates identity is to
generalize, reduce, and essentialize a complex and multifaceted particular existence.
Furthermore, engaging with divisions, as Said points out, even when one is intent on
dismantling them, is never without consequences. Every “us” and “them,” regardless of what
defines sameness and otherness, risks the negative effects of asymmetry, schism, acrimony,
and violence (45).
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My exploration of the tension between the “real” and the simulated contributes to a
growing scholarship in American studies concerned with the effects of new modes of
representation on the study of subjectivity, and with the corresponding questions regarding
knowledge production in the age of overflowing information exchange. Centering my
analysis at the conjunctions of digital and visual cultures, I follow the lines of inquiry set by
Lisa Nakamura (2008), who was one of the first to dispel the notion that cyberspace was an
impersonal, unbiased, pristine realm in which the race, gender, class, or sexual orientation of
users were of no significance. While in its early days the Internet presented a potentially
utopian medium through which identity could be reconfigured and reimagined as an
unmarked, virgin virtual presence, its infiltration of every aspect of our lives has proven this
avatar dreamland a false promise. With digital interactions becoming so commonplace they
are in fact considered natural, expected, and essential to the function of society everywhere,
it becomes clear that they are “inextricably tied to the contemporary racial project of
producing volitional racial mobility in the service of new forms of capitalism” (30). The
Internet in all its portals and applications can no longer be seen as the neutral, equalizing
medium that it was once thought to be. Like most other media of popular and constant use
(television, film, journalism, or the advertising industry), cyberspace doesn’t merely
represent preexisting subjectivities, but shapes and reinforces them through a seemingly
inclusive celebration of differences that in effect feeds hierarchical economic, social, and
political trends. As Nakamura emphasizes, there is room for much more work to be done in
this area, and we must continuously reassess the fast-evolving virtual norms that direct our
lives.
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In her analysis of social media as a form of social ordering, Taina Bucher (2018)
points to the fact that human existence has become so steeped in and dependent on computer
technologies that individual identities rarely have meaning anymore outside our screened and
mediated lives. The integration of human and machine is so totalizing that it may not make
sense anymore to view algorithms as a mere tool in the hands of high-tech industries or
economic and governmental entities. The computations themselves have come to possess
political power so that what we still refer to as the “social” is in fact a programmed
construction “articulated in and through computational means of assembling and organizing,
which always already embody certain norms and values about the social world” (4). For
example, social media updates are designed to stimulate user interaction in such a way that
the more a user engages with the presented feeds, the more visible they become, and the
constant “threat of invisibility” creates a cycle of partaking according to normalizing
measurements of time spent on the platform and the number of clicks per certain time blocks.
On Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, and other similar apps, it is the technical
infrastructure that molds and regulates social connections through profile availability and
popularity. More than disciplining users in what Bucher terms “participatory subjectivity,” I
would add, the infrastructure of AI has the power to determine the user’s very sense of
individual identity, constructed through preferences, profile settings, uploads, searches, and
“likes” or “dislikes.”
Similarly, Ruha Benjamin (2019) exposes AI algorithms in marketing strategies,
entertainment portals, and social media as the rising power that perpetuates, with cunning
efficacy and alleged objectivity, the man-made systems of racialized, classed, and gendered
hierarchies. Just like our human eyes instantly register visual information to be interpreted by
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the trained human brain according to categories of discernment and discrimination, search
engines and coding apparatuses are able to record and process the most basic data a given
user might deliberately or inadvertently submit by searching for certain products and
information on the World Wide Web. For instance, Amazon, Netflix, Facebook, and other
platforms that operate through tailored marketing do not need to gather any actual details
about the race, gender, sexual orientation, or social status of the user/consumer. Maintaining
a façade of sterilized objectivity, their algorithms rely on prior search histories as proxies
through which to predict further purchase interests, generating lists of segmented suggestions
and recommendations that “benignly” propagate race, gender, or class divides. Thus,
Benjamin argues, economic recognition and informational detection replace both political
representation and social engagement. “This transactional model of citizenship presumes that
people’s primary value hinges on the ability to spend money and, in the digital age, expend
attention” (10). By browsing, choosing, scrolling, watching, clicking, and buying, we
exercise our rights and responsibilities. The technology-mediated life, therefore, is
increasingly the only life that matters—so much so that to opt out, to disengage from the
Web, to return to analog, or even to delete certain apps is perceived as antisocial, if not
borderline criminal—suspicious of dissent, evasion, or conspiratory rejection of the present
social-political-economic order. In the context of these constructs of virtual participatory
subjectivity, my analysis of visual media evaluates screened productions, popular Internet
portals, and the hidden workings of AI systems not as static, mechanized objects or
functions, but as dynamic forces that, much like the historical political movements of the
past, induce dramatic material and cultural changes over time, shaping and modifying the
living conditions and the very identities of individuals and groups across the globe.
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Despite the open discursive outcries about inequality that flood social media and
circulate freely online, hierarchical divisions between “same” and “other” have not crumbled.
On the contrary—the advanced technologies of mediated representation further entrench
them, turning racial, gendered, and classed taxonomies into timeless, borderless, ultimate
truths. The visual culture of the past, which depended on material objects such as reels,
prints, tapes, or projectors, as well as physical spaces such as movie theaters, galleries,
libraries, or living rooms, is now unbound by these constraints. Hence, while the power of
the visual to disseminate ideology and dictate inequality is nothing new, it has of late gained
unprecedented proportions as it has transcended the limitations of time, space, and matter, to
exponentially perpetuate itself in the realm of the virtual, the immaterial, and the eternal. It is
true that not all digital representations, profiling, predictions, and personalizations are
biasedly computed, but, as Benjamin (2019) suggests, enough are to merit careful
interrogation. While existing social hierarchies are reinforced, she argues, novel methods of
social control are being produced, and that means that “whenever we hear the promises of
tech being extolled, our antennae should pop up to question what all that hype of ‘better,
faster, fairer’ might be hiding and making us ignore” (48). My project argues that the
theoretical examination of identity-reinforcing and alterity-generating mechanisms must heed
this warning in a self-reflexive manner and pay alert attention to the fact that we, the
scholars/users/consumers, no longer enjoy the vantage point of critical disengagement. The
machines that enable research and writing, which were once stationary devices we could
choose to use or not, turn on or shut off, are no longer optional but mandatory. How we
operate, communicate, and do our work absolutely depends on them. And the screen, which
was once distinct from the “real,” is now touch-responsive and highly portable, fitting easily
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in purses and pockets. Once connected, separation from the screen, from the device, from the
Web, is unthinkable.
As my project communicates with the above and other contemporary works in
American studies, it also revisits the philosophical and critical work of late 20 th century
postmodern theorists, creating a bridge between the visionary writing of Marshal McLuhan,
Guy Debord, Paul Virilio, and in particular Jean Baudrillard, and present considerations of
the effects the artificial, the virtual, and the simulated have on human existence. The global
crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ensuing limitations enforced on many activities and
interactions, and the turn to remote, digital configurations as substitutes for numerous human
operations, I suggest, reframe the works of the science fiction writers and cultural theorists of
previous decades as especially pertinent and useful for understanding the changes
experienced by people not only in the U.S. but all over the world. Adding to the foundational
historical materialism that grounds much of contemporary scholarship in American studies,
my hope is to emphasize the potential of a poststructural approach to expand scopes of
analysis. The examination of contemporary cultural productions through a semiotic lens
highlights increasingly globalized signification practices that mass media and digital
networks circulate in every country and every language, thus prompting the reconsideration
of the function and importance of borders. Similarly, emphasizing the forward charge of
technological advancements, which creates, as Paul Virilio ([2005] 2007) argues, “an
accelerated temporality that affects customs and moral standards and art every bit as much as
the politics of nations” (3), changes the meaning of historical timelines. Allowing for a
philosophical, speculative inquiry to emerge, the open-ended span of interpretive semiotics
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favors a contemplation of human existence as a whole species--a broadened perspective from
which to assess familiar categories of identity.
David Harvey, for example, interrogates postmodern concerns with a clear focus on
the reorganization of global capitalism, addressing the new levels of time-space compression
that follow this restructuring through an analysis of the shifts in the material and the
economic conditions of life. While he does point to postmodern aesthetics as fascinating and
worth exploring for their complex, dynamic, seductive nature, he centers his work around the
measurable and practical conditions that emphasize capitalist logic as the engine that drives
postmodernity, thus rendering it a direct continuation of modernity’s mass production,
industrialization, and urbanization. Many American studies scholars have adopted a similar
methodology, utilizing and elaborating on the critical ideas of historical materialism.
Baudrillard, on the other hand, sees what he calls the hyperreal as a postindustrial or even
postcapitalist development. In his view, the aesthetics of simulation create their own logic,
apart from (although interweaved with) the motives and agendas of economic and political
systems. If for Harvey (1990), postmodern developments are the result of “the more flexible
motion of capital [which] emphasizes the new, the fleeting, the ephemeral, the fugitive, and
the contingent in modern life, rather than the more solid values implanted under Fordism”
(171), in Baudrillard’s (1981) hyperreal “it is the whole traditional world of causality that is
in question: the perspectival, determinist mode, the ‘active,’ critical mode, the analytical
mode—the distinction between cause and effect, between active and passive, between subject
and object, between the end and its means” (30). Baudrillard’s more radical view rejects the
connections drawn between “the relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism” and the
“fleeting qualities of a postmodernist aesthetic that celebrates difference, ephemerality,
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spectacle, fashion, and the commodification of cultural forms" (Harvey 1990, 156). For him,
the spectacle and ephemerality of the postmodern have swallowed up their own causal
reference points to such a degree that the very historical and material perspectives that were
once useful critical tools are becoming less relevant and may simply remain as symbolic acts
of repetition with no actual hold on a “reality” that is increasingly more virtual than real.
As part of the shifting sensibilities presented by the logic of the postmodern
hyperreal—the global networks of advanced communication technologies, AI systems,
excessive information exchange, and the pervasive power of the image—Baudrillard
explores the disappearance of signs and their referents into the vortex of representational
simulation that permeates our consciousness and our knowledge production procedures. In
his foretelling theorizing of postmodern human existence, Baudrillard sees the rapidly
growing dominance of the virtual as a poststructural system of signs in which a phenomenon
is no longer distinct or independent from its endless replication. Leading to an allencompassing liquefying of familiar semiotic relations, layers upon layers of manipulated
mediation distort the original meaning of the source material, generating signifiers that
cannot reliably be connected to stable referents. The signs “identity” and “alterity,” of course,
are not exempt. Baudrillard’s poststructural disappearance guides each of the dissertation’s
chapters toward a potential collapse of many stipulated taxonomies we tend to take for
granted: locality, ethnicity, nation, race, class, gender, and—ultimately—humanity.
This collapse resonates with Jacques Derrida’s understanding of poststructuralist
deconstruction as a form of radical critique not only of linguistic formations but of political
and social systems as well. Paralleling Baudrillard’s disappearance, Derrida’s concept of
différance challenges common, often unnoticed dialectical and hierarchical features that
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direct the production of meaning in any given text. When considering any system of signs,
discursive or otherwise, différance points to both deferral and difference, highlighting the
open-ended voids left by both. Deferral indicates the gap between signifier and signified; the
notion that signs gesture toward but never fully convey the original thing they represent. In
other words, the “essence” remains forever out of reach, mediated by signs whose true
function is to summon more signs in an ongoing attempt to comprehend the true meaning of
the source, which in turn remains further and further behind in endless suspension (1972, 7).
At the same time, meaning making also depends on difference: the separation and
juxtaposition of signs so that their value emerges through dualistic attributes, binary
oppositions, and ordered taxonomies. These structural orders and their inevitable hierarchies,
however, must be understood as arbitrary, just as linguistic signs themselves are arbitrary,
and only represent the signified through agreed-upon connotations and denotations (1972,
10).
A personal, direct encounter with the other, as Emmanuel Levinas suggests, stands in
stark contrast to the various mediated attempts to comprehend alterity. In such undeffered
confrontations, an ethical inquiry arises on a precognitive, prelinguistic level, bringing to the
surface the spontaneous question of relationality and responsibility, and this question is a
most valuable source of self-reflection; a generative interruption in the fundamental
understanding of one’s place and purpose. “The other that is announced,” Levinas ([1947]
1987) writes, “is not unknown but unknowable, refractory to all light.” (43) Any attempt to
“know” otherness, to define, classify, and thus seize it, therefore, is futile, as the light that is
refracted only comes back to the knowing subject, to the self. The questions that baffle the
Solaris scholars remain unanswered, and what further complicates the studying of the odd
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planet is the fact that without exception, all the scientists who travel to it experience severe
psychological breakdowns, and their work is interrupted by intense surges of the most painful
of human emotions: grief, guilt, shame, regret, and suicidal ideations. Insomnia, disturbing
dreams, hallucinations, and eventually terror-inducing visitations from long-dead people
threaten not only the wellbeing of the space station’s crew members, but the very foundations
of scientific inquiry. Gradually, all logic, reason, order, and objectivity deteriorate and lose
their hold. The momentous task of understanding the foreign planet’s behavior becomes
insignificant in the face of the urgent need to resolve the internal conflicts of the tormented
individual self. It is as if while the scientists are conducting their research, examining,
measuring, and assessing this extraterrestrial other, the other in turn is engaged in its own
experiments, gathering and reflecting back the most private information stored in the
astronauts’ psyches.
The dissertation owes much of its overarching inspiration to Levinas, who does not
present an ethical theory, nor point to conclusive answers to the moral dilemma of alterity,
but instead engages in descriptive and interpretative exploration of intersubjective
encounters. “The relationship with the other,” he emphasizes,” “is a relationship with a
Mystery. The other's entire being is constituted by its exteriority, or rather its alterity, for
exteriority is a property of space and leads the subject back to itself” ([1947] 1987, 43).
Taking into account the axiomatic mystery of the Other, and thus the dialogic nature of the
self, the dissertation puts Levinas’s consideration for the ethical implications of alterity in
conversation with Baudrillard’s theory of disappearance to investigate the growing difficulty
in tracing the contours of subjectivity. I look at contemporary representational circuits with
the goal of deconstructing the imagery of “self” and “other” while exploring the speculation,
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ambiguity, and uncertainty as legitimate and necessary components of processes of
knowledge production
The first chapter investigates conceptions of subjectivity in contemporary American
studies literature and its influential origins, creating an exploratory dialogue between several
confluent theories that inform the study of identity and alterity. It examines the Marxist
foundations of historical materialism and puts it in conversation with the poststructural ideas
and methodologies explored by Baudrillard, Derrida, and others who view the concretizing of
the subject in quantifiable terms as theoretically limiting due to the potentially essentializing
tendencies of categorical distinctions. In recent years, many of the leading interventions in
American studies have engaged with questions surrounding the epistemic limitations of
academic practices, and of working in institutions of higher education that operate as
neoliberal businesses. This means that within academia itself, critique of the American
empire and its racialized, gendered, classed social and political orders must navigate
surveilling and censoring from the outside, as well as potential methodological pitfalls from
the inside. In order to avoid the often-undetectable hazards of epistemic violence, repeated
calls are being made in the field urging scholars to seek non-traditional forms of theorizing
and writing, and to vigilantly examine the efficacy of the critical work that is being produced.
My aim in this chapter and indeed in the dissertation as a whole is to identify the challenges
that a contemporary discussion of subjectivity involves, and to track possible routes that
would disengage the discourse from its liberal-humanist confinements and allow it to move
in alternate, perhaps more open, expansive, and dynamic directions.
Considering visual signs, mass media, and the world of entertainment as powerful
tools for identity classification processes, the second chapter presents a close aesthetic
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reading of several sample visual texts in an attempt to understand how images provide a
sense of familiarity with the other, and hence a sense of “knowing,” defining, possessing, and
controlling both identity and alterity. The study looks at popular cultural attempts to contest
and dissolve racial categories by exposing the arbitrariness of visual marks that differentiate
“same” from “different.” This arbitrariness, however, still carries with it the heavy baggage
of history, and the symptoms of social stagnation that traps alterity in a prescribed container.
Select scenes that tackle this debilitating arbitrariness are found in classics such as Woody
Allen’s Annie Hall (1977), Chris Eyre’s Smoke Signals (1998), and Spike Lee’s Bamboozled
(2000), as well as in more contemporary television shows such as Dear White People
(Simien 2017) or Unorthodox (Winger 2020). These productions stand out in their intentional
effort to dismantle essentialist constructs and disrupt contemporary notions of equality that
multicultural discourses propagate while ultimately upholding long-standing racial
hierarchies. Lingering on occurrences that reveal the performative aspects of racial identity in
everyday life, the essay engages with moments that interrogate the promise of racial, ethnic,
and cultural inclusion by unveiling the alleged neutrality of white dominance. Through often
subtle dialogic clashes and challenging exchanges of gazes, the emptiness behind white
hegemony is exposed, allowing for alternate narratives to surface. Reflecting on the
ideological apparatuses of the hyperreal, and the deceptive nature of visual signs, the chapter
questions not only typical racial formations but performances of resistance as well, especially
those that rely too heavily on hidden kernels of essentialism. Is there any possibility, I ask,
for moving beyond (or around) the boundaries of ordered taxonomies? For subverting the
instant stereotyping that visual representation so easily produces, regardless of its declared
intention?
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The third chapter applies Baudrillard’s semiotics of the hyperreal and Levinas’s
ethical inquiry of alterity to an analysis of mass-mediated representations of radical,
threatening alterities. Looking at the ways in which, as Said (1978) argues, the other is
produced by popular cultural knowledge, the chapter develops a comparative semiotic
exploration that situates the COVID-19 global crisis alongside common forms of terrorism,
suggesting that these parallel menacing unknowns evoke a moral question mark that, if
carefully attended to, has the capacity to destabilize the self and offer an opportunity for a
reassessment of a collective understanding of U.S. history, as well as a critical examination
of a presumed human superiority over other species, the planet, and evolutionary processes.
The potential, however, perceived and repeatedly marked as unwanted, is arrested by the
mechanisms of simulation, as images, messages, and signs flood the screens that surround us,
creating a sheltered existence that in itself becomes a mediated, virtual stream rather than a
direct and tangible experience. Within the self-perpetuating systems of signs that circulate in
the hyper-commodified realms of the simulated spectacle, identity and alterity circle around
each other in repetitive, predictable patterns that ultimately rob both of their meaning and
function. Looking for deconstructive openings that question contemporary meaning-making
processes, the analysis aims to regard the invisible, the uncertain, and the erratic not as
opponents but rather as useful elements of both knowing and being. This may lead, as
Baudrillard (1981) suggests, to articulating subjectivity in a manner that “can remove us from
the system’s strategy of simulation and the impasse of death in which it imprisons us” (154).
The fourth installment expands on the thematic thread that runs through the previous
sections, further exploring the notion that mass media, hypervisuality, and digital
technologies alter human perception and affect our understanding of subjecthood. Focusing
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on representations of the COVID-19 pandemic, the work presents a semiotic analysis of
images and processes, drawing parallels between computational procedures and human
cognitive functions. The similarities are growing, I suggest, not only because we program
computers to imitate human activities and behaviors, but because artificial intelligence,
mechanized processes, and algorithms, in turn, gradually program us to operate in
accordance with prescribed, systematized, and highly predictable modes of thinking and
acting. The preconfigured methods of analysis used in designing AI, along with the twodimensional interface, are no longer confined to the hard drive or the screen; they penetrate
the human mind and dictate world views, sensory perception, social interactions, and how we
perceive the self in relation to the other. Even seemingly spontaneous struggles for social
equality, it appears, are subject to the laws of simulation and cash-nexus, and the mediated
mechanisms of the hyperreal quickly devour the contents of radical resistance, absorbing the
new into the spiraling cycles of perpetual regurgitation, leaving a shell of surface-level
activism in the spaces where actual refusal once was.
Looking at discursive articulations that systematically secure identity and alterity in
hierarchical structures that are ordered according to what is deemed central or peripheral, the
fifth and final chapter heeds the call made in recent years in American studies for an
ongoing, self-reflexive, conscious assessment of institutional practices of knowledge
production. The essay points to drawbacks of conventional protocols of research, writing,
and presentation, searching for ways to subvert traditional subject-object power dynamics.
Following Kandice Chuh’s (2018) appeal for seeking out “pedagogies of dissent,” as well as
Baudrillard’s commentary on the university as an institution that produces information but
not necessarily meaningful knowledge, the chapter reflects on the inherent limitations of
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familiar research methodologies in exploring nonhierarchical constructs of self and other,
emphasizing the inherently essentializing and ultimately discriminatory division of subject
and object that is at the core of dialectical thought. As noted by leading scholars in American
studies, the discipline, despite its deep commitment to radical politics, innovative
methodologies, and extra-institutional involvement with struggles for social justice, is still
part of the university, which, as Baudrillard (1981) points out, is now “an uncertain
institution” with an unclear function and ambiguous content (149). Like the university, the
discipline itself is not exempt from the challenges of formulaic modalities of thinking,
researching, and writing, and their intrinsic risk of reinflicting epistemic violence.
In a world governed by the laws of simulation, cash-nexus, and surplus reproduction,
what is the worth and meaning of “knowledge”? Under the phantom aura of insight and
progress, or revolution and dissent, what is it that is actually being produced? Even within
the field of American studies, certain so-called “radical” ideologies that guide the
examination of identity and alterity risk spiraling in predictable orbits. These circular
trajectories often stay locked in their courses by the gravity of familiar categorical constructs
and the so-called objectivity of formal presentation. Awareness of these restrictive patterns, I
suggest, also entails navigating their drawbacks and seeking out alternative epistemologies
that would allow for the other to emerge as an unclassified totality: an expression of a
particular and fundamentally impenetrable mystery that lies beyond the concretizing
constructs and defies the mastery and possession of “knowing.”
*
Like the enormous, incomprehensible displays erected by the plasma that covers
Solaris, the other we set out to study, understand, write about, represent, and defend remains
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a shape-shifting, opaque, impenetrable entity, not only unknown but unknowable. Rather
than trying to resolve the enigma, my intention in this project is to consider this mystery as a
generative philosophical and ethical question mark; a mirror of alterity that reflects back to
the subject the chaos of its own being and the unintelligible disarray of a world in flux.
Perhaps, as Levinas points out, there is good reason to fear alterity as we fear death. After all,
both hold the power to expose the limits of existence and the confines of all that we as a
species venerate: science, order, reason, progress, formal education, technology, the
accumulation of possessions and power, and moral aspirations of justice, liberty, alliances,
and solidarities. In the face of both alterity and death, all of these signifiers deteriorate and
lose their meaning, much like the subject loses its agency and centrality. The work presented
here suggests that this disappearance of meaning might not be a bad thing, as it is from this
vanishing point that unexpected perspectives might emerge, and with them new ways of
knowing, being, and relating

19
Chapter One
On the Enduring Question of Subjectivity

Who is the subject in the current historical moment? How might subjectivity be theorized
within a cultural logic marked by the governing principles of advanced technology and
consumerism, and by what Jean Baudrillard (1981) calls the hyperreal, which he defines as a
state of increasing interdependency between the real and the simulated: “the generation by
models of a real without origin or reality” (1)? Although theories of subjectivity and attempts
to understand otherness evolve over time and generate inquiries that are significantly
different from those that came before them, contemporary articulations of identity and
alterity are part of an ongoing attempt throughout human history to assess and define an
experience of being which, in essence, lies just beyond rational explanations. It is worth
noting that explorations of the nature of the self have preoccupied philosophers, poets, and
cultural critics throughout the ages and across all continents. But when talking about the
designated eras pertinent to this project, broadly termed as both modernity and
postmodernity, the theoretical frame of reference is mostly Eurocentric. From Descartes’s
“cogito ergo sum,” the Enlightenment’s philosophy of mind, or Hegel’s idealism, to
Husserl’s phenomenological intersubjectivity and Sartre’s existentialism in Being and
Nothingness, the subject is generally imagined as an individual entity that is awake,
conscious, and has direct access to reason, logic, and discerning cognitive processes (Zima
2015, 2). This entity is also thought to have agency, the capacity to act independently, and a
desire to express itself, to make itself known.
One of the most challenging concerns for contemporary cultural critics and for
American studies scholars in particular is the lingering view developed by the secular
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humanism of the Enlightenment, according to which the human individual is seen as a
solidified creature of reason and free will who possesses an innate, autonomous moral core.
In terms of historical progressions, the dramatic political, economic, and industrial changes
of late modernity had certainly inspired major revisions of this notion, making it possible to
perceive the individual as a relational being embedded within systems of governance and
social structures that orient, evaluate, and determine its worth. Nevertheless, this relational
paradigm, in many ways, still retains a certain fundamental sense of agency which resides in
the subject: a capacity for logical cognitive processes, conscious choice, and ethical critical
discernment.
With the rise of global capitalism, the acceleration of technological developments, the
decline of the nation state (and with it national identity) and the deterioration of “high”
culture in favor of mass media and excessive consumerism, further reconfigurations
occurred, and the subject is now often theorized as a multi-faceted moving collage of
disjointed, shifting, at times contradictory parts. Much more fluid and variable, this
conception of the subject is dependent on shifting contexts and multiple avenues for
belonging and differentiating. Here, as Gianni Vattimo (2019) argues, Heidegger’s theory of
Being as a phenomenological gesturing (a movement toward something: an object of desire,
the other, the future, death) and Nietzsche’s understanding of the subject as a split presence
in the process of becoming have greatly informed “the normal condition of postmodern
human beings in a world in which the intensification of communication—freed at both the
political and the technical level—paves the road to an effective experience of the individual
as multiplicity” (16). Why then, even in the postmodernist flux that frees the subject from an
imagined ontological, metaphysical solid kernel, do problems related to identity still persist?
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Why is there still such a strong desire—an obsession, really—to define, categorize, study,
and cohere different subjectivities in their varying expressions of relationality?
For Stuart Hall, the obsession with difference holds a great deal of significance
precisely because positivist understandings of identity and alterity have not disappeared into
a more fluid flow that might liberate the individual from the burdens of imposed
classifications. Essentialist constructs remain intact, stubborn and fixed, and despite any new
forms they may take, they still preside over the politics of representation, contributing to
deepening ideological rifts, unequal distribution of resources, the alarming rise of
fundamentalist and nationalist movements, and escalating violent eruptions around the globe.
Referencing Raymond Williams, Hall (1980) argues that the study of subjectivity constructs
must involve recognizing “those patterns of organization, those characteristic forms of
human energy which can be discovered as revealing themselves—in ‘unexpected identities
and correspondences’ as well as in ‘discontinuities of an unexpected kind’—within or
underlying all social practices” (60). As Hall points out, organizing patterns are often
concealed by the mass media, digital technology, and consumer culture, as globalization
holds the potential for dislodging identity from its enduring taxonomies, from the ordering of
groups according to unifying inscriptions, be they skin color, ethnic origin, religious
affiliation, sexual orientation, political leaning, cultural background, or market segments.
Under this futuristic, utopian promise of leveled grounds, however, essentialist
differentiations are still reinforced steadily.
Following Williams, Hall often employs a Marxist perspective to examine the
obscuration of insistent taxonomies of difference, and this focus on historical materialism has
guided much of the work that emerged out of the Birmingham School for Cultural Studies,
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and in turn has also shaped the foundations of American studies scholarship. Further
advancing the Marxist methodologies of the Birmingham School, Frederik Jameson has been
another deeply influential figure in American studies. Like Hall, in Jameson’s 1991
comprehensive volume, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, he sees
the subject as a product of globalized markets that engender classed, gendered, and racialized
populations whose positioning adheres to the familiar hierarchical orders of past European
colonialism. Examined through this lens, postmodern identities still derive their coherence
from the lingering legacies of Eurocentric power structures, now replaced with U.S.dominant neoimperialism.
Jameson views postmodernism as tightly wound with late capitalism, much in the
same way that modernism emerged out of the Industrial Revolution, Fordism, and the spread
of traditional monopoly capitalism. The aesthetic trajectories of modernism or
postmodernism, however, are relevant to Jameson only to the extent that they advance the
discussion of both as modes of production (1991, 406), and although the “hyperspace” of
postmodernism does present a fascinating, “strange new landscape” (xxi), it is not too strange
to be tackled by the Marxist dialectical approach. To understand postmodernism, Jameson
writes, “the dialectic requires us to hold equally to a positive or ‘progressive’ evaluation of
its emergence, as Marx did for the world market as the horizon of national economics, or as
Lenin did for the older imperialist global network” (50). Following this logic in all his
subsequent works, Jameson, who has been vastly influential in American studies, favors a
politically progressive, reactionary focus on material conditions and observable practices
over the concern with the phenomenology of lived experiences, the parts of those experiences
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that may evade logic and methodological expression, and speculation as a form of critical
inquiry.
Similar to Jameson and to Hall, David Harvey sees subjectivity as relational and
conditional, and yet tightly bound to the postmodern reorganization of global capitalism and
to shifts in the realms of the material and the economic. For Harvey too, the aesthetics of
postmodernism are worth exploring for their complex, dynamic, seductive nature, but they
too are cohered as expressions of the capitalist logic that is still the engine that drives
postmodernity, thus rendering it a direct continuation of modernity’s mass production,
industrialization, and urbanization. Elaborating on Marx’s idea of the time-space
compression, Harvey (1990) emphasizes the changes in perception brought about by
capitalism. After several identifiable key developments in the history of capitalism, he
suggests, the postmodern era has introduced a novel aspect of the time-space compression, so
that the concept no longer applies (as in Marx’s original analysis) to the objective
acceleration of manufacturing time and the far-reaching, rapid transportation of goods, but
involves “processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are
forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves”
(240). In Harvey’s view, postmodernism signals a crisis in representation, a marked shift
from the representational conventions of modernism, and of course from modernism’s roots
in the Renaissance.
According to Paul Virilio ([1980] 1991), however, the shifting modalities of
representation (and of human cognition) produced by time-space compression do not
necessarily denote “crisis.” The hidden, yet perhaps more intriguing element in what we still
conceptualize in terms of capital, wealth, and power, as Virilio notes, is velocity. In this
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view, forces outside human control emerge as determining factors in recent transformations
of social and political structures. How we experience events, then, is a result of existing in “a
space which is speed-space,” where both our environment and our sense of time are
manipulated by electronic transmissions and cybernetic machines, and where therefore “man
is present in this sort of time not via his physical presence, but via programming” (71).
Examining historical eras from a postmarxist perspective, Virilio sees the acceleration that
characterizes postmodernism as motivated not only by capitalist expansions but by the
evolution of warfare. The technological advances of the present, in other words, are the
byproducts of the military industry, where the most daring innovations are developed, and
where the greatest scientists and high-tech experts are employed. But the accelerated
processes and novelties of the war machine (exemplified best, perhaps, by the atomic bomb)
acquire a life of their own, a logic of their own, and a particular aesthetics, which Virilio
refers to as the “aesthetics of disappearance.”
Where does the rushing forward of technological advances leave the subject? How do
we proceed to reflect on what it means to be human and to exist in relation to other, different,
foreign, unknown and unknowable humans? Do the historical formations of logic,
subjectivity, and identity still stand the test of time? Like it or not, Virilio ([1980] 1991)
argues, cultural criticism in its various forms must accept “the fait accompli of technology”
(42). All contemporary cultural productions are embedded in a mechanized, digitized,
screened matrix that has long ago detached itself from social, economic, or political
preconceptions, from what we want to call “reason,” “truth,” or even “embodiment” and
“awareness.” We rely so heavily on artificial mediation that subjectivity itself, at least at it
was once imagined, is disappearing from the scene, leaving an absence in the place where
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wakeful presence once was (or was thought to be), and it is this representational specter of
what once was—the ephemeral remainder—that demands grappling with.
Both Harvey and Jameson consider the postmodern time-space compression and the
departure of representational practices from their origins as still dialectical, at least in terms
of historical timeline formations. To evaluate their analysis now, three decades later, is to
realize the possibility that new concerns have tipped some scales. In the midst of an
unprecedented global pandemic, and under the pressure of fast-approaching ecological crises,
between the notion expressed by robotics specialists that singularity is unavoidable (or has
already happened) and articulated by geologists in regard to the end of the Anthropocene, the
problem of history recedes in the face of the rising question of futurity. As Natalie Melas
(2020) reflects, “epochality, not just as a cognitive or epistemological frame, but as
experience, drops away, leaving me with a dissociated sense of obsolescence, anachronism
severed from historicity” (Post45, “1990 at 30”). Reexamining the postmodern built
environments (shopping malls, megaplex movie theaters, Las Vegas) and temporal
experiences (air travel, instant communication, microwave cooking) that featured so
prominently in the works of Jameson and Harvey, it is possible that the historical materialist,
subject-centered approach to theorizing space is changing its meaning, as home
entertainment, internet shopping, virtual conferencing, and instant messaging render both
space and time irrelevant.
More aware of the deteriorating hold of epochality, Jean Baudrillard, a contemporary
and critical interlocuter of Virilio’s, turns his attention toward the future, and considers the
obsolete as a generative opening for critical discourse. Parting ways with the strict historical
materialism of Marxism, he takes on a theoretical position that is aligned with the
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poststructural leanings of Jean-François Lyotard and the legacy of Jacques Derrida, Roland
Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Georges Bataille, among others who may be labeled as
postmarxist. In Lyotard’s ([1979] 1984) view, for example, the mechanisms of
postmodernism, grounded as they are in mass media, rapidly evolving technology, and global
consumer culture, diminish the value of historical metanarratives and, in fact, reconfigure the
structures of the social and the political. As a result, he suggests that both the conservative
and progressive approaches are equally outdated, as both regurgitate old models of
diagnosing, assessing, and analyzing problems that emerge from a different kind of logic. “I
will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a
metadiscourse,” he writes, “making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working
subject, or the creation of wealth.” The postmodern, accordingly, can be viewed as
“incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiii–xxiv). For Lyotard, the aesthetics of the
fragmented, frantic, dynamic, recycled, overloaded hyperreal hold the key to an
understanding of this incredulity and its manifestations in the realms of the arts, language,
knowledge, science, politics, and, ultimately, human consciousness. Pre-established rules
lose their functional soundness here, and the familiar methods of discerning, categorizing,
and determining judgment are being called into question. Instead of turning again and again
to these methods, Lyotard suggests, we might want to consider adapting to the deceiving,
insubstantial, unstable nature of simulation, virtual representation, and what artist Nam June
Paik termed the “electronic superhighway.”

27

Figure 1. Electronic Superhighway: Continental U.S., Alaska, Hawaii. Video installation by
Nam June Paik, 1995.
If for Harvey (1990), postmodern developments are directly related to “the more
flexible motion of capital [which] emphasizes the new, the fleeting, the ephemeral, the
fugitive, and the contingent in modern life, rather than the more solid values implanted under
Fordism” (171), for Baudrillard (1981), in the postmodern hyperreal, “it is the whole
traditional world of causality that is in question: the perspectival, determinist mode, the
‘active,’ critical mode, the analytical mode—the distinction between cause and effect,
between active and passive, between subject and object, between the end and its means” (30).
Baudrillard’s radical interpretation, therefore, expands the connections drawn by Harvey and
Jameson between “the relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism” and the “fleeting
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qualities of a postmodernist aesthetic that celebrates difference, ephemerality, spectacle,
fashion, and the commodification of cultural forms” (Harvey 1990, 156). The poststructural
approach, then, sees what Baudrillard calls the hyperreal as a postindustrial or even
postcapitalist development: an independent system in which the practices of simulation
create their own logic, apart from the motives and agendas of economic systems.
Within American studies, it seems that modernist notions of the individual still
underlie much of the recent calls for heightened awareness of discursive pitfalls of pinning
subjectivities to generalizing taxonomies of ethnic, economic, and cultural markings.
Aesthetic inquiry, phenomenology, and the elevation of non-normative expressions of
identity formation are all recent efforts to disengage the discipline—and the Humanities as a
whole—from its intricate ties with Eurocentric liberalism and the neocolonial agendas of
representation that perpetuate the marginalization and silencing of certain populations.
Nevertheless, the lingering view of the subject as an embodied, rational being of agency and
reason presents an ongoing challenge. Aesthetic inquiry, as Kandice Chuh (2019) argues,
allows for a shift away from the rigid dogmas of traditional paradigms of subjecthood,
making room for different epistemologies that favor modes of knowing and being that defy
the prescribed constructs of secular humanism (26). The coherent, stable, self-contained,
individualized subject that has been articulated in modernist literature and philosophy, Chuh
argues, has served as a model on which to formulate the academic study of identity and
alterity, the various disciplines of the Humanities, and society as a whole. This liberal
humanist conception of the subject has been (and still is) so instrumental in shaping social
structures, that we are often blind to the ways in which it eliminates other ways of engaging
with self-other dynamics, ways that are more aligned with the postmodern, poststructural
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dispelling of agency, consistency, uniformity, and rationality. In her close readings of
experimental, marginalized, “ethnic” literature, Chuh emphasizes “poiesis in critique” as a
way “to amplify, by routing through aesthetics, the presence and potential of alternatives to
liberal humanist onto-epistemologies that give rise to the narrow definition of the human
around which the modern condition has been organized” (3). The liberal humanist notion of
the subject as a rational, independent individual can be seen as a guiding force in
contemporary social and political orders, and to a large extent is the root of neocolonial
global power configurations and the persistent inequalities of race, gender, class, sexual
orientation, or ability. To counter these effects, throughout her book Chuh encourages
scholars in the humanities to turn to “illiberal” ways of conceptualizing identity and move
towards “subjectless” modalities of knowledge production.
Similarly, in his 2012 The Reorder of Things, Roderick Ferguson examines the
“insurgent articulation of difference” (27) that began with the student movements in the
1960s, emphasizing the subsequent institutionalization and containment of the radical
resistance with which these movements attempted to destabilize racialized structures of
power in the U.S. Ferguson’s study of the processes of co-opting and disarming the struggle
for equality, which echoes Jodi Melamed’s concerns about the academy in her 2011
Represent and Destroy, sets up a dialectical juxtaposition between the “politics of
absorption” (27) and the potential revolution staged by the student movements over half a
century ago. Like Melamed, Ferguson argues that the university’s administrative power “had
to affirm difference to demonstrate institutional protocols and progress” (214) by establishing
ethnic, race, gender, and sexuality studies departments and curricula. Through broadening the
ranges of representation, the budding revolution was curbed and absorbed into the normative
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discourses of higher education, serving, in the end, not the newly represented minorities, but
the neoliberal agendas of the institution, which could now capitalize on its revised policies of
diversity and affirmative action. This is the essence of identity politics in higher education,
which is still a source of potential epistemic violence.
The absorptive suppression of the attempted insurgence, writes Ferguson, “divulges a
story not captured in the taken-for-granted analytics of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard,
and their descendants,” as “typical poststructuralist and postmarxist theorizations leave out
the student movements that yielded the interdisciplinary fields'' (2012, 5). Such a declaration,
I suggest, is worth reevaluating. Baudrillard (1981), for one, credits the French student
uprising of 1968 for pointing to the impasses of knowledge, and for presenting an “explosive
contradiction of knowledge and power in the university, and, at the same time, through
symbolic (rather than political) contagion in the whole institutional and social order.” Such
an eruption, as Baudrillard sees it, was in fact bound to quickly lose its meaning in the socalled “victories” it had achieved in terms of representation and inclusion. Furthermore, our
conception of the powers that are responsible for the suppression may require a
reexamination, since “power itself, after knowledge, has taken off, has become
ungraspable—has dispossessed itself” (149). In the long-term operations of the system in all
its institutional iterations, Baudrillard suggests, both knowledge production and power
structures are becoming more and more obscured by the methods, procedures, and formulas
that keep them in motion and by the perpetual discursive practices that simulate their
purported function to the point where their actual meaning can no longer be determined with
effectual measures of coherence and clarity.

31
Because the title of Ferguson’s The Reorder of Things is a direct reference to Michel
Foucault’s 1966 The Order of Things, it is also worthwhile to revisit Foucault’s original
contribution. The analysis of the meaning of knowledge in Foucault’s work focuses on
representation, and the centrality of representation in practices of knowledge production. As
means of representing and decoding information change over time, world views and our
understanding of what “truth” is consequently change as well over the course of history. If
different time periods can be characterized by the different modes of learning and presenting
knowledge exercised in the sciences and in higher learning in general, then an inquiry into
what distinguishes the contemporary episteme (the rules and methods that govern a system of
knowledge production) may reveal the limitations and blind spots of current representational
practices. For Foucault, historical processes of change in epistemes occur in incremental
shifts over time, and in the big picture of these gradual transitions, single events such as the
student movements of the 1960s and 1970s do not hold up as a significant source that merits
continuous attention. In fact, in his view, to seek an “origin” to courses of development is a
futile endeavor, a mark of the refusal to come to terms with the philosophical paradox of an
evolving culture that generates “knowledge” in excess while draining actual knowing of its
ability to provide meaning. In a historical period marked by the rise of the machine, the
multiplicative simulation technologies through which signs keep slipping away from their
referents, and the exponentially growing circulation of information, the subject itself
becomes less and less substantial, the imaginary autonomous command invested in the term
“Man” by the Enlightenment already dissolving into an inane state of indeterminacy. As
Foucault writes, “it is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by
man’s disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a
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lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space
in which it is once more possible to think” (342). Disappearance, in other words, could be a
generative place of speculation, creative analysis, and aesthetic inquiry, rather than a dead
end from which we must escape by rematerializing subjectivity in an attempt to find our
origin stories and thus make sense of our place in the empirical world.
Treating the logic of disappearance as a generative source of new epistemologies
seems to fit with several self-reflexive trends in contemporary American studies. In the 2013
issue of the American Quarterly, for example, Matthew Frye Jacobson’s presidential address
at the ASA annual meeting calls for a deeper and more determined analysis of U.S. imperial
legacies, both historic and current, both domestic and foreign. By tracing the course of the
American empire, he argues, scholars resist the oppressive, nationalistic mechanisms of
knowledge production, while working towards an applicable critique of current
manifestations of U.S. military might and economic power, which must be examined in
conjunction with classed, racialized, and gendered inequalities. Jacobson is particularly
interested in institutionalized disparities in the world of higher education, and American
studies, he notes, “is especially well placed to document, recount, and situate the history of
the institution, from the first land grants and the professionalization of the disciplines to the
current trend of corporatization that menaces the university’s core mission” (“Where We
Stand: US Empire at Street Level and in the Archive,” June 2013,) To honestly assess
institutional and disciplinary practices, however, it might also be useful to reexamine the
definition of “knowledge” and to account for the ways in which the age of information drains
the term from its original signifying powers. When Jacobson stresses that “students are not
clients or customers and ideas are not commodities; knowledge cannot be manufactured,
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packaged, and distributed as if it were a snack food” 287), he is in effect calling attention to
the fact that, despite our best efforts, that is in fact a fairly accurate description of the state of
higher education today. In this call to action, recommitting to the cause of public education in
the face of ongoing budget cuts, administrative reorganizations, and the shift toward the
business model must connect the discursive denunciations of the American Empire with
“street level” solidarities aiming to foster egalitarianism and social justice. To resist the
corporate practices of the university, then, means to insist on returning to the “core mission”
of offering equal and affordable access to quality education and continually striving to
promote democratic practices, civic freedoms, and cross-cultural alliances. From the
radically poststructural viewpoint of thinkers like Foucault or Baudrillard, however, the
question must be asked: Is that even possible? Have not those freedoms and alliances that we
advocate themselves turned into empty assertions of outdated solutions? Do they not
mechanically replicate the student resistance movements of the 1960s or other glorified
historical moments of uprising that have since been emptied of their meaning and exhausted
by cycles of repeated simulation?
In 2015, Lisa Duggan continues along the same lines of scholarly activism when she
justifies the ASA’s vote for an academic boycott of Israel as part of the many avenues taken
in American studies to intellectually condemn settler colonialism, imperial violence, and
severely uneven political power dynamics, siding unapologetically with “those without
power.” American studies scholars are, Duggan declares, “prison abolitionists, transgender
warriors, Native and indigenous activists, union organizers, critical curators, artists,
musicians and performers, and more, as well as scholars” (“The Fun and the Fury of
Transforming American Studies,” American Quarterly, June 2015, 291). Work done in the
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field, therefore, requires not only a probing inquiry into the mechanisms of empire, but a
committed engagement with social movements; a “revolutionary consciousness,” which she
admits might sound outmoded and prescriptive, and yet, precisely because it points to the
world of phenomenology, feeling, and aspiration, it is an important component of the general
position American studies scholarship must take, one that understands the conditions of life
under the current power structures as lacking, as not enough, as urgently needing
improvement.
Further pursuing this urging for action, accountability, and self-reflexivity, Kandice
Chuh’s 2018 presidential address encourages members of the American Studies Association
to delve deeper into an investigation of the liberal and neoliberal ideological foundations on
which academic institutions in the U.S. were built. These foundations, as she demonstrates in
her work, still dictate modes of researching, teaching, and writing, and are the guiding forces
behind recent attacks on and restrictions of academic freedoms. The discipline must fight the
suppression of scholarly work that critiques the U.S. as an empire and must keep tackling the
hierarchical structure of the empire, namely racism, settler colonialism, and the latecapitalistic exploitation of people, cultures, natural resources, landscapes, and ecosystems.
To counter the limitation of the nationalist, neoliberal agendas, Chuh advocates “a pedagogy
of dissent”: “an organized approach to un/learning grounded in the world and founded in
generosity and compassion, understood to be essential to social transformation” (“Pedagogies
of Dissent,” American Quarterly, June 2018, 168). Here again is an attempt to disengage
from the nationalistic, neoliberal strategies of institutional management while holding on to a
familiar view of the subject—especially the educator—as capable of grand feats of social
change.
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However, as María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo (2003) demonstrates, there is a certain
risk in using the rhetoric of dissent and revolution. Saldaña-Portillo’s work reveals the
striking similarities between the language used by modern revolutionary movements and the
Enlightenment-informed expressions of a model subjectivity that are grounded in
Eurocentric, normative theories of individual as well as collective agency and of Man’s
transformational potential. The language of social change itself might construct the liberation
of the subaltern in familiar epistemologies that are gendered and racialized. In its sweeping
assertions of opposition, such rhetoric can be dismissive of nuance and particularities. Taking
up the secular humanistic notions of Man’s central place in the universe as a generator of
change, many resistance movements passionately adopt, in effect, the very language of the
oppressive system they attempt to reject. The paradigms of activism, transformation, and
transcendence, Saldaña-Portillo suggests, may have the ironic effect of silencing and
objectifying the very people the revolution sets out to liberate, fortifying, paradoxically, the
exploitative political-economic agenda of neocolonial capitalism.
The mission of reconfiguring national and imperial agendas while actively supporting
the struggles of social movements places American studies scholars in a delicate place that
can be traced back to Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) problematizing of institutional scholarship
engaged in postcolonial critique. Spivak’s main concern in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” is
that as academics working in Europe and North America attempt to give voice to and
“empower” previously or presently marginalized peoples, they in fact, by virtue of working
within prescribed theoretical frameworks and representational methods, reaffirm Eurocentric
legacies of political, cultural, and epistemological domination. Spivak points to the ways in
which progressive theory and criticism are entrenched in the same rhetorical protocols of the
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very imperialist regimes they aim to unsettle. The resulting discourse, more often than not,
aims to know, classify, analyze, and ultimately possess subaltern populations by confiscating
and appropriating their historically silenced voices. Discouraging scholars from speaking in
the name of the subaltern, Spivak suggests making more room for the omissions and lacunas:
the empty spaces created by systemic oppression, exploitation, and dispossession. Rather
than seeking to fill them up, or to recover and rescue missing voices, she argues, institutional
academic discourse should engage with the impossibility of representation, treating it as a
generative, critical tool in a process of unraveling the dynamics, conditions, and mechanisms
of representational practices.
The fine line between the desire to give the silenced subaltern a voice and the
possible epistemic violence that doing so entails is also at the core of Wendy S. Hesford’s
2006 Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms, in which she
interrogates the language and visual signs used by international human rights organizations to
advance justice and equality. The verbal and visual representations that advocate the
empowering of “those without power” often repeat—albeit unintentionally—Eurocentric
political, cultural, and moral definitions of subjecthood, thus, in effect, maintaining the
unbalanced relations between “self” and “other.” In this context, provocative images and
descriptions of injustice and suffering position those who do have power in the role of
superior benefactors who are called to rescue, liberate, and redeem the less fortunate. Here
again, attempts to study, know, and advocate for the other are problematic because they risk
the ironic rhetorical locking of that other inside an eternal victimizing cage while
inadvertently perpetuating hegemonies grounded in race, class, and gender hierarchies.
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Similarly questioning not just the language but also the imagery of a “revolutionary
consciousness,” Leigh Raiford’s (2011) work examines the ways in which American social
movements have used photography in particular as a tool of resistance. Her analysis shows
how iconic images that were circulated widely with the intention to promote social justice
“become integral to processes of national, racial, and political identity formation” (3). On the
one hand, visual articulations of resistance were successfully deployed by early twentiethcentury anti-lynching campaigns, the civil rights, and the black power movements to
mobilize participants, publicize goals, narrate histories, and construct visible identities for
marginalized groups marked for racial exclusion. Visual self-representation “offered activists
a seemingly democratic and versatile medium through which they could visually reference,
reframe, or reject dominant political categories” (9). And yet, Raiford warns, we must be
careful not to glorify this historical reclamation of black identity, because much like words
and perhaps even more so, images are prone to capturing and fixing identities, underpinning
alterities, and holding subjectivities captive in designated ontological taxonomies. This
warning resonates with Spivak’s cautioning against idealizing the subaltern’s missing voice
as the ultimate antidote to Eurocentric articulations of subjectivity, especially those that,
against best intentions, essentialize the other as Other while appropriating its alterity in the
name of resistance and progress.
If poststructuralism can be used to destabilize the potentially essentializing qualities
of visual and rhetorical representation, it also raises a legitimate theoretical concern in regard
to the epistemic dissolving of the subject, and to the presumably dead end of disappearance,
erasure, and thus the potential further silencing of those without power. In response to
theories that were getting too abstract, too far away from “real” life, and to the radical,
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nihilistic threat of complete eradication of human agency, the centering of affect, according
to Patricia Clough (2010), proposed “a substantive shift in that it returned critical theory and
cultural criticism to bodily matter, which had been treated in terms of various
constructionisms under the influence of poststructuralism and deconstruction” (206). Like
phenomenology before it, affect theory is an attempt to revive the dynamism of the human as
an embodied, autonomous, active agent in a concretely material world, thereby countering
the poststructural disappearance of the subject into hyperreal, hologramic dimensions.
Nevertheless, it is precisely the disintegration of the individual subject into a
fragmented, origin-less configuration that might present a fissure from which to disengage
both “self” and “other” from their conventional, dichotomized understandings. Contrary to
historical materialism, phenomenology, and affect theory, which retains the understanding of
identity and alterity as intricately tied to processes of production and consumption, and to
observable political power structures, Foucault and Baudrillard argue that the postmodern
hyperreal presents a new logic based on the notion of the void, of abstraction, and of
disappearance. Within this void, the individual subject, whether self or other, loses its
substantiating qualities to an accelerated process of immaterializing. Advanced technology,
social homogenization, alienation, and the commodification of everything (not only all
material objects but also ideologies, moral principles, and identities) lead to reification, a
Marxist term that refers to the conflation of subject and object in the context of commodity
fetishism, where commercial items become infused with non-functional qualities such as
success, status, happiness, comfort, etc., while ideas, concepts, and values are reduced to
things that can be bought and sold in the ever-circling marketplace of signs. The human
subject too, is accordingly reified, objectified and abstracted, turned into a flattened image
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laden with identity demarcations that have no clear origin. Within the current system of
representation, as markets of exchange, mass media, and the virtual realms govern all forms
of social relations, individuality, self-determination, and the presumed human potential to
produce change no longer hold much validity. Instead of insisting on a return to an origin
narrative that might procure a redemptive reassertion of human potentiality, poststructuralism
suggests, it is perhaps more useful to confront disappearance on its own terms, as an
unresolvable baffling paradox, seeking not to restore a presumed fullness of existence but
creatively exploring the possibilities that lie in the nothingness of being.
As Foucault, Baudrillard, and Virilio suggest, the ways in which advanced technology
is evolving in conjunction with, and yet apart from, the familiar structures of political
governance and social ordering signals a different kind of logic within which to reconfigure
specific politics of relations and, on a larger scale, the human species’ place in the world.
Deeply penetrating every aspect of human life, technology operates its own mechanism of
deference, where all interactions are designed to mediate and suspend, and where the
disappearance of the “real” leaves the subject in a state of passive anticipation rather than
active participation. The electronic circuits of the digital and virtual realms dictate and
organize our workplaces, social interactions, and daily experiences. Our very identity, John
Cheney-Lippold (2017) argues, is constructed by machines. From the basic level of physical
existence (health, fitness, family planning, the diagnosis and treatment of disease) to
metaphysical practices (meditation, yoga, bible study, or higher education), everything we do
depends on networks of algorithms and the high-definition allure of simulation. Complex
computations determine the information we get, the connections we maintain, the purchases
we make, the things we consume, and the political, social, or environmental activism we may
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choose to participate in (24). In truth, machines are in charge of both the functions and
perceptions that define who we are and how we see ourselves, others, and what we call
reality.
In Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard suggests that “a revolution has put an
end to this ‘classical’ economics of value, a revolution of value itself, which carries value
beyond its commodity form into its radical form… beyond all reference to a real” (1993, 7).
Traditional capitalist dynamics of value exchange, therefore, no longer hold their original
meaning, because it is the symbolic that has come to dominate human perception in all areas
of life, from material products and services to concepts, ideologies, and representational
formations. The one thing, however, that stands outside the circuits of symbolic value
exchange is death. Death, Baudrillard demonstrates, is completely abstracted, and while in
the past it did have a place in religious, political, or artistic systems of signs, today its only
symbolic value is that of the absolute negation of life. As the totality of the negative, the role
death has acquired within the abstracted signification circuits of the hyperreal is that of the
ultimate Other—an alterity that must be fiercely rejected, denounced, and condemned.
We are very much concerned with distorted representation and exclusion practices of
the racialized other, the poor, the mentally or physically handicapped, queer and
transgendered people, women, immigrants, indigenous people, the elderly, or the
incarcerated. But “at the very core of the ‘rationality’ of our culture,” writes Baudrillard, “is
an exclusion that precedes every other… preceding all these and serving as their model: the
exclusion of the dead and of death” (1993, 126). Before the human other, or perhaps
embedded in it, death is the primary negation of the self that in our times is an unspeakable
abomination that holds no symbolic value. Examining this fundamental exclusion of death is
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an apt example of how poststructural methodologies can shed light on cultural workings that
tend to remain hidden and yet have a profound effect on our daily lives.
According to poststructuralist logic, sign systems can be defined largely by what they
abhor and banish. Foucault (1966), for example, argues that a society that is obsessed with
expelling the mentally ill, the criminal, or the sexually “different” is, in fact, plagued with
precisely the same madness, moral degradation, and perversion it imagines and condemns in
the exorcised populations. For Baudrillard (1993), it is the adamant rejection of death that
signifies a dying society: a culture of disappearance where all meaning, including that of
human subjectivity, is being lost in the transference to the virtual realms. A global pandemic,
for example, is perceived and represented as a menacing threat that must be avoided at all
costs, at the same time that the physical death of thousands is obscured by graphs, diagrams,
daily and hourly reports, expert predictions and calculated projections. The methodical
tracking of the virus gives the illusion of reason, containment, and control, while the actual
dead are quickly and easily “thrown out of the group’s symbolic circulation. They are no
longer beings with a role to play” (126). Which brings up the question, Are we? What is the
role of the living in the fragmented, pixelated, remote-controlled world of the hyperreal?
With our bodies vulnerable, helpless, and confined, our minds roam free in the alternate
universes of cyberspace. All aspects of our identities are being uploaded, processed, and
backed up by our various electronic devices. We carefully watch the incessant newsfeeds that
sensationalize mortality rates, death curves, and infection statistics, mostly unaware of the
power of simulation to produce an illusion of reality where the visual models of scientific
assessments reassure the living that someone is in charge, that measures are being taken to
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stop the spread of the virus, that a vaccine is on its way, and that soon this will all end and we
will get back to “normal.” The next question, naturally, would be, What is “normal”?
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Chapter Two
Mass Media and Mass Alterity

The obsession with seeing difference seems to be a human trait that has long ago lost its
practical purpose. As vision has evolved to form the dominant sense that dictates perception,
representational imagery takes precedence over any other mode of understanding, knowing,
and experiencing. The unbalanced reliance on the visual generates systems of classification
that are securely fortified by the media: by simulations and reproductions that magnify
differences and tightly connect the signifier “identity” with surface visual referents that are
easily coded and recoded in the symbolic spheres of the postmodern hyperreal. The
unprecedented domination of the spectacle arises through mechanisms of visual production
that themselves operate as a directive force, so that the image as well as the medium conjoin
to guide viewers’ eyes and cognitive processes, to shape mass perceptions, and to uphold
hierarchical categories of difference. Through images that aestheticize—and thus
legitimize—a particular point of view, visual cultural production reflects at the same time
that it constructs a racially-organized “reality.” And unlike other historical systems of
domination (dictatorships, theocracy, colonialism, slavery), visual media has transcended the
need for coercion and physical force. On the contrary: simulation apparatuses work by
attraction and seduction, by offering viewers constant stimulation and tantalizing glimpses of
appealing fantastical possibilities while always remaining efficiently veiled as either
objective information or harmless entertainment. Not a particular person or government, the
true power of our times is the media itself, which, as Jean Baudrillard (1981) suggests,
operates outside the political, in the pure realm of circulation, where all ideologies operate
under the supreme laws of supply and demand. Like any other commodity, any agenda of the
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social or the political “is dependent on mass production and consumption. Its spark has
disappeared, only the fiction of a political universe remains” (26). By extinguishing all
sparks, the media disarms both subjects and objects so that a mesmerized, subdued
tranquility is achieved as the desired status quo, flattening all oppositional currents onto the
smooth surface of the screen.
Within the flatlands of the hyperreal, however, identity and alterity still have their
roots in the social and racial hierarchies of past empires. The racialized other, it appears, is an
inescapable product of European colonialism, and remains an organizing sign that can be
deconstructed but not dissolved. It is a convenient conceptual habit, as Baudrillard (1993)
argues, to cling to the definition of the other as either the dreaded enemy or the oppressed
victim (88). As cultural signs that are embedded in colonial legacies, both understandings of
the other do not contest racial formations but rather reinforce them. Mediated representations
make that especially clear by focusing on seeing difference rather than contending with an
alterity as that which could never be represented, never fully understood. This chapter
focuses on examples of popular cultural attempts to question and dissolve racial divides.
Many such contesting representations point to the superficiality of visual marks that sustain
social hierarchies as well as to the cultural stagnation that insists on containing alterity and
repressing its inquisitive potential. Comparing and contrasting classics such as Spike Lee’s
Bamboozled (2000), Chris Eyre’s Smoke Signals (1998), and Woody Allen’s Annie Hall
(1977) with contemporary productions like Justin Simien’s Dear White People (2015) and
Anna Winger’s Unorthodox (2020), the analysis highlights the performative reframing of
racial identity constructs and the destabilizing of multicultural discourses that ironically work
to uphold long-standing racial categories. Examining cinematic moments that challenge
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neoliberal notions of racial, ethnic, and cultural inclusion, I consider the effectiveness of such
contestations in light of the deceptive nature of visual signs, which inadvertently often
reinforce positivist constructs and allow the viewer to “know” otherness and thus appropriate
and disarm it.
In her analysis of the conjunctions between cinema and anthropology, Fatimah Rony
(1996) points to late 19th and early 20th century studies of Indigenous peoples as the origin of
European science’s obsession with racial variance as pathology. “Discoveries,” she suggests,
hinged on “the desire to see ‘difference,’ and to establish iconographies for recognizing
difference instantaneously” (32). Anthropologists would present their findings in public
science fairs in big cities around Europe and North America, and “native villages” were
recreated for the enjoyment of visitors. In these prototypical villages, Indigenous specimens
were performing their “primitive” daily lives for “civilized” white patrons as part of an
educational experience that also functioned, clearly, as pure entertainment. But what the
curious patrons occasionally learned is that while they were unabashedly watching the bodies
and faces of the “savages,” those very bodies and faces watched them back, in an exchange
that was charged with the potential to radically reverse the presumed power structure. The
“savages” too had eyes, and innate curiosity, and so, “Visitors to the fair were meant to ‘see
anthropology,’ but what they were seeing was not often comfortable: the gaze returned” (41).
And, as Rony speculates, “Perhaps with a third eye, the performers at the fair were aware of
being viewed as objects of ethnographic spectacle, and resisted this status by subverting the
illusion of scientific voyeurism” (41). This returned gaze, according to Rony, can be not only
uncomfortable, but actually potentially threatening to the seemingly immune positioning of
whiteness at the top of the social-racial order.
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The fundamental nature of anthropological studies aimed at classifying various
groups of people, as Baudrillard (1981) points out, is to obscure the very human they attempt
to comprehend. “The logical evolution of science is to distance itself increasingly from its
object, until it dispenses with it entirely: its autonomy is only rendered even more fantastic—
it attains its pure form” (7−8). “Savages,” therefore, are doomed by science to forever
embody primitivism. They are “frozen, cryogenized, sterilized, protected to death, they have
become referential simulacra, and science itself has become pure simulation” (8). The openair educational fairs of past centuries, contemporary indoor museums, and exponentially
growing digital repositories all ensure the continued fossilization of Indians. The idea that
ethnography’s preoccupation with the distilment of alterity only applies to certain
unfortunate groups and not others, however, is a misguided presumption. It is naive, says
Baudrillard, to assume that the Third World and oppressed non-white minorities are the sole
victims of ethnography’s violence; its hijacking of the real, its hallucination of truth. We
have all become specimens, obliged to perform an assigned role, compelled to operate “under
the sign of dead differences, and of the resurrection of differences” (8). Difference, in
Baudrillard’s view, should not be eliminated, for its function as a disruptive force is crucial.
The oppositional gaze of the savage is a potent mirror held before science, there to reveal the
compartmentalization of the scientific object as “equal to the confinement of the mad and the
dead” (8). Mirroring, mimicking, reversing—these are the poststructural functions that push
against the disappearance of the real. It is not necessarily a way out, but it is a conscious
illumination of the violence inherent in knowledge production.
Alterity hinges on the element of surprise lurking in the returned gaze, in the bold
resistance to being known, and in the unsettling disruption in a relational system in which
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subjectivity, identity, and performance are prescribed by a strict social hierarchy. Writing
about the act of looking as a charged reclamation of power, bell hooks (1992) suggests that
the long history of black people’s positioning as the other on display, and the repressive
mechanisms that regulated, forbade, and punished (at times by death) the returned gaze, had
produced an overwhelming, rebellious need to look, to stare back. “Even in the worst
circumstances of oppression, the ability to manipulate one’s gaze in the face of structures of
domination that would contain it, opens up the possibility of agency” (16). The oppositional
gaze, which was often the only tool of resistance available to the subjugated subaltern, goes
mostly unnoticed in historical records, but deserves critical recognition as the one consistent
key intervention that stripped whiteness of its assumed neutrality, exposing it as an
artificiality, a blind and blinding hegemonic construction.
From its very early days, cinema, much like European and later American
imperialism, has assumed whiteness to be the default standard from which other races then
deviate. While obviously holding a position of power at the top of the racial hierarchy that
dictates social ordering, in the Eurocentric representational imagination “white” does not
indicate a racial group, a distinct culture, or even a skin tone. On the contrary; it is in fact the
blank, unmarked category that indicates humanity in a most nondescript way, and under this
general blankness people are distinguished through their personal traits and individual
character. This perception of whiteness as norm, as a universal model for humanity, is in fact
precisely what enables white hegemony to maintain itself in a seemingly natural
configuration. As Richard Dyer (1997) argues, white people do not see themselves as
superior; they are convinced that they are “just people,” and it is because they understand
themselves as the ordinary human standard that they “seem not to be represented to
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themselves as whites but as people who are variously gendered, classed, sexualized, and
abled” (3). Thus, a hierarchy is preserved in which, against this assumed neutrality of color,
minority others exhibit unique physiognomies, character traits, or cultural marks that set
them apart and give them their unique racial identity. This process of racialization has come
to be accepted so widely that it appears, for the most part, as absolutely natural. In this way,
whiteness as a social infrastructure becomes synonymous with racism, an equivalence made
discernible by the returned gaze.
In the film Smoke Signals (Eyre, 1998), for example, the whiteness-as-racism
configuration functions as central to understanding indigeneity. The plot follows two young
men, Victor Joseph (played by Adam Beach) and Thomas Build-the-Fire (Evan Adams), as
they take a long road trip from Idaho to Arizona. On the Greyhound bus, Victor teaches
Thomas how to be a “real Indian.” But what does “real Indian” mean? Passing through
classic U.S. Western desert scenery, Victor instructs Thomas: “First of all, quit grinning like
an idiot. Indians ain’t supposed to smile like that. Get stoic.” As Thomas practices looking
stoic, Victor affirms: “You gotta look mean, or people won’t respect you. White people will
run all over you if you don’t look mean.” Victor’s idea of the image he needs to project to the
outside world is based on his double consciousness: on the need to look a certain way in a
hostile world, and the image of the mean Indian he adopts that offers protection by way of
fulfilling white expectations. Ridiculing Thomas for watching Dances with Wolves too many
times and performing the white-pleasing stereotype of the noble savage, the medicine man,
or the storyteller, Victor himself is trapped in another stereotype, that of the self-possessed,
spirited warrior.
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Is there such a thing anymore as a real Indian, or any “real” other for that matter? In a
film, on the screen, young Native Americans appear to be wrestling with their identity. They
emerge from a material experience of life on the reservation, where they perform certain
roles within a community of sameness. In that context, Thomas can wear glasses, be a geek,
smile for no reason, and believe in fairytales. This is his individual, peculiar character, the
self that is independent of the group. That self, however, must be eliminated when traveling
outside the reservation. The image Indians carry with them into the outside world is not of
their own making—it is an imitation of the marks of alterity that are being maintained by
hundreds of years of reinforcement by repetition.
There is always tension in the attempt to emerge free out of dynamics that are by
nature dependent. Group identity is a product of this game, it is defined by the effort to
maintain uniformity through alterity, a process that is, more often than not, self-defeating.
The white world maintains its identity by repeatedly pointing to difference, to the physical
and cultural marks that make up an essentially imaginary Indian. The Indian, in turn, imitates
those tropes at the same time that he mimics select white ways, constructing an identity that
has little to do with what a “real” Indian is, once was, or should become. Victor, who seems
to have mastered the art of being Native, insists that a real Indian must dress like any modern
American guy, in jeans, T-shirts, and basketball high-tops. American sports are important, as
is popular culture, like John Wayne Westerns. Braids are outdated, but the long hair must
remain, loose and untamed, symbolizing... What? Freedom? Rebellion? Wildness? The game
of replication, unfortunately, always leads back to square one, to the labeled box of
otherness. “Mimesis,” says Michael Taussig (1993), “plays this trick of dancing between the
very same and the very different. An impossible but necessary, indeed an everyday affair,
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mimesis registers both sameness and difference, or being alike and of being other” (129).
Being alike, as much as being other, it appears, amplifies the power of the group at the
expense of the individual. When a collective identity is the main indicator for classification,
there is no room for personal preferences, for the odd, the peculiar, the quirky.
The bus stops for a break during which Thomas obligingly changes his outfit
according to Victor’s instructions, and is now wearing jeans and a bright T-shirt, like every
“normal” guy. His hair is loose, his glasses pocketed. Climbing back on the bus, however, the
boys are confronted with two white men that have taken their seats. The men refuse to move,
ordering Victor and Thomas to “find another place to have their Pow Wow.” Helpless, the
two shuffle to the back of the bus to the silent stares of other white passengers and an
indifferent driver. And here comes an attempt to subvert the defeat. Victor reminds Thomas
of an Indian joke that explains why John Wayne, the iconic hero, never smiles. As the joke
goes, John Wayne had very bad teeth and was embarrassed by the fact that he had to wear
false ones. Much to the disdain of the all-white travelers, Victor and Thomas actually do
imitate a Pow Wow and improvise a loud song that points out “this critical flaw in the person
who symbolically represents the anti-Indian American cowboy” (Zonn and Winchell 2002,
153). In this application of the oppositional gaze, the two boys momentarily reverse the
racializing process and not only disturb the unsympathetic rednecks on the bus by singing
and drumming, but also identify a major imperfection (some white people’s predisposition
for rotten and crooked teeth) that now signifies a defect in American hero mythology. What
matters here, as Zonn and Winchell emphasize, is not the boys’ “allegiance to some form of
essential identity, but rather their effective destabilization of those other identities built
around the West, namely, the cowboys” (153). The disruption created by the third-eye
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returned gaze allows the “savage”—in this case the modern American Indian—to parody the
“civilized,” turning the tables so that the unfavorable inscriptions of whiteness become
visible, available for labeling, typecasting, and mocking.
Countering the liberal understanding of Indians as the exotic victims of conquest,
mass extinction, and cultural destruction, Indianness can be explained as precisely what
consistently eludes the restrictions of taxonomy. To survive the various projections and
impositions of the dominant order is no easy feat, and survival depends on inevitable
adaptation processes that cannot be judged as good or bad, especially when considering that
the process is far from over. Alterity, then, “is every inch a relationship, not a thing in itself,
and in this case an actively mediated colonial relationship meeting contradictory and
conflicting European expectations of what constitutes Indianness” (Taussig 1993, 130). But
such a relationship—the demanding, probing, challenging radical otherness of direct
encounter—has fallen, like everything else, under the market laws of supply and demand,
and under the flattening wheels of mass reproduction (Baudrillard [1990] 1993, 141). The
Indigenous other on display that had once required an expensive trip to the museum, the
primitive village at the world fair, or the actual reservation now enters every living room with
great ease, becoming one of many simulations of otherness a viewer can choose from. As a
mediated representation that can be copied, reproduced, and reimagined ad infinitum,
otherness is dramatized to the point of losing its meaning and potency. It has turned, as
Baudrillard argues, into psychodrama and melodrama: into harmless entertainment ([1990]
1993, 142).
The melodrama of alterity thrives on the thrill of surface difference, thus neutralizing
present and historical systems entrenched in hierarchical inequality. Despite increasing
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liberal sympathies, many not-insignificant advances in official policies, and a formal rhetoric
of a color-blind society, the hierarchical patterns that govern everyday race relations in
America remain rooted in white supremacy. And although no laws exist anymore that forbid
or punish the movement of eyes, the act of looking still remains a telling indication of a
power structure in which whiteness reserves the right to look, inspect, study, scrutinize,
categorize and taxonomize, while for the non-white the oppositional gaze is still very much a
risky tool of resistance. This is especially true in the contemporary, hyperreal configuration
of racial ordering, in which mainstream popular culture is saturated with the appropriation of
non-white subcultures. Within the circuits of mass media and global capitalism, such
representations reach beyond mere entertainment and become a mode of containment.
American capitalism thrives on the promotion of equality and is extremely convincing in
creating the illusion of inclusion. But, according to Taussig, the same capitalist forces of
market economy and technological development repeatedly thwart the materializing of
freedom and fairness. And race, inseparable from class (and gender), is still a mechanism
through which the socio-economic order arranges itself. “As in a shadow play,” writes
Taussig (1993), “the Indian and the black are beings through which the ceaseless dilemma of
labor-discipline and freedom in capitalist enterprise is to be figured” (156). And the
magnetizing visuality of the entertainment industry is the main medium through which the
American drama of identity formation is played, quite literally.
Spike Lee’s Bamboozled ([2000] 2001), like many of his other films, provocatively
tackles a question that parallels that of the “real Indian”—what might be called “the black
experience.” The movie examines a long history of exploitation not in labor but in show
business. From the early days of slavery in the U.S., the film argues, black people were on
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display as entertainers, playing music, singing, dancing, and telling jokes for the pleasure of
white audiences. “Blackness,” therefore, is so tightly associated with entertainment that is
nearly impossible for a black person in America to be taken seriously unless that person is a
threatening delinquent, preferably a gang member, who conforms to yet another white
imaginary, one that equate blackness with lawlessness, drugs, and violence. Like the leading
characters in Smoke Signals, the young protagonists in Bamboozled are trapped between
racial stereotypes propagated by popular culture. In order to survive as living representations
of alterity, they must choose between a limited range of labels: comedian, musician, athlete,
or criminal.
The film follows Pierre Delacroix (Damon Wayans), a Harvard-educated television
writer, whose scripts are rejected and ridiculed by his white boss, Thomas Dunwitty (Michael
Rappaport), for casting blacks in “conventional” roles of well-assimilated young
professionals. Early in the film, after Delacroix is late to a staff meeting he was not informed
of, Dunwitty calls him into his office, which is adorned with African art and large photos of
Muhammad Ali, Michael Jordan, and Mike Tyson.

DUNWITTY: Do you know what C.P. Time is?
DELACROIX: C.P. Time is Colored People's Time. The stereotypical belief that Negroes are
always late. That Negroes have no sense of time—except when it comes to music or dance.
[They both laugh.]
DUNWITTY: I'm sorry about my blowup but I have to have a whipping boy every meeting.
DELACROIX: I understand. But again, in all honesty I was not informed.
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DUNWITTY: Forget it. Look, I know you're my most creative person I've got on staff.
You're hip. You know what's happening. I got some pasty ass white boys and girls writing
for me, know what I mean? I understand Black culture. I grew up around black people all my
life. If the truth be told I probably know "niggers" better than you, Monsieur Delacroix, and
don't go gettin’ offended by my use of the quote-unquote N word. I got a black wife and two
bi-racial children, so I feel like I have the right. I don't give a damn what that prick Spike Lee
says, Tarantino was right. Nigger is just a word. If Dirty Ole Bastard can use it every other
word so can I.
DELACROIX: I would prefer you not use that word in my presence.
DUNWITTY: Oh really?? [pause] Nigger! Nigger nigger nigger!

In response to this, Delacroix is fantasizing an outburst in which he beats on
Dunwitty, yelling at him: Whitey! Whitey whitey whitey! The fantasy passes and Delacroix
remains composed and subdued, but his inner outrage emphasizes the unfathomable audacity
of this white man’s use of the “N word,” and his proclaiming to understand black culture
better than blacks. The self-referential meta-commentary that compares Spike Lee with
Quentin Tarantino exposes the ultimate authority when it comes to representations of
blackness. It is not the conscientious African American film artist but rather the sensational
white one who gets to determine what is tasteful or not.

DUNWITTY: The material you've been creating is too white bread. White people with black
faces. The Huxtables, Cosby—genius, revolutionary. But that's dead. We can't go down that
road again.
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DELACROIX: I don't agree. The Negro middle class does exist, and it's rich material for a
dramatic series or even a sitcom.
DUNWITTY: I'm telling you it's not... It's too clean, too antiseptic... Too...
DELACROIX: White? I still feel all of my scripts would make good shows.
DUNWITTY: Delacroix, wake up, brother man. The reason why they didn't get picked up
was because nobody, and I mean no motherfuckin’ body, niggers and crackers alike, wants to
see that junk.
DELACROIX: I've never been given a fair shot.
DUNWITTY: You got your head stuck up your ass with your Harvard education and your
pretentious ways. Brother man, I'm blacker than you. I'm keepin' it real and you're frontin',
trying to be white.
DELACROIX: I'm an Oreo, a sell out? Because I don't aspire to do Homeboys from Out of
Space, The Secret diary of Desmond Pfeiffer, or, as you might put it, some "nigger" show? Is
that what you think?
DUNWITTY: Yes, that's exactly what I think.

In this exchange, Dunwitty, arrogantly assuming superior knowledge of black culture,
criticizes Delacroix for being a “sell out.” What he’s saying, which in effect, summarizes the
whole film’s oppositional stance, is that ambition, intelligence, good education, a career, and
a middle-class life, which are all the indications of success in the white world, become
undesirable when used to represent blackness. While the white Dunwitty shamelessly adopts
the style, dialect, and attitude associated with black stereotypes, the black Delacroix exhibits
typical white characteristics (he is reserved, uptight, well dressed, polite, and articulate), but

56
in show business, the film demonstrates, blacks are only interesting if they maintain their
unique racial identity, which is to say if they exhibit the marks that clearly distinguish them
as different. Under the growing pressure to write something more “black,” Delacroix, hoping
to shock the boss and get fired, pitches a grotesque minstrel show loaded with the most
abhorrent black stereotypes and offensive racist jokes. To his amazement, the boss loves the
idea, the show gets produced and turns into a big hit, and Delacroix sinks deeper and deeper
into despair as he becomes the celebrated new talent in a white-dominated entertainment
industry, and a hated target for black power militants.
According to Dyer (1997), if white is the omnipresent blank category that “both
defines normality and fully inhabits it,” then whiteness, by virtue of being equated with
simply being human, ensures a position of power that in and of itself often remains
unacknowledged. Thus, white people create the world in their own image, but are unable to
see themselves doing so, and because white authority depends on this positionality, “white
people set standards of humanity by which they are bound to succeed and others bound to
fail” (9). This invisible, self-perpetuating cycle that underlies the whole paradigm of white
ascendency has manifested in different ways during different times in history, but the
principles always remain the same. Dunwitty’s character is an outrageous caricature of the
most recent version of this blind supremacy. Utterly unaware of himself, completely
confident and secure in a position of privilege, the white man, under the discourse of
equality, inclusion, and diversity, can step into the realm of the black with the authoritative
conviction of the expert to make sure that blacks do not “sell out,” cross the lines, and
become too white, because that is decisively not entertaining; that is not what the public
wants to see. Such mixing of identities can, in fact, be too threatening. Only the white man is
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allowed to play with identity, to pretend to be black, but people of color must maintain their
distinct non-white categorical inscriptions; they must stay in the role of the other, both on the
screen and off.
Bamboozled positions the white viewer in alignment with Dunwitty, who arrogantly
claims to be “more black than black” because he possesses such extensive knowledge of
black culture. Watching the film, along with numerous other visual productions depicting
past and present struggles of black people in America, the general viewer develops a
comfortable familiarity with the surface markers of the black experience. Within this
“knowing” the appearance, fashion, music, literature, and resistance of African Americans all
become commodities to consume, appropriate, and discard when a more interesting
difference enters the market. On a symbolic level, Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) argues,
difference is what destroys otherness. What does it mean, he asks, to say that “women are the
other for men, or the mad are the other for the sane, or that primitive people are the other for
civilized people?” (144). Even to delve deeper under the surface of discernable differences
and address alterity in terms of power relations between genders, classes, races, ages, and
abilities is too reductionist, because in reality things are never that simple, and because that
kind of analysis too assumes knowledge of something that is inherently unknowable.
Relational exchanges between beings and things are less a matter of structural difference and
mote of a mysterious yin-yang dynamics: “the symbolic order implies dual and complex
forms that are not dependent on distinctions between ego and other… The two are not
differentiated along a single scale of values: rather, they are mutually reinforcing aspects of
an immutable order, parts of a reversible cycle like the cycle of day and night” (Baudrillard
[1990] 1993, 145). In other words, just like it makes little sense to refer to the night as the
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“other” of the day, it is also inherently limiting to construct feminine as other to masculine,
Indigenous as other to the European colonizer, or black as other to white. Structural
difference brings order and regulation into the relational exchange. Alterity, on the other
hand, disrupts and introduces a measure of chaos and unpredictability into it.
What is left of that spontaneous chaotic potential? Observing an 1895 Parisian
exhibition of a native African village, the anthropologist Felix-Louis Regnault noted the
curious laugh of the African villager as testimony to the child-like “Negro character.” “But is
it not possible,” asks Rony (1996), “that the laugh marked out a space of ironic resistance?”
(40). The natives, of course, were fenced in, and any possible demonstrations of defiance
were quickly contained, but the challenge created by the returned gaze remained a
disquieting dare to a white society that had to sustain its superiority through the systematic
disqualifying of the non-white other. When “native villages” in ethnographic exhibitions
were discontinued, Rony suggests, cinema took over as a much more cost-effective visual
tool for circulating ideologies concerning non-white bodies and cultures, eliminating the
“potentially threatening return look of the performer present in the exposition, thus offering
more perfect scientific voyeurism (43). Yet, as Mirzoeff (2011) acknowledges, at the same
time that hegemonic visuality reaffirms the ruling order, a countervisuality also exists, which
reveals the prevailing view’s limited understanding of reality. Alternate perspectives,
however, are often dismissed and suppressed, and always operate in the margins, but that is
because they are actually powerful interrogations of the “right to look” and the “right to the
real,” offering oppositional readings of mainstream culture while opening up meaningful
sites of resistance by emphasizing self-generated representations of subaltern subjectivities.
But how effective are these countervisualities when considering the all-engulfing
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appropriative power of mass media, of over-simulation and over-stimulation? The returned
gaze of early 20th century public science fairs, where Indigenous peoples on display would
suddenly raise their heads, look a white observer in the eye, smile, gesture, or talk, may have
changed form since those first encounters, but does it still present the same disruptive
possibilities?
Although no longer a rare display in the native village of the world fair or the
reservation, American Indians as they are represented in the media are still mostly cast in
narrow clichéd roles. Whether the image is of a staggering drunk at the Greyhound station, a
traditional dancer at the local powwows, or a medicine woman telling stories of healing and
resiliency, the Indian identity has been so widely appropriated over the course of American
history, that it is now impossible to imagine it as anything but its distilled and essentialized
stereotypical representation. The stereotype has seen some profound transformations: from
the abject primitive enemy to the romanticized noble warrior, from the barbarian in loincloth
to the unappreciated veteran, and from the blasphemous heathen to the sought-after shaman.
As Philip Deloria (1998) argues, the contemporary, politically correct typecasting replaces
“race” with the less obtrusive “culture,” creating an illusion of anti-racist equality. In effect,
however, nothing has changed. The signifier “culture” may be the contemporary rhetorical
replacement of colonial vocabulary, but the Indian subject is still in impossibility within the
group demarcations of the essentialized collective. “Culture,” and especially
“multiculturalism,” are meant to indicate respect and inclusion for histories, worldviews, and
lifeways, but in effect reiterate long-standing conceptions of visible differences deeply rooted
in skin tone and physiognomic features. The anthropological concept of cultural relativism,
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as Deloria shows, despite its deeply flawed methodologies and applications, still pervades
popular understandings and mediated representations of different groups of people.
In 1950 the renowned anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber celebrated cultural relativism
by asserting that “The most significant accomplishment of anthropology in the first half of
the twentieth century has been the extension and clarification of the concept of culture. The
outstanding consequence of this conceptual extension has been the toppling of the doctrine of
racism” (Deloria 1998, 130). There is now an agreement, Kroeber continues, “that each
culture must be examined in terms of its own structure and values, instead of being rated by
the standards of other civilization exalted as absolute” (Deloria 1998, 130). Are all cultures
created equal? According to Deloria, the assessment is profoundly misguided if not outright
hypocritical. It is true that cultural relativism was a sharp, progressive departure from
previous, science-based notions of “culture” as a standardized scale measuring human
development. On this social Darwinist gradation, Western European societies were
positioned as the most advanced, particularly in comparison with non-white peoples who
were perceived to exist in an “inferior,” “primitive” stage of development. In this context,
cultural relativism was perhaps a radically progressive shift toward a dismantling of the
scale. Yet while relativist ideas that resist comparison became known and accepted on the
surface, they still rely on a certain positivist approach that undermines a true leveling of the
field. Even when attempting to disregard the outdated assessment of “culture” in terms of
human development, relativism still insists on marking difference and coding cultures
according to moral principles and hierarchical categorizations grounded in Eurocentric logic,
even when hierarchies are occasionally flipped, as in common contemporary searches for
authenticity, spirituality, a return to nature, or anything else that “indigeneity” might offer as
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an alternative to capitalist materialism, advanced technology, and the dizzying speed of the
electronic superhighways.
In the second half of the 20th century, for example, white youth of various
backgrounds across the U.S. became frustrated and disillusioned with growing urbanization,
industrialization, and the endless cycles of production and consumption. Intellectual
frustration and social alienation motivated activists, artists, writers, and musicians to explore
and engage with “unspoiled cultures” of either local minorities or remote, exotic lands,
searching for a renewed connection with instinct, wilderness, and community; some sort of
an authentic primitivism to counteract the ailments of modern life. “For whites of all
classes,” argues Deloria (1998), “the quests for personal substance and identity often
involved forays into racial Otherness. Among the many boundaries that separated
‘inauthentic’ Selves from Others imagined to be real and pure, race was perhaps the most
visible and the most interesting” (132). And while such racial crossings have a long history
entrenched in any form of imperial and colonial expansion, in the late 20th century they took
on a particular flavor that reflected a deep confusion regarding national discourses of racial
equality, diversity, and multiculturalism; a rhetoric full of promise that sadly stood in
contrast to the material and social reality of continued segregation, discrimination, and a de
facto upholding of solidified hierarchies in which Eurocentric whiteness remains at the top.
Like Deloria, Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) warns against the seemingly benign sign
“culture,” arguing that what is has come to signify in anthropology and, for that matter, any
representational production, is a group of people that can be identified through certain
definite shared characteristics (54). This, in effect, is not that different from the taxonomies
of traditional racial discourse and can be just as dangerous regardless of the positioning of
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the represented group. It is the method of classification itself that perpetuates a habitual
hierarchy of authority over an object of study, and which, in pattern-seeking analytics and
generalizing evaluations, risks reinflicting the same epistemic violence it attempts to avoid
by replacing “race” with “culture”. Ultimately, both terms involve looking for, studying, and
affirming difference as a way to “know,” possess, and contain the unknown.
Of the many minority groups in America, Jews present a long-standing example of
the violence of “culture,” as historically, the racialization of Jews was never constructed
along physiognomic lines. Whether in Europe, Africa, or the Middle East, to be Jewish meant
to practice a non-mainstream religion, to stand out as a Christianity-resistant minority rather
than a physically distinct other. This particular difference, as Matthew Frye Jacobson (1998)
argues, positions the Jews always almost within and still just outside dominant, white
civilizations, which are, in essence, Christian civilizations. The Jewish question can be so
baffling precisely because they could easily pass for white, and all they had to do in order to
fully conform and join the ruling order was to change some habits, modify some traditions,
and convert to Christianity. And strangely, for the most part, they refused. “From the outset,”
Jacobson points out, “scientific writings on Jews in Europe tended to focus upon questions of
assimilation, most often emphasizing the race’s stubborn immutability—which is to say, its
unassimilability” (179−180). In that stubborn refusal lies a historical returned gaze, a quiet,
lingering opposition that challenges, by its very presence, the assumed superiority of white
Christianity.
In Hollywood, Jewish culture translated into the trademarks of humor, wit, and
neurosis. In the modern representational economy of the media, Jewishness has a distinct
sophisticated, self-deprecating, neurotic flavor, of which Woody Allen is perhaps the most
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well-known master. Annie Hall (1977), for example, laments the universally complicated
nature of love and relationships, but also explores the question of assimilation and the
ongoing positionality of the Jew as the original, the ultimate Other. Early in their doomed
relationship, the protagonist, Alvy Singer (Woody Allen), and his girlfriend Annie (Diane
Keaton), are having a traditional Easter dinner with Annie’s family in Wisconsin. They are
engaged in a polite conversation about food and family outings when suddenly Woody Allen
turns to the camera and speaks directly to the audience. “I can’t believe this family,” he says,
pointing out the small talk of swap meets and boating, “normal” things that would have
otherwise remained unnoticed. “They really look American,” he continues, “very healthy,
like they never get sick or anything.” What does a “real American” look like? The common
whiteness epitomized by the Midwestern family, the scene suggests, is the unspoken core of
American national identity, an ideal into which immigrants are expected to assimilate—light
skinned ones with greater prospects of success, dark skinned with much less. Are Jews
white? Most of them certainly look white, and here is a curious exception to the visuality that
rules racial identity.
The definition of race in America changes over time, and with it configurations of
whiteness. Naturally, as waves of European immigrants arrived in the U.S. in the 19th
century, not all of them were equally welcomed into the melting pot. These immigration
waves brought with them a European hierarchy of superior and inferior “races” that were
quickly embedded within the formation of the American identity. “Not surprisingly,” writes
Karen Brodkin (1998), “the belief in European races took root most deeply among the
wealthy U.S.-born Protestant elite, who feared a hostile and seemingly unassimilable
working class” (80). Eastern-European Jews found themselves at the bottom of the social
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order in the new world, living, much like they did in antisemitic Europe, in small, insular
enclaves within the developing cities of the East Coast. In the early 20th century, as eugenics
theories were gaining rampant popularity on both sides of the Atlantic, scientific racism
“sanctified the notion that real Americans were white and real whites came from northwest
Europe” (81). At the same time, in post-emancipation America, the definition of whiteness
was forced to gradually expand, as to include previously marginalized European immigrants:
Catholics, Poles, Italians, Irish, and Jews. The weight of whiteness had to be shifted, so to
speak, so that the pressing issues of African American integration and new, Spanish-speaking
populations crossing the southern borders could be clearly resolved along color lines rather
than ethnic ones. But the most significant factor in the evolving delineation of whiteness,
according to Brodkin, was the unprecedented economic boom that followed the first World
War. “Although changing views on who was white made it easier for Euroethnic to become
middle class,” she argues, “it was also the case that economic prosperity played a very
powerful role in the whitening process” (87). The acceleration of economic growth enabled a
broader scope of participation in the rise of the middle class, and ethnic distinctions that were
previous grounds for discriminatory laws and practices were now tolerated (and later
celebrated) as benign differences that could be overlooked when members of the inferior
group proved themselves to be following white Protestant work ethics and liberal capitalistic
ventures. Even before WWII, therefore, “mobility of Jews and other Euroethnics rested
ultimately on U.S. postwar economic prosperity with its enormously expanded need for
professional, technical, and managerial labor, and on government assistance in providing it”
(87). Thus, during and after the second World War, Jews in America were already
established as middle class citizens that were passing for white in increasingly expanding
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professional and social contexts. In the post WWII decades, anti-Semitism went gradually
out of fashion or, perhaps, simply went underground as more pressing forms of racism were
gathering momentum and taking center stage.
Taking a different angle on group identity formation and the racializing of visible
others, Shlomo Sand (2009) argues that the concept of a unified Jewish people was a modern
invention, a response to European antisemitism and global surges of nationalism. In the late
1900s, as the “scientific” studies of eugenics were evolving into antisemitic movements and
purist political parties, Jewish historians and Zionist thinkers began to paradoxically engage
with the same positivist theories of race and culture in a deliberate effort to construct a
“people,” a nation, and eventually a state out of numerous Jewish communities scattered
across various countries and continents, speaking different languages, belonging to different
ethnicities and histories, sharing no affiliations other than religious beliefs (21). Sand’s study
explains well the power of myth to propagate nationalistic agendas based in racial divides.
The Zionist vision of a Jewish “people” returning to an ancient “homeland” served as a
successful answer to the Jewish question, especially following the Holocaust. But anything
that is built to counter something ends up reinforcing the very thing it attempts to dismantle.
As later demonstrated by nationalistic civil rights organizations in the U.S. (for example the
Black Panthers or the Chicano movement), ethnic pride can be a dangerous thing when it
utilizes the same exclusionist methods by which a particular group was marginalized to begin
with.
It is true that orthodox Jews still wear the garb that clearly sets them apart. They are
thus easy to spot and to quickly cast in the role of the other. When Christianity became the
dominant religion of the Roman Empire and thus spread across Europe, Jews who stubbornly
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rejected the sweeping mass conversions were perceived as a fragmenting threat to imperial
concord, an enemy to God and to God’s earthly representatives—the emperors and monarchs
of European nations. A couple of millennia later, that long-standing otherness remains
entrenched, even when most Jews on the planet are secular and have no external identifying
marks. What is this otherness, then, when there are no noticeable visible variances?
Regardless of faith, attire, hair color, nose size, or any other observable features, to be born a
Jew, especially in the post-Holocaust era, means to instantly belong to an exceptionally long
history of persecution and marginalization. This is something that, despite their genuine
efforts, people who choose to convert to Judaism will never be able to fully comprehend.
Conversion makes the belief system the focus of identity, when in reality the racialized
meaning of Jewishness has no correlation with spiritual consciousness, practices, or tradition.
Jewishness is a historical identity category that is fundamentally rooted in exclusion,
condemnation, dehumanizing discrimination, violence, exile, dispossession, and genocide.
Regardless of skin tone, language, or cultural background, what all Jews share is a
profoundly traumatic historical legacy, and at the same time an embodied reflection of the
moral failure of white Christianity.
Right before turning to the camera, the Easter dinner scene shows Annie’s old
grandmother (who Alvy proclaims to be a “classic Jew hater”) looking at Alvy across the
table and for a brief moment we see what he imagines her gaze to project: an image of a
Hasidic Jew in traditional garb and a long beard, which is to say, the stereotypical Jew as the
differentiated other. The caricature is humorous, but the effect is powerful, as it emphasizes
the fact that even though they easily pass as white, modern day Jews are not “real
Americans.” True, their assimilation process was relatively smooth, but it doesn’t take much
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to scratch the surface of American national identity and understand how despite a rhetoric of
inclusion and the myth of the melting pot, whiteness, which also corresponds, at least in this
case, with Christianity, remains the preferred expression of true Americanism.
This instant racialization that happens on the screen is a quick articulation of what
Rony (1996) refers to as the third eye experience. Rony explains the third eye moment in
cinema as the point in which the viewer sees herself on the screen with an acute awareness of
how she is being perceived by others, how she fits into the world. Building on W. E. B. Du
Bois’s concept of double consciousness, “the sense of always looking at one’s self through
the eyes of others” (4), the third eye includes the screen as a sight apparatus through which
the experience of racial differentiation is experienced and understood. “For a person of color
growing up in the United States the experience of viewing oneself as an object is profoundly
formative,” says Rony, stressing that this is something that non-white people face every time
they encounter a representation of a person of color, while white people are very rarely asked
to negotiate their identity outside of their own definition of themselves. The glimpse that we
get of Alvy’s Jewish double consciousness during the encounter with Annie’s grandmother
across the dinner table enhances his observations a moment later, when he returns the gaze
and lets us see that not only Jews, but whites too, in this case the typical Midwestern,
healthy, perfected American family, can suddenly find themselves on display, objectified,
performing a role for a scrutinizing observer. Alvy’s impression of his all-American hosts
triggers a comparison with his own family back in Brooklyn, and to let the viewers follow his
train of thought the screen splits and we see the contrast between the peaceful, spacious,
orderly, “civilized” Easter celebration in Wisconsin, and the raucous, crowded gathering of
New York Jews, where people talk loudly over each other and freely discuss marital
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problems, physical illness, unemployment, and other unpleasantries. The question arises,
who is on display here? Although in this comparison the Jews appear as eccentric, rowdy and
uncouth, Annie’s family too suddenly seems unappealingly odd, the camera’s returned gaze
recasting the so-called “norm” as, in fact, disturbingly abnormal: repressed, rigid, static, and
eerily cold. The notion that the “norm” is in fact dangerously hypocritical is reinforced in the
next scene, in which Annie’s brother Duane (played by the ridiculously hyper-white
Christopher Walken) confesses to Alvy his hidden, deranged fantasies. The reserved, proper,
all-American whiteness that was just exposed through Alvy’s dinnertime commentary, then,
has a potent dark side; a frightening, violent force lurking just under the surface, ready to
unleash at the right provocation. This configuration of whiteness is far as can be from
“normal,” and in fact takes on a troubling quality of deviant pathology—something carefully
reserved for the taxonomy of the racialized other.
Through the decades since those early classic moments, the alterity of the Jews has
taken on new shapes and flavors while always maintaining its pronounced visual difference.
Recent Netflix shows such as Shtisel (Elon and Indursky 2018 and Unorthodox (Winger
2020), for example, grant audiences a particularly voyeuristic viewpoint from which to
become intimately acquainted with the lifeways of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish populations in
present-day Israel or Brooklyn. The strange rituals and customs of the insulated sects enter
living rooms, bedrooms, and kitchens all over the world, creating a sense of knowing and
understanding of a world that is in fact completely foreign. Thus, the well-defined alterity of
the Hasidic Jew penetrates the private space of the viewer, who now, having seen “real” Jews
on TV, can presume familiarity with this otherness that nevertheless remains ever more
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remote, shrouded in the well-rehearsed stereotypes of strict religious fanaticism and outdated
Eastern European garb.
In Unorthodox, for instance, the protagonist, Esther Shapiro (Shira Haas), leaves the
tight community to explore secular life, undergoing a personal transformation until she
becomes “one of us” (modernized, liberated, dressed in tight jeans and wearing red lipstick).
Following her dramatized journey, the process of identification affords the viewer a
patronizing position from which to condemn the alterity of the Hasidic Jew, which remains
intact, solidified, and neatly contained in the confines of visual difference that, in this case, is
also backed by a strong ideological and ethical judgment. Esther Shapiro’s struggle to free
herself from religious oppression, to escape the tyranny of a cult-like community,
reestablishes the divide between the dynamic secular humanist subject, individuated and free
to express herself in a progressive, globalized, cosmopolitan, hyper-modern culture and the
stagnant, repressive, archaic relic of an unwelcomed history that is the traditional Orthodox
Jew.
There is always a double bind imminent in visual representations of racial identity.
Even the most critical use of a stereotypical image, like that of the black athlete (or
entertainer, or gangster) or the Hasidic Jew, reinforces the categorical demarcation at the
same time that it exposes its artificiality. Gwendolyn Audrey Foster (1999) equates the
American film industry with a plantocracy, a particularly efficient mechanism of visuality
that relies for its own profitable efficiency, on racial, gender, and sexuality hierarchies that
are embedded in the American national psyche. Foster focuses on cinematic representations
of captivity and bondage, and her reading of Hollywood cinematic productions reveals how
bodies (of actors, spectators, and the populations they represent), are held captive by
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oppressive, prescribed images and master narratives of white superiority and its racialized
otherness. While actual slavery of course depends on literal bondage, Foster suggests that
“the Hollywood Plantocracy is dependent upon theoretically captive bodies” (48); subjects
that are locked into very rigid conceptualizations of racial identity. It is true that over the
decades, with changing costs and availability of equipment and technology, and with
domestic and global decolonizing movements gathering significant momentum, more and
more cameras find their ways into the hands of non-white artists who use the same medium
that once eliminated the threat of the returned gaze to stare back. The cinematic returned gaze
holds subversive power, and yet it’s as if images have lives of their own, and regardless of
intention and commentary, the very sight of them, even when meant to disrupt the
constraining hierarchies, simultaneously serves to re-erect categorical divides.
Mediated representations strip the returned gaze of the potential resistance it may
have had in a direct encounter. “White people,” Dyer (1997) writes, “need to learn to see
themselves as white, to see their particularity. In other words, whiteness needs to be made
strange” (10). But in the economy of the visual marketplace, is that really possible? Raising
the eyes and the camera to stare back may seem like a bold, performative act of contestation,
but if the medium is the message, as Marshal McLuhan (1967) argues, then the ultimate
result is always the same: flatness, sameness, an illusion of inclusion. In reality, any attempts
to challenge the existing order produce clashes, chaos, and upsurges of racist violence. Mass
media, and especially the entertainment industry, mask the actual physicality of such
confrontations with a new mode of subjugation propelled by the rhetoric of multiculturalism,
desegregation, and diversity. In the realms of the hyperreal, cultural appropriation and the
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commodification of otherness unfold as the new mechanisms of oppression that celebrate
theatrical opposition in order to contain actual resistance.
Dear White People (Simien 2017-18), a television show based on a film by the same
title, is an admirable production that attempts to challenge contemporary modes of
containment, but even that is problematic due to the inherent neutralizing effects of visual
representation. The show’s popularity on Netflix, I suspect, relies heavily on its sensational
protest of white entitlement, of the one-way street of playing Indian according to which only
white people get to choose their identity, wearing otherness as one wears a fashionable new
outfit. The dramatic oppositional logic in Dear White People experiments with the notion
that entertainment, despite its glaring limitations, may be the only avenue left for addressing
the persistent, unresolved questions of racial constructs in America. As grassroots activism,
petitions, and street marches lose their potency not only to increased surveillance and police
militarization, but, more importantly, to the screening technologies of the hyperreal,
mediated performances of fictionalized protest are the only available tools for returning the
gaze. The show may be a daring and provocative production, but by its very nature as a
televised spectacle it teeters on the dangerous cliff of the replication abyss, inadvertently
revisiting the horror scenarios of Bamboozled, which Spike Lee so aptly lamented, where
performance and identity are inextricable, and the blackface minstrel show is available for
whites to appropriate and discard as needed, while people of color are forever trapped in it,
can never wipe the dark paint off their faces at the end of the night.
In the fetishized blackness of Dear White People, the actresses are gorgeous, their
dark skin a seductive invitation intended to draw the viewer into the intense conflicts, the
provocative language, and the steamy sex scenes. This is what is expected of entertainment
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involving the black-white divide. No doubt, there is merit in the anger and political
awareness raised by the show’s relatively realistic representations of race relations, but the
question remains whether this kind of in-your-face blatant drama, infused with the same old
visual tropes that cast black performers in the role of the exotic, sensual, potentially
dangerous other, can have any significant deconstructive impact, or whether mass mediated
entertainment is doomed to ultimately reinstate the familiar hierarchical orientations of
belonging and differentiation.
Nevertheless, the returned gaze celebrates many moments of a distinct and poignant
effort to topple white hegemony’s claim to neutrality and to destabilize its position as the
unmarked standard from which all other races deviate. For example:
- “Dear white people, our skin color is not a weapon. You don’t have to be afraid of it.”
- “Dear white people, please stop touching my hair. Does this look like a petting zoo to you?”
- “Dear white people, the minimum requirement of black friends needed to not seem racist
has just been raised to two. Sorry, but your weed man, Tyrone, does not count.”
- “Dear white people, this just in: Dating a black person to piss off your parents is a form of
racism.”
- “Dear white people using Instagram: You have an iPhone and you go on hikes. I get it.”
- “Dear white people, here’s a little tip: When you ask someone who looks ethnically
different ‘what are you?’ the answer is usually a person about to slap the shit out of you.”
- “Dear white people... You know what? Never mind.”
In the end, it is that “never mind” that might express a most sober acknowledgement
of the deeply embedded foundations of racial classifications, and the futility of the attempt to
make whiteness strange, to dislodge it from the seemingly innocuous blandness that, as Dyer
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(1997) argues, keeps it in power. It’s a statement of defeat, yes, but at the same time a raising
of the stakes, as it calls into question the efficacy of mediated confrontation and with it the
artificiality of all mediated constructs. In the end, it suggests, videotaped returned gazes,
expertly produced wit and nuance, and sharply written humor and play may be too subtle to
penetrate the rigid visual taxonomies of group identity. Even much-acclaimed selfrepresentation, as the above examples and countless others demonstrate, too often
inadvertently swallows up the particularity of the individual, obscuring it in the persistent
imaginary of mass alterity. The preoccupation with skin color as the dominant aspect of
identity is not a one-way, top-to-bottom hierarchical structure, but a circular entanglement in
which minorities are compelled to define their identity by its visible difference, reinforcing
the power of mass-produced stereotypes over the discrete and distinct particularity of
personal subjectivity, thus maintaining all the familiar ordered divisions.
Visual narratives, by their very nature, promote identities that emphasize drama,
conflict, the charged exchange of gazes, and the dynamics of seeing and being seen. When
race is the central identity-defining factor in every story in which the main character is a nonwhite person, the rhetoric of multiculturalism, inclusion, equality, and a color-blind society
becomes a laughable myth. In a long list titled “Daily Effects of White Privilege,” Peggy
McIntosh (1990) points to economic, political, social, and relational freedoms that white
people take for granted, and that are rarely experienced by non-white minorities. Out of this
list, the one I believe is most crucial for understanding the oppressive power of group
categories is this: “I am never asked to speak for all the people in my racial group” (3). The
ability to define and express one’s own identity along personal lines of traits, skills, tastes
and inclinations, beliefs, a specific family heritage, and even gender or class, is something
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white populations in America don’t consider a special right, but it is hard to deny that only
white individuals—even immigrants, even the poor, disabled, old, or marginalized—enjoy
the privilege of individuality, and are never expected to speak for or otherwise represent a
whole race.
In workplaces, doctors’ offices, financial institutions, or school admissions forms,
every questionnaire asks the respondent to identify as one of several possible categories, with
the recent addition of the option “some other race, ethnicity, or origin.” In other words,
alterity can fall into an established form of non-white, or be cast as a new, less familiar kind
of “other.” If we are to adhere to the rhetoric of inclusion and the vision of a colorblind
society, these specifications are meant to ensure the fair treatment of all groups, supporting
equal opportunity and enabling affirmative action. And yet every such list of populations to
be affiliated with further erases individual traits, qualifications, strengths, and weaknesses, as
they are quickly absorbed into the apparently much more telling label of “Asian,” “African
American,” “Latino,” or “Middle Eastern”—a mark that is, at its core, a visual indicator.
What do such categories mean, one must wonder, to an actual blind person filling out the
form, to someone who has never seen any black, yellow, brown, or red “other,” or, for that
matter, never had a chance to examine her own reflection in the mirror?
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Chapter Three
Virus and the Other

A highly contagious virus appears on the global scene, and it is a novel one: little is known
about its origins, its patterns, or its lethal capacities. Epidemiologists, immunologists, and
biostatisticians are working overtime to collect facts, figures, expert prognoses and
evaluations—anything that would provide reassurance that there is a way to control and
predict the proliferation and contagion rates of the disease. Out of the blue, the virus spreads
like wildfire, demobilizing everything: the work force, transportation, commerce, education,
cultural events, and all social interactions. A war is declared, and as in well-rehearsed science
fiction narratives, for once it is not a war among nations but one that unites the human race in
unprecedented solidarity against a common foe, invisible but deadly. Unlike other wars,
however, this one cannot be fought by charging, but on the contrary—by retreating. Unlike in
traditional confrontation with a bullying entity, this is not a show of power, and what is
required is not action but extended protective measures of defense. To win this battle, we are
told, we must run and hide, duck and cover, and await further orders. Surprisingly, amidst
frustrations with this uncharacteristic docility, we find that withdrawing, at least in the
relatively affluent parts of the world, may not be as difficult as we thought, and perhaps even
has some advantages. From the comfort of a couch in front of a screen or a home office work
station, fighting an invisible enemy certainly entails protective measures and careful conduct,
but also strategic distractions through endless streams of repetitive information and
entertaining diversions.
This chapter considers symbolic parallels between the sensationalized threat of the
pandemic and familiar historic notions of terrorism, arguing that from a semiotics point of
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view, these two forms of radical alterity could signify the moral question mark articulated by
Emmanuel Levinas in his exploration of alterity as an ethical inquiry into the nature of the
self. This inquiry, however, is systematically evaded, as formulaic constructs of “normal”
and “deviant,” “safe” and “dangerous,” “same” and “different” circulate repeatedly in
American mass media. Looking at representations of terror in the mediated productions, the
study points to symbolic exchange processes through which the technological mechanisms
that inform, warn, and protect human populations also obscure, distort, and alter a collective
perception of historical events. The public rhetoric that positions the virus as the abhorrent
other, I suggest, is not unlike other media-enabled war narratives involving human villains
and terrorists out to destroy the U.S. In these mythological enactments of good vs. evil,
“America” suggests reason, benevolence, purity, and innocence, while the terrorist is the
embodiment of irrational, immoral, barbaric violence. Considering a long-standing tradition
of cultural amnesia in the U.S., a close reading of visual and rhetorical expressions of
otherness unfolds a potential opportunity for reevaluating forgotten historical responsibilities
as well as the current state of being in an America that is ruled by elaborate technologies of
information exchange, communication, and mediated simulation. Utilizing Jean Baudrillard’s
semiotics of the hyperreal and Levinas’s critical investigation of the meaning of alterity, my
aim is to observe and assess a current culture that is increasingly dependent on electric
circuits, microchips, fiber-optic communication, and LCD screens, a culture that more and
more is defined by the separation of isolated human bodies and the hyper-connectivity of
machines.
In the age of mass media, cyber-optic technology, and the globalized free markets of
late-stage capitalism, alterity appears to serve mainly as a counter-reinforcement of group

77
identity, leaving one-on-one actual interactions behind as the interpersonal challenge is being
transferred onto the symbolic level of mediated encounters. For example, Muslim rejection of
North American ideologies based in excessive consumerism and extreme individualism,
perhaps the last vestige of resistance to the widespread powers of the American Empire, is
constructed through the symbolic language of mediated representation so that ideological
differences become synonymous with violent fundamentalism. Yet, as Edward Said (1978)
argues, without carefully examining forms and methods of representing Islam and the Middle
East, “one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which
European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically,
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (3). While the
relationship between the Occident and the Orient is commonly characterized by historians
along lines of uneven power dynamics in which the West was able to politically dominate
and imaginatively narrate the East, Said emphasizes the insubstantial nature of the two
conceptually manufactured regions. “As much as the West itself,” he writes, “the Orient is an
idea that has a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and
presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent
reflect each other” (5). The otherness that is produced by arbitrary dividing lines of
geography, faith, skin color, or culture is then quite naturally reproduced ad infinitum by
conventional systems of representational signs.
As a sign, the reproduced face of Islam in mass media is an essentializing obscuration
of actual difference. A representative figure far removed from the realities of actual Muslim
individuals, the simulated image is epitomized, interestingly, by physical layers of cloth: face
coverings, headdresses, and the radical menace of the keffiyeh. Here, the exotified,
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villainized, turbaned men and hyper-sexualized, veiled women of early colonial Orientalism
have been reconfigured at the same time that they’ve gathered additional symbolic value. No
longer conquerable, the East, as Said emphasizes, is not as much of interest “as the East
made known, and therefore less fearsome, to the Western reading public” (1978, 60). What is
being shown, and therefore known, however, still thrives on the latent threat of a radicalized
alterity. Symbolically, the niqāb often functions in mainstream U.S. mass media as an
emblem of religious fanaticism, and the keffiyeh as the flag of terrorism.
The modern visual vilifying of Muslims, as Jack Shaheen (2001) points out, is a
startling demonstration of the media’s power to construct an image that then becomes a
reality. In numerous cinematic and television productions, Arabs “are brute murderers, sleazy
rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, the abusers of women” (8). These roles have been
reinforced over more than a century of both entertainment and news channels, evolving, in
recent decades, into the ultimate Other: the heartless terrorist, the embodiment of Evil. The
scarves, cloaks, and shrouds of Islam, originally meant to promote modesty and humility
before God (or simply protect the delicate skin from the harsh elements of desert climates),
are now the ultimate signifiers of unwanted alterity, standing in stark contrast to the bare-all
exhibitionism of U.S. popular culture, countering at once capitalism, Christianity, whiteness,
and the American way of life.
Terrorism is so effective because of its shock value, because it has no point of origin,
no organized structure, and no predictable patterns. It is impossible to fight because it is not a
coherent entity but a fragmented plurality, a loose but persistent thread that runs with no
beginning or end, weaving itself into the local and the mundane, where it gathers momentum
precisely because we all assume and expect our everyday to be secure, predictable, civil, free
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of the horrors reserved for designated combat soldiers on faraway battlefields. The symbolic
resonance of the rebel keffiyeh is so potent because it points to the frightening mystery of the
covered face of the other, of that which resists representation, and which can therefore be
anyone. Under the protective layers of the fabric that wraps around the face, however, the
eyes remain, and so does the gaze. “The Other manifests itself by the absolute resistance of
its defenseless eyes,” Levinas ([1947] 1987) writes. And this defiance, the challenge the gaze
poses, “brings into question my freedom, which is discovered to be murderous and
usurpatory” (294). I may not see the terrorist clearly, but the terrorist sees me, calling into
question not only the nature of my existence but my very right to exist.
Radical alterity such as foreign (or even domestic) terrorism and deadly contagious
diseases both lurk among the unsuspecting, threatening to debilitate, derail, or destroy life as
we know it (or think we do). Not to say that these forces are interchangeable, but they do
share certain commonalities that are worth noting. Writing about the AIDS epidemic of the
1980s, Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) reflects on what he terms the “superconductive” variations
of viral threats, highlighting the signifying overlaps of their impact. “Infection,” he writes,
“is no longer confined within a given system but can leap from one system to another” (37),
and while different in form, the symbolic nature of perils such as plagues, radical
organizations, and even computer viruses are similar in that they all spell the demise of the
system and announce total catastrophe. When the media, along with science, technology,
familiar means of knowledge production, the entertainment industry, and the consumptiondriven everyday all contribute equally to the construction of a secure existence, the unstable,
erratic uncertainty of large-scale crises such as viruses and terrorism rattle the very core of
the solid, reliable mechanisms of our society.
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Like the devastating horrors of American wars, argues Marita Sturken (1997), the
realities of the AIDS epidemic were quick to be transformed into meaningless nostalgia by
popular media’s construing of the events as remote anomalies and by the mass memorializing
of victims. Juxtaposing the glorified commemoration of the Vietnam War fatalities with the
media treatment of AIDS patients as already dead, Sturken points to popular cultural
expressions of mourning as mechanisms that circumvent present truths by constructing
narratives of personalized remembering while, ironically, encouraging a collective forgetting.
“Traditional history,” writes Sturken, “has a paradoxical relationship to the body of the
individual who has lived through a given event—the Vietnam veteran, the Gulf War veteran,
or the person with AIDS. The survivors of recent political event often disrupt the closure of a
particular history; indeed, history operates more efficiently when its agents are dead” (5).
Thus, through repeated broadcasting of documentary imagery and the quick erecting of
national memorials, the actual suffering of disease and the brutality of war (as well as the
lingering effects of both catastrophes) recede into the innocuous container of memory,
creating a safe distance between victim and viewer, reassuring the spectator that all is well
now, the danger is over, nothing substantial connects the present or the future to the
unfortunate past.
Although human enemies still have eyes and a challenging gaze while a virus does
not, when considered as parallel disruptions of the innocent familiarity of the everyday, the
masked terrorist and a spreading virus are equally effective in their function as the other.
Their hidden, nerve-racking presence holds the power to destabilize what we presume to be
the concrete ground of factuality and render the common tools and procedures of knowing
undependable. Just like death, the unknown is an intolerable negation. Possessed by fear, we
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fight by clinging that much harder to what we believe is our source of truth: the media.
Paradoxically, as Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) notes, “we attempt to escape from uncertainty by
relying even more on information and communication systems, so merely aggravating the
uncertainty itself” (43). If the relentless stream of constantly changing updates, statistics,
warnings, commentary, assessments, and projections provide a sense of safety and a measure
of control, it is not because of the reassuring content, but because that very stream has
seamlessly merged with the self and has gradually, without us noticing, taken charge. On the
collective level, existence rarely holds meaning anymore without communication and
mediation technologies, an elaborate system of electric circuits that manage every aspect of
social life and circumscribe an understanding of how the individual fits into the social. The
stream is how we get “authenticated.”
The mechanism of simulation can be imagined as a symbiotic force of mutation that
both feeds on and alters phenomena, working both inside and outside individuals and society.
The validation it provides becomes a necessary reassurance that disguises the deep
insecurities it creates. The dependency on artificial intelligence, information technology, and
audio-visual stimulation distorts our perception to the point where it is increasingly harder to
differentiate the authentic from the reproduced. This interblending not only colors the way
we experience whatever is happening now, but also divorces the present from its temporal
context. “We forget a little too easily,” Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) writes, “that the whole of
our reality is filtered through the media, including tragic events of the past. This means that it
is too late to verify and understand those events historically, for the characteristic thing about
the present period, the present fin de siècle, is the fact that the tools required for such
intelligibility have been lost” (91) For instance, films and television productions (including
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documentaries) commemorating slavery, the plight of Native Americans, or the Holocaust,
do not add to an understanding of these atrocities, nor to the possibility of drawing
connections between them and what is happening now. Instead, they create an illusion of
knowing, while reinforcing distance, disengagement, and doubt. “We shall never know,” for
example, “whether Nazism, the concentration camps or Hiroshima were intelligible or not:
we are no longer part of the same mental universe. Victim and executioner are
interchangeable, responsibility is diffrangible, dissoluble—such are the virtues of our
marvelous interface” (91). The events of the past, less comprehensible than ever, and
completely exhausted by repetitive representation, disappear into a monitor whose perpetual
glare leads to the inevitable question: did that really happen?
The turning of historical horrors into screened spectacles, reproduced simulations,
and potentially profit-generating events leads Marita Sturken (2007) to examine this cultural
amnesia through a framework she refers to as “tourism of history.” Within a consumeroriented and media-dependent system that is quick to broadcast, sensationalize, and
commodify large-scale tragic events, Sturken shows, terrorist attacks, like other wars and
battles both on U.S. soil and abroad, are processed through a production line of memorabilia
that casts a nostalgic, innocent light on the event, promoting an image of America as a victim
of evil mishap, rather than a full participant (often as perpetrator) in a global scene of
political tension and in contentious historical precursors to contemporary violence. “In such
places as the Oklahoma City National Memorial and Ground Zero,” writes Sturken, “the
practices of sorrowful pilgrimage and tourism are intermixed and often inseparable; one can
cry and take pictures, leave a personalized object, and purchase a souvenir” (11). This allAmerican tradition of traveling far to visit national memorials, documenting the visit by
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taking pictures at the site, and collecting overpriced trinkets such as snow globes, keychains,
T-shirts, paper weights, or baseball caps, creates a safe distance between the American public
and the meaning of historical accountability. The memorial site, along with the adjacent
museum and gift shop, create a simulated experience that enables the illusion of taking part
in the tragedy. Reinforced by layers of mediation—the televised footage of the actual event,
the endlessly recycled images of shocking horrors, the photos and videos taken by the
visitors and circulating on social media—the public processing of national trauma reflects the
overall political refusal to examine America’s part in a global history of war, violence, and
unwarranted death.
In documenting the pilgrimage to sights of terror, war, and death, and in collecting
the appropriate souvenirs, the act of remembering in fact turns into a collective forgetting, as
the loss of real lives becomes a celebration of involuntary martyrdom. By enlisting victims to
serve as war heroes, national myths of freedom, peace, and innocence are elevated as ideals
worthy of untimely, violent death in the hands of constructed “evil” enemies: a radical other
who, rather than shed a moral light on national responsibility, becomes an agent of systemic
amnesia. Because formulaic public rhetoric still warns against forgetting, artificial memories
are being implanted in the public consciousness, replaying the catastrophe, but, Baudrillard
([1981] 1994) argues, “much too late for it to be able to make real waves and profoundly
disturb something, and especially, especially through a medium that is itself cold, radiating
forgetfulness, deterrence, and extermination in a still more systematic way, if that is possible,
than the camps themselves” (49). The Jewish Holocaust, for example, was an
incomprehensible event even as it was happening; a horror so devastating in its intensity and
magnitude it left a paralyzing dark void in our ability to logically understand what happened.
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The testimonies of both German perpetrators and Jewish victims, the images of starved
prisoners and heaps of skeletal corpses, the numerous scholarly analyses of the historical
events, the archives amassing documents and evidence, and the block-busting fictional
productions based on “true stories” (for example The Hiding Place, Schindler’s List, The
Pianist, and the various adaptations of The Diary of Anne Frank) cannot penetrate the
incomprehensible hate and cruelty, and there is no logical framework that can comprehend
the causes and conditions. Risking auxiliary epistemic violence, such productions cannot
fully convey the depth of the personal losses nor the complexity and lingering implications of
the horrors. Instead, they further entrench the Jews in their victimhood and their otherness,
ensuring the dead are remembered in masses as nameless ghosts, and the survivors are
revered as relics whose sole function is to serve as living monuments: walking memorial sites
there to evoke sorrow, pity, and guilt.
It is perhaps for this reason that Hannah Arendt (1963), when covering the Adolf
Eichmann trial, was critical of the spectacle created by the internationally publicized event,
and of the overstated, melodramatic aspects of the procedures, which the state of Israel was
utilizing in order to justify its right to exist, and which the rest of the world watched in grave
fascination, seduced by the incriminating details of unspeakable acts of violence. Arendt’s
analysis refrained from participating in the grand celebration of “justice.” In fact, she was
more interested in redefining legal systems and the concept of justice itself so that they could
begin to come to terms not with the specific genocide of the Jews but with the unprecedented
crimes against humanity in which Gypsies, gay people, disabled people, communists, and
anyone suspected of resisting the Nazi regime were systematically gathered, imprisoned,
tortured, and executed. “The trouble with Eichmann,” according to Arendt, “was precisely
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that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they
were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal
institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying
than all the atrocities put together” (276). Arendt’s “banality of evil,” as Judith Butler (2011)
clarifies, refers not only to the “normal,” mundane, progressive, cold, calculated, machinelike ways in which the assaults were carried out, but to the astonishingly effective
suppression of critical thinking that these routinized atrocities implemented. “Indeed,” Butler
writes, “at one point the failure to think is precisely the name of the crime that Eichmann
commits. We might think at first that this is a scandalous way to describe his horrendous
crime, but for Arendt the consequence of non-thinking is genocidal, or certainly can be”
(280). The immense and unfathomable loss of the Holocaust, therefore, is not limited to the
physical suffering and death of millions or the traumatic psychological aftermaths of the
event. On a philosophical, existential level, the loss of thinking leaves a void that no
documentary or fictional representational production can mask.
Perhaps, Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) suggests, a void like that should be treated as
such. To fill it up with information does not lead to understanding but is in fact an injustice to
what should be honored as unknowable. The most perplexing thing about the holocaust, he
notes, is not the torture, death, or dehumanizing of millions, but the way in which it was
done—the methodical, efficient, cost-effective coldness with which the Nazis orchestrated
the project. The historical significance of the Holocaust, accordingly, is that “it was the first
major events of cold systems, of cooling systems, of systems of deterrence and extermination
that will then be deployed in other forms” (50). Such utilizations of machine-efficient
coldness include the nuclear bombs that the U.S. dropped in Japan, the Cold War, and the

86
rise of the media as the supreme empire that dictates all human life: the personal, political,
social, ethical, and psychological (McLuhan 1967, 26). The media, with its forced
remembrance through artificial imagery, then, is an extension and an expansion of a
systematic coldness that has no intention to ask moral questions or to contemplate the
incomprehensible. By its very function it obscures, diverts, and distracts. Ultimately, all
media is distraction—an avoidance that dominates our existence.
The otherness that the German Jews epitomized so perfectly that they had to be
systematically exterminated was an otherness that, like Abel, never posed any physical
threat, and yet possessed a difference profoundly dangerous in essence, perhaps precisely
because of its docile complacency, the unassuming manner with which they assimilated, and
the simultaneous stubborn pride with which they maintained a separate identity. As
nonconfrontational as the gaze of the Jew was, it still resisted and therefore called into
question Christianity’s ascendency and German nationalism, along with their growing ethical
contradictions, which eventually culminated in the concentration camps and the gas
chambers. Nevertheless, not only did the face of the Jew survive the impressively methodical
genocide, it also still grips the German collective social conscience in lingering guilt and
unprecedented national shame. At the same historical moment, Japanese Americans were
forced into internment camps across the U.S., and two massive nuclear bombs were dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, incinerating hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians and
with them the myth of American exceptionalism. The guilt and the shame that still seem to
haunt the German national identity, however, somehow managed to skip over the moral
sensibility of the American people. While much of Europe was recovering from the
devastating destruction left by the war, American mass media immediately started producing
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and broadcasting self-congratulatory narratives that effectively eliminated any potential
doubt regarding the means that led to victory. In the popular imagination, the parallel events
of the Holocaust, the Japanese internment camps, and the nuclear bombings are never
discussed as sharing similar ethical associations, and if they are presented as interrelated at
all, it is usually with the clear-cut positioning of the Jerrys and the Japs as Evil, and the
Americans as the good guys, forced against their will into the war, the bombs an unfortunate
necessity in the honorable mission to ensure the victory of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. This story is repeated over and over again in countless reiterations in books, films,
and television productions. History turns into entertainment, and nowadays both the Jewish
and the Japanese holocausts recede into their respective time capsules, screened specters
shrouded in immateriality. Mediated productions do not merely reenact drama, but enhance it
to induce excitement, total engagement, and cathartic experiences that dwarf any possible
real-life events. This is the seductive power of the hyperreal—it magically captures our
attention and instantly offers escape into a world that offers brighter colors, sharper images,
the ability to travel through time and space, to live all our dreams as well as our nightmares
vicariously.
Without a collective awareness and self-reflexive accountability, as Lisa Yoneyama
(2016) demonstrates, any historical discourse is empty, and any attempt to enact justice is
futile. Focusing on the U.S. bombing of Japan during WWII, Yoneyama connects American
military and political involvement in Japan with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, pointing to the
imagery and the rhetorical strategies that enabled the American media to construct a glorified
and nostalgic understanding of the post–World War II occupation of Japan and the ensuing
tight political and economic collaborations between the two nations as a grand success. The
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popular narrative of self-defense military victory, which is repeated diligently to effectively
obscure the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is bolstered with a continuous celebration of
American freedoms that include the liberation of “oppressed” Japanese women and the
deliverance of the whole population from the dark ages of imperialism and communism into
the progressive light of capitalism and consumerism. These nostalgic tales of post-WWII
“success” and the various scripts of American benevolence repeated in both the U.S. and
Japan during the Cold War, Yoneyama demonstrates, worked well to rally public support for
the first Gulf War in 1990 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as justify other (ongoing)
forceful interventions in the Middle East.
Through an awareness of “transwar connectivity,” Yoneyama emphasizes the need to
reconsider national culpability: “to make connections, to perceive affinities and convergences
of geohistorical elements that have worked together to constitute mid-twentieth century
violence” (2016, 49). Closely examining the rhetoric produced by mainstream news reports,
historical documentaries, fictional films and television shows, and the commodified
proliferation of American ideologies such freedom of speech, democracy, women’s rights, or
individualism reveals the progression that links WWII forgotten atrocities with Cold War
alliances and the post–Cold War period with the present-day global “war on terror.” What a
nation remembers and what it forgets directly defines how it continues to repeat violent acts,
both domestically and abroad. The attentive investigation of what a culture distorts or
subverts provides a critical lens through which to understand how our present conditions are
deeply embedded in the colluding historical legacies of capitalism, militarism, and
imperialism (Yoneyama 2016, 192). Submerged in cultural amnesia, even today it is still all
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too easy for the U.S. to condemn Nazi Germany for the unimaginable horrors of the Jewish
Holocaust without ever stopping to consider the parallel mass murder inflicted on Japan.
In the American popular imagination, Pearl Harbor appears as a unique,
unprecedented attack that stands alone in its bold, uncalled for violence, removed from the
aggressive American political, economic, and military maneuvers that came before and after
the event that “forced” the U.S. to get involved in the war. The reproduced iterations and
tourist-oriented commemoration of Pearl Harbor, along with the Oklahoma City bombing,
the Columbine high school shooting, or the 9/11 attacks, fortify a distinct image of the U.S.
as a model nation of peace and tolerance, suffering, in all these “random” instances,
exceptional and unjust brutalities. These familiar narratives of innocence, Sturken suggests,
“perpetuate the myth that American society is not violent, despite the dominance of gun
culture and the high numbers each year of deaths from gun violence; despite the violence of
late twentieth-century U.S. involvement in the wars in Southeast Asia, Central America, and
the Middle East; and despite the racial violence that has deeply marked U.S. history” (2007,
16). Such national myths, as Roland Barthes (1957) suggests, like other forms of modern
myths propagated by popular culture and mass media, are so powerful precisely because they
do not lend themselves to contradiction or complexity. In the spheres and the media in which
they propagate themselves, there is no room for doubt. The images, language, and frame of
reference that enable modern mythologies are easy to absorb and repeat because they are
essentialized, simplified representations of a tangled, problematic, complicated reality (269).
As modern myths loosen the framework of history and past horrors appear more and
more disconnected, fragmented, and insubstantial, present events too rise out of nowhere like
phantoms, bringing with them unforeseen drama and chaos before falling, just as suddenly,
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into nothingness and into the soothing drug that is mass media. The terrorists of today have
nothing to do with the wars of the previous century, and even less with the conflicts of
tomorrow. The “Axis of Evil” of the early 2000s has little to do with the “Axis powers” of
World War II, and if connections are drawn at all in the American popular imagination, they
sweepingly point right back to the founding fathers’ vision of America as the Empire of
Liberty, a light unto the nations, divinely ordained to spread the good news of “freedom”
throughout the world. When other nations might have different ideas for what freedom means
(it is, after all, a vague and relative term), when they have ideologies and agendas that do not
fit smoothly with the globalized proselytizing of the American way of life, there is no choice
but to declare those nations enemies, and proceed to liberate them from anti-imperialistic
sentiments using the most sophisticated weapons available, waging wars that, in the social
conscience, fail to signify death and destruction, but rather proudly symbolize liberty and
progress.
It is true that the eyes of the keffiyeh-clad Muslim still confront the West with a gaze
full of hurt, hate, and explosive rage. It is a gaze that raises, without the need for words,
penetrating inquiries concerning ideologies the West rarely stops to examine, such as
capitalism, democracy, a very particular concept of “liberty,” and the default superiority of
Christianity and European thought. It is perhaps the only thing that remains of Levinas’s
understanding of the other as an ethical dilemma, a force without which the self stagnates in
moral inertia. It is also true, however, that this gaze, like those of the capitalized Others that
came before it, is distorted by representation—by the insatiable reproductive urges of media
technology. While the West has not yet swallowed and appropriated it as familiar,
entertaining, or fashionable, mass media still works as a disarming agent by the very fact that
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anything that is processed through a screen loses its measurable referents. Without substance,
the image becomes a phantom. It haunts and disturbs, but unless there is an actual terrorist
attack that affects individual bodies directly, it stays contained in the realm of simulation, in
the safe stream of information that remains just outside the definition of “reality” at the same
time that it dictates our experience of the “real.”
Like a virus, today’s terrorism is perceived as a force of pure Evil, isolated from
causes and conditions, and of course devoid of any correlation to the collective self’s moral
standards, although the ethical conduct of the collective other is quickly condemned as
utterly abominable. It is perhaps no longer possible to properly contextualize and historicize
terrorism, but, according to Baudrillard (2002), we can start with the understanding that an
eruption on the scale of the seemingly unimaginable September 11, 2001, attacks “goes far
beyond the hatred that the disinherited and the exploited of the world feel for the global,
hegemonic superpower—those who happened to fall on the wrong side of world order”
(404). In the immediate wake of the September 11 events, news media relentlessly drilled the
footage of the collapsing Twin Towers into the collective memory until it became just that: a
remembrance, an evocative mirage, an emblem of trauma. Never pausing to contemplate the
loss, television shows including Sex and the City, The Sopranos, and The Late Show with
David Letterman decided to simply cut out all background pictures containing the World
Trade Center from their opening credits. “Hollywood followed suit,” reports Lindsey Ellis
(2017), “by cutting shots of the Twin Towers from such films such as Zoolander (2001),
Serendipity (2001), and Kissing Jessica Stein (2001). The Time Machine (2002) and Men in
Black II (2002) removed entire scenes that involved the towers, with the latter swapping in
the Statue of Liberty” (https://www.vox.com/2016/9/9/12814898/pop-culture-response-to-9-
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11). This is cultural amnesia at its best, a fast and seamless erasing of the actual event in
favor of fictionalized simulation. It is also a telling demonstration of the system’s efficient
obliteration of any historical perspective. The September 11 attacks, according to television,
came out of nowhere. That was how America experienced this dark day, and no attempt has
been made to consider the context: the obvious fact that it was a delayed counteroffensive in
the American-Arab war that had started in 1991 with the invasion and destruction of Iraq, a
horrific event in the collective experience of millions of Arabs and Muslims across the world,
known in America in its commercial name the Gulf War, or its catchy, expurgated,
Hollywood-style title Desert Storm. Furthermore, this dissolution of meaning disregards
completely the possibility that the terrorism of today corresponds not only with the American
humiliation and annihilation of Iraq in the 1990s, but the sheer devastation of Vietnam in the
1960s, Korea in the 1950s, and the bombing of Japan in 1945.
The distortion of reality that the media generates moves temporally in both directions,
into the future as well as the past. If the event’s sickening images quickly lost their initial
shock value as they were ceaselessly televised, we can also consider how globally-broadcast
American popular culture may have fertilized the grounds of resistance long before that
festering defiance turned to real-life action. To examine the origins of such a catastrophic
event, we may want to examine an immense number of cinematic productions that are
obsessed with similar catastrophes. Throughout the 1990s, for example, following the first
Gulf War, films such as Under Siege (1992), Passenger 57 (1992), True Lies (1994), or Air
Force One (1997) were hot export commodities that traveled overseas to provide the world
with first-class Hollywood entertainment. In these productions, Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Steven Seagal, Wesley Snipes, and Harrison Ford heroically carry the message of freedom to
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global audiences (applauding and skeptical alike), advertising the exceptional righteousness
of American violence, warranted as a necessary means for upholding justice.
However, pushing propaganda is not all that these films do. By dramatizing and
accentuating terror, they “conjure it up thanks to their power of images, while drowning it in
special effects. But the universal attraction they exert, equal in that aspect to pornography,
shows that the passage to the act is always close. The system shows more of its velleity
toward self-destruction, the nearer it is to perfection or absolute power” (Baudrillard 2002,
405). Is it possible, then, that such popular cultural productions reveal, under the celebratory
glorification of America as a fearless and gallant global superpower, a deep anxiety about the
instability of it all, about the ever-present threat of demise? Looking back, Hollywood’s
fascination with grand-scale disaster started long before the popular action films of the
1990s. From alien invasions and scientific experiments gone wrong to Russian spies and
Muslim terrorists, American cinema is filled with a variety of apocalyptic visions in which
the infiltrating imaginary other, insidious and conspiring, must be exposed and gotten rid of
if the world is to escape total destruction. In this light, amusing classics such as Them!
(1954), Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), or Night of the Living Dead (1968) are but
early links in a long chain of growing insecurities, ever more apparent now with
inexhaustible reiterations of familiar end-of-the-world themes, whether by terrorists,
zombies, radioactive insects, sinister aliens, or unstoppable pandemics.
By the year 2020, the public imagination is programed to visually link zombies,
terrorists, and viruses, who all strike randomly and without any provocation, presenting an
immediate threat of decomposition not only to the vulnerable physical forms of human
beings, but to a whole way of life. Invaders spell catastrophe, and we have seen enough
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stages apocalypses to know that in order to stop the rapid spread of a particularly contagious
pathogen, for example, restrictions of movement, commerce, and social interactions must be
enforced. And yet, despite the countless cinematic scenes embedded in our psyches, we are
taken by surprise as swiftly, like dominos, entire economic, political, and social systems fall.
The stock market is crashing, jobs are eliminated, offices close, and with them schools,
churches, gyms, playgrounds, and shopping malls. Suddenly, innocent civilians must
negotiate the terms of their survival alone, apart from external structures, removed from the
reassuring security of the everyday. Like terrorism, the virus destabilizes the subject not
merely by harboring death and disrupting our routines, but by asking questions we normally
take great care to avoid. Who are we, not as participants in the public domains but alone, in
the privacy of the domestic space? What makes our existence count? What right do we have
to live, if we are to survive while others are dying?
Unlike zombies, aliens, and terrorists, a virus is invisible to the naked eye. For a
moment, the media falters, unsure how to represent that which resists representation. The
great equalizer, the medical mask, comes to the rescue. In a world that demands visual
representation, it becomes the sign of the times, a most recognizable icon that stands for
“pandemic.” While worn in hope of reassuring protection, its blank universality becomes
charged, ironically, with a distinct expression of terror and panic. Like all masks, it covers
and obscures, thus creating an unsettling fear of the unseen, the unknown. Like terrorists,
viruses move freely among us, undetected and imperceptible until they erupt with chilling,
indiscriminatory coldness of which the face mask is in fact the perfect illustration.
Furthermore, fitting for the age of globalization, here is an agent of death that levels
the playfield and attacks the West as much as the Rest, the haves as much as the have-nots,
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regardless of race, ethnic origin, gender, creed, or status. The alterity of the virus does not
question the right to exist of one person over another, of one population over another, but of
the species as a whole. And, as Baudrillard ([1987b] 1990b) speculates, “if we consider the
superiority of the human species, the size of its brain, its powers of thinking, language and
organization, we can say this: were there the slightest possibility that another rival or superior
species might appear, on earth or elsewhere, man would use every means at his disposal to
destroy it” (114). Fitting, too, with the best science fiction nightmares in the history of
entertainment, a rapidly multiplying invisible parasite is the epitome of otherness; an
abominable subversion beyond our understanding or control, threatening to eradicate a
species we believe to be invincible and whose preeminence we take for granted as absolute,
God-given truth.

Figure 2. Palestinian Protesters. Photograph by Musa Al-Shaer, October 14, 2015.

96

Figure 3. Coronavirus in the Occupied West Bank. Photograph by Mohammed Salem,
September 10, 2020.
“An outcome is fatal,” writes Baudrillard ([1990] 1993), “when the same sign
presides over both the advent of something and its demise” (40) as is the case with the
surgical mask, which illustrates perfectly the instability of postmodern semiotics and the
ensuing implosion of meaning. A continent-hopping pandemic threatens more than our
physical existence. As commerce, education, services, facilities, and all public spaces shut
down one by one, the virus becomes a reflection of the notion that, in some respects, “the
whole system is globally terroristic. A greater terror than the terror of violence and accident
is the terror of uncertainty and dissuasion” (42), a suspicion we are not ready to consider. But
the beauty of the hyperreal is its infinite mazes of avoidance. In a determined attempt to
distract ourselves from the unknown, we rely even more heavily on the media, and luckily
that is still in place, with unlimited access to aggregated information, digital communication,
and audio-visual entertainment. We cling to what validates existence and provides security,
unable to see how these very things exacerbate instability.
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Viruses, like terrorism, appear out of nowhere, turn the world upside down in an
instant, shatter the everyday with the persisting anxious question: will things ever be the
same again? Even a killing pandemic, however, can be traced, at least as a signifier, back to
trends that have gathered momentum over the past few decades. The 1976 film Boy in the
Plastic Bubble presented the true story of a boy born with a rare disorder that severely
compromises his immune system. This meant that in order to live, he couldn’t have any
contact with the outside world—with unfiltered air or unsanitized surfaces—and had to stay
in his room where even his parents could not touch him or spend too much time with him.
His homeschooling, play time, and socialization were done by the most advanced computers
available at the time and, of course, television. The tear-jerking drama is a prefiguration of a
future in which we are all going to find ourselves confined to our rooms, instructed by
computers, engaging with screens instead of living beings, obsessed with sheltering ourselves
from the uncertainty of the other, and from intruding bugs, pests, and germs. The story of the
boy and his bubble, Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) observes, “epitomizes the kind of vacuumsealed existence hitherto reserved for bacteria and particles in laboratories but now destined
for us as, more and more, we are vacuum-pressed like records, vacuum-packed like deepfrozen foods and vacuum-enclosed for death… That we think and reflect in a vacuum is
demonstrated by the ubiquitousness of artificial intelligence” (61). We all know that the
outside world can turn on us, and we are also quite skilled at staying indoors and disinfecting
our surroundings. Is it possible, then, that a real virus, when it hits, simply mirrors to us what
is already in the making? Are we not already well on our way to a life in a bubble, a life in
the safe and sterile sites of the hyperreal?
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Over the past few decades, many other productions, more apocalyptic in their premise
and more terrorizing in their affect, have ensured that a deadly contamination is nothing new
in our collective psyche, and yet what is presented as entertainment fails to register properly
when an actual event happens. While sign exchanges go both ways, the transference
mechanism between what is on and off the screen is never exact, as signifiers and referents
constantly slip, slide, and lose relevance. While simulation draws on the actual, and the
actual in turn mimics the fabricated, the system is full of glitches, as the two worlds circle
one another in an ongoing competition for stimulation, excitement, and sensationalism. The
film Outbreak (Petersen 1995), for example, opens with a quote from Nobel laureate in
Physiology and Medicine, Dr. Joshua Lederberg. “The single biggest threat to man’s
continued dominance on the planet,” Lederberg warns, “is the virus.” This is perhaps
scientifically true, but in the context of a fictional drama, it’s hard to tell what to take
seriously. The surgical masks, isolation suits, and face shields worn by Dustin Hoffman,
Morgan Freeman, and Rene Russo look intimidating at first, then normal, and eventually
almost sexy. In 28 Days Later (Boyle 2003), a raging virus transforms the infected into
mutant zombies with an insatiable hunger for human flesh. As governments fail to contain
the epidemic, mass evacuations turn into mass bloodbaths. The post-apocalyptic world into
which the protagonist wakes up eerily foreshadows the desolate streets and abandoned
shopping malls of COVID-19. Traffic signals keep blinking, neon signs keep advertising
seductive products, but the human factor has been removed from the picture, gone into
hiding. Unlike Outbreak, where the classic battle between Good (the honest, warm,
charmingly human Dustin Hoffman) and Evil (the cold, conniving Donald Sutherland) ends,
predictably, with Good cathartically winning and order being restored, 28 Days Later offers a
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grim, radical critique of the shortsighted dysfunction of governments, authorities, and the
capitalist system, and the cannibalistic urges that lurk behind the façade of “progress” and
“civilization.” Nevertheless, as a fictitious production, the film’s political and social
commentary gets lost in the vicarious horror of an irreparable catastrophe. Just entertainment,
we delight. Nothing, we are sure, could look that bad in real life.
Conversely, the documentary series Pandemic (Castro, LaPenne, and McGarry 2020)
features real-life scientists, hospitals packed with influenza patients, and expert physicians
who gravely announce that a novel, incurable strain of the flu is “not a question of if, but
when.” Here too, however, warnings mean little when they are packaged and marketed as a
thrilling television show, starring a young and beautiful female epidemiologist who, like
Dustin Hoffman, risks her own life to save others, fights for what’s right, and makes the
protective gear look like high-tech fashion accessories. Moreover, with the rapid advances of
the actual virus, such a documentary becomes dated faster than it has a chance to make an
impression, as it is already competing with live reports showing images of the sick, the
dying, and their grieving families, doctors working day and night in overcrowded clinics,
close-up interviews with specialists stressing the sacrifices that must be made in order to stop
the disease. The real, as soon as it happens, gets decoded and reprogrammed by the
hyperreal. And in spite of endless images of panic and hysteria, the screen maintains
unwavering faith in the superpowers of the human species. If we come together, the media
insists, cooperate and collaborate, we can defeat the bloodthirsty alien. We have seen it in the
movies, so it must be true. Governments around the world (led by America, of course), will
join forces and share resources. The best scientific minds will work around the clock to
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develop a vaccine. The most altruistic doctors and nurses will dedicate their lives to the
cause. With a little faith, inspiration, and determination, we shall overcome.
Like all wars in the age of simulation, a battle against a virus is characterized by the
“what ifs” of potentiality and speculation. Enemies in previous wars had a face, and later a
keffiyeh and raging eyes, but here is a body-snatching microorganism with no identity, no
skin color, accent, or pungent spices in its food. What kind of other is this? The threat is
particularly powerful precisely because it is insubstantial, transparent, obscure. In a mediadominated world, however, nothing is valid without an image. And visual representation
produced the illusion of control, the belief that we know what we're dealing with and
therefore know how to deal with it. Hence the surgical mask, a mandatory prop that signifies
both danger and salvation: a reassuring sign of science and an emblem of uncertainty that
stands for death. Because the war is televised and its images resemble so closely the fictitious
entertainment productions that precede and are bound to follow it, the actual damage,
experienced by the public as a mediated event, loses its material quality and dwells
somewhere between reality and the screen. The hyperreal, in its excessive and unstoppable
stream of information and visual stimulation, swallows up the death drama automatically,
turning it into a staged act, one that as it is happening is already registering as a distant
memory—a specter—rather than an authentic experience. Behind the panic, the dread, and
the inconveniences, a large-scale crisis such as a war or a pandemic is best dealt with from
the comfort of a well-wired home and a well-stocked pantry. The bunker is already dug, all
we have to do is settle into its disinfected surfaces and tune in, log in, plug in.
As the pandemic-related restrictions demonstrate, the virtual world of the hyperreal
can be a safe and comfortable alternative to the perilous unpredictability of unscreened
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interactions. Overnight, anything that requires physical presence becomes dangerous, and
things that seemed essential, such as work, school classrooms, travel, shopping malls, and
social gatherings, are rendered superfluous. For those with home computers or even just
smart phones and a sufficiently reliable internet connection, it is perfectly possible to slip
into a new form of existence, one that does not include the physical presence of the body.
And of course, for many years prior to the crisis, social media outlets seem to have
anticipated the unwarranted dangers of in-person interactions, and supplemental apps such as
Facetime, Zoom, and Skype ensure that we can still “meet,” “chat,” “visit,” “hang out,”
“date,” and much more. In the world of phenomena, it appears, corporeality might be
outdated, as we find that our projected selves inhabit the virtual realms with ease, and with
the added special effects, poise, and glamour afforded by digital polishing.
The paradox of a retracted human experience and an expanding technological system
leads Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) to suggest that the far-reaching streams of simulation not
only distort or neutralize meaning, but reduce it to a superfluous, withering, unnecessary
thing of the past. Mass media as a system is not concerned with events—only with the
staging of events, with the act of presentation and representation. Form, style, and design
diminish content, and in an endless cycle of replication that has long ago lost its origin, and
in which signifiers circulate endlessly without actual referents, signification dissolves not
only theoretically but on the practical level of social experience. “Everywhere,” Baudrillard
observes, “socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial” ([1981] 1994, 80). In much of the
world, regardless of the sophistication of the technology used, to be a social being means to
be connected to a device. Communication, interactions, and connections depend on electronic
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machines, and the reference points to a social structure that exists outside the structures of
technology are gradually disappearing.
As the organic formation of the human body becomes increasingly self-sufficient,
connected to the outer world through mediated circuits, the function of alterity becomes
obscured. For Levinas ([1984] 2001), the meaning of alterity emerges not from stated
differences, but from the inarticulate phenomenon through which the other emerges as
simply not the self. “Before any attribute,” he writes, “you are other than I, other otherwise,
absolutely other! And it is this alterity, different from the one which is linked to attributes,
that is your alterity. This alterity is not justifiable logically; it is, on the contrary, logically
indiscernible. The identity of the I is not the result of any knowledge whatsoever: I find
myself without looking for myself” (49). Here alterity does not define identity by contrast, as
the core, continuous sense of being the self is a reality that does not require definition. What
the other does is to suddenly present a question that was not there before, a doubt in the very
core of my awareness, a fissure in the continuity of my separate existence. The presence of a
living being outside myself is the primary commencement of a discriminating consciousness,
one that is capable of at least momentarily disidentifying. This sudden break from the totality
of the separate self, Levinas suggests, is immediately accompanied by an ethical uncertainty
regarding what's right and what's wrong.
Following Levinas, alterity is a moral demand that defies categorical differences, that
penetrates much deeper than demarcations of collective disparities. The challenge to the self
would still arise even if only two people were to live on the planet, and even if they were of
the same race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, social standing, and political affiliation. The
irreducible mystery of the other, along with its inevitable threat, potential conflict, and latent
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violence would all be there even if these two people were brothers, as the biblical story of
Cain and Abel illustrates so well. One brother appears to be favored by God. The other,
enraged with jealousy and insecurity, kills him. But the relatively quick elimination of one
brother’s body means the agonizing destruction of the other’s soul. The brother who lives is
the one who continues to suffer⎯banished by God, he is condemned to exile, doomed to
spend the rest of his days wrestling with his marred conscience, forever haunted by the
memory of his brother’s blood crying out from the soil.
“Are 'friends' electric?" asked pop icon Gary Numan in a 1979 hit single. Four
decades later, the question is rhetorical. While contact with other human beings is deemed
too dangerous, electronic devices are much more reliable, sanitary, and reassuring. Bodies
occupying space, sensory experiences, and the range of possible interactions among living
beings are things of the past. The visuality of the screen is no longer an imitation; it is the
ruling power that has come to dominate our world as everything outside of it acquires the
quality of supplemental, peripheral, optional add-ons. What cannot be recorded and
replicated—touch, smell, taste, spontaneity, chance—is demoted, its validity doubtful and
insignificant. “Media, by altering the environment,” writes McLuhan (1967), “evoke in us
unique ratios of sense perceptions. The extension of any one sense alters the way we think
and act--the way we perceive the world. When these ratios change, men change” (41). As the
battle against the virus mandates more and more closures of institutions and facilities, it
becomes increasingly evident that the unpredictable, unhygienic, potentially hazardous world
of the real, while still a nice optional feature, may not be necessary anymore. Anything
imaginable can be purchased online, offices and agencies can offer most of their services
remotely, as do many hospitals and clinics. Doctor’s appointments, consultations,
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psychotherapy sessions, board meetings, conventions, religious ceremonies, mass protests,
birthday parties, family dinners, or just coffee with a friend—all of it can happen on the
screen, with the aid of live video cameras, voice recognition, automated human captioning,
and the exciting new implementations of 3-D technologies. Under the illusion that we are in
control, life in the simulated hyperreal is pleasant and satisfying. We click, scroll, capture,
embed, authorize, choose our own backgrounds, colors, themes, and avatars, “like” what we
like and block or delete the rest. Here, I am master of my universe, I am both the director and
the star of my own show, and the fact that millions of others are doing the same on their own
private screens doesn’t bother me at all. There is no competition. This, in many ways, is
much more appealing than the unruly, unpredictable, infected outside world, a “real” that is
gradually rendered superfluous, soon to become obsolete.
Where does that leave the definition of the subject? Perhaps, Walter Benjamin’s
argument that the aura—the particular vitality and unique impact—of art is lost in the age of
mechanical reproduction can be applied to humans as well. As an individual is being
mediated, processed, and reproduced, its original presence dissipates, becomes lost in
simulation technologies. At the same time that it is stripped of its authentic potency, a work
of art that is copied and circulated assumes a symbolic function that has little—if any—
connection to the social and historical contexts in which it originated. This process of
symbolic exchange is part of the logic of commodity fetishism, which applies to subjects as
well as to objects so that now I too can duplicate myself in digital form as a photographed,
recorded, videotaped, televised, streaming, or embedded rendition, propagating myself
through essentializing images that take on a life of their own, leaving me, their living master
copy, far behind. Without pausing, we pass right into the mesmerizing haze of the virtual.
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Without hesitation, we are ready—and have been for a while—to trade a corporeal existence
for a cybernetic one. Here we are sheltered, immune, and invincible.
What becomes of identity without the one-of-a-kind face of the other before it was
defused and appropriated by the media, before it was masked and distorted beyond
recognition, the face which “resists possession, resists my powers” (Levinas [1963] 1991,
197)? Without that refusal, the self can indulge in an orgy of its own subjectivity with
nothing in the vicinity that could reveal its boundaries, its substantiality, or its ethical
obligation. Under these conditions, identity too, like the oppressed and the persecuted of the
past, is liberated through representation to the point of meaninglessness implosion, of
impotence and futility. All I can do is reinvent myself, polish and rearrange the pixels that
will become my hologram. Free to mimic anything, play multiple roles, construct and
deconstruct my various personas, I too am pulled into the untethered streaming spirals of the
hyperreal, where the “I” circulates without a concrete referent, without origin.
“Let us imagine,” writes Levinas (1989), “all beings, things and persons, reverting to
nothingness. One cannot put this return to nothingness outside of all events. But what of this
nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and the silence of nothingness.
The indeterminateness of this “something is happening” is not the indeterminateness of a
subject and does not refer to a substantive” (30). For Debord and Baudrillard, that
nothingness is no longer imaginary. It is the hyperreal into which organic forms are being
flung, losing their signification in a swirling web of mediated simulation that drains all signs
of meaning. Subjects and objects alike, historical others and present selves, dissolve into a
realm devoid of reference points. Who do we become—as individuals, as a community, as a
nation, as a species—in this hollowed circuitry? Hypothetically, existence does not
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necessitate existents. It can take on an independent construct that is completely removed
from biology, from our current understanding of subjectivity. “Like the third person pronoun
in the impersonal form of a verb, it designates not the uncertainly known author of the action,
but the characteristic of this action itself which somehow has no author” (Levinas, 1989, 30).
Such an existence, however, has no discernment, no consciousness, and therefore no moral
implication. Without the grounding references of subject and object, there is also no identity
and no alterity. The meaning of self and other, therefore, entails phenomena: embodiment,
substance, encounters, sense perceptions, the conflicting forces of the internal and external.
Out of these clashes ethical questions arise and seek to be answered. This is not a choice, it’s
an obligation that is inseparable from consciousness itself.
To be a conscious being is to hold moral responsibilities, and as Arendt warns, the
failure to think that comes with simply following orders and going with the flow of popular
ideologies signifies ethical failure as well. Gitta Sereny (1974) affirms this notion in her
thorough psychological assessment of Franz Stangl, the Nazi commander of Treblinka, who
in 1970 was convicted in West Germany for his part in murdering 900,000 people. The
portrait that emerges from Sereny’s numerous interviews with the imprisoned Stangl is an indepth confirmation of the banality of evil and of the astonishing failure to think of an
intelligent, respectable individual, a law-abiding citizen and a loyal family man. Cognizant
and rational, Stangl keeps claiming that his conscience is clear, that he was doing what he
was told, that despite being in charge of torturing and killing thousands of men, women, and
children, despite witnessing daily the most extreme human suffering and routinely wading
through piles of corpses, there was never any doubt in his mind that he was doing exactly the
right thing. Sereny finds no answer to her persisting question, “Whether evil is created by
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circumstances or by birth, and to what extent it is determined by the individual himself, or by
his environment” (1974, 13). Mirroring the Eichmann trial in Israel several years earlier, the
Stangl trial was another proudly publicized spectacle which allowed Germany to proclaim
accountability and justice to itself and to the world. The captured monster that the media
advertised, Sereny notes, was a fantastical beast that appeared to have little to do with the
quiet, clean, courteous man Sereny sat with for long conversations during her prison visits
(21).
Cogs in the machine, automatons devoid of the capacity to think independently, to
discern right from wrong, to learn from history, and to cultivate a moral core, Eichmann and
Stangl have become sensational icons of evil that are meant to shock and appall the
conscientious reader. Sereny’s work, like Arendt’s, stands out as an unusual form of
representation, one that is invested in the question rather than the answer. Constructing a
narrative grounded in inquiry, these texts are philosophical in nature and therefore untethered
by the particular historical moment they address. The remembering they encourage is not
limited to the specific horrors they engage with, but extends to a moral dilemma that is, in
essence, timeless. Under certain hypothetical circumstances, they ask, could I be an
Eichmann? Given the right incentives, would I become a Stangl? As the famous 1961
Stanley Milgram experiment in obedience and authority suggests, the answer is a definitive
yes. Do the 2020 presidential election riots in the U.S. not demonstrate the persistent
resurgence of white supremacy, racism, and violent hate? Is the state of Israel not a
contemporary model of an apartheid regime that thrives, much like Nazi Germany before it,
on segregation, oppression, and the active persecution of Palestinians? And from an even
bigger perspective, is the rising domination of advanced technology not in itself a form of
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technological imperialism, a system that controls and orchestrates not just national but also
global economic trends, political moves, information exchange, commerce, medicine, and
culture? Plugged into cold machines of calculated programming, the average user of
advanced technology may no longer be fully conscious, capable of autonomous thinking,
unaltered by the medium’s self-bolstering message. If that is the case, then the average user
is also ethically impaired, unable to recognize the right questions, let alone address them.
Reproduction, adapted representation, and simulated otherness remain trapped in the
circuits of symbolic exchange, and are not likely to arouse lasting disturbance in the world of
phenomena, the world of the sensory reactions and material encounters. For alterity to
function as a radical question mark, it must be embodied (Levinas 1989, 38). It must present
to the self an alternative to its own being that is equally subjective, equally capable of taking
up space and time on the same continuous plane. In the far edges of the real, mostly out of
sight and certainly out of mind, such otherness still exists, remaining, for now, inaccessible to
replication technologies, or simply lacking any market value. Undocumented immigrants,
severely handicapped people, disabled veterans, drug addicts, hopeless alcoholics, criminals,
or the extreme poor constitute negligible minorities that on occasion still present a face that is
beyond knowing, beyond possessing. In the times of COVID-19, the homeless are a suitable
example. Unlike the hospitalized, institutionalized, or incarcerated, which are easier to
ignore, the homeless are contained neither by the media nor by the authorities; they are
outside any recognizable system, free to roam among us and disrupt the surface order in their
nonconformity. This caste of “untouchables” rarely enters mainstream concerns as anything
more than a distasteful eyesore: an unfortunate lot, menacing, perhaps even dangerous at
times, unpleasant, inconvenient. Somewhere between human and animal, the living and the

109
dead, the homeless population can often register as resembling the Hollywood zombies we
are familiar with, and while we may be slightly afraid, we can’t exactly take them too
seriously. We have become very skilled at averting our gaze; deflecting the real. In this
reversal of the signification process, here the spectacle has the power to manipulate
experience, to construct and contextualize the encounter. In this case, the reign of the media
is clear: a fictional creature replicated tirelessly in numerous zombie movies gains the status
of an “original,” while the homeless people, inadvertently mimicking a popular culture
image, are mere imitations, easily-dismissed apparitions.
Nevertheless, an encounter with the homeless does have the potential to stir
discomfort, to pose questions. To begin with, every time a disheveled figure in tattered rags
dares to gaze up, every time there is eye contact, a silent doubt arises: Who is the real zombie
in this scene? After all, I am the one who spends most of my life as a human extension of
electronic devices, while the unshaven drifters are out there, day and night, in a reality so
tangible its visceral effects are literally inconceivable to me. I carefully roll down the
window at the stoplight, hand the person a dollar, and drive off to the safety of my bubble,
where to “live” is to click, scroll, drag, copy, paste, delete. If I am not a zombie, certainly I
must be a cyborg.
A deadly virus breeds a new order commanding the public to stay at home. That is, if
you have a home. The rules made for registered voters and compliant cyborgs are impossible
to enforce on the living dead. Vulnerable as they are, and even more feared now that their
very presence indicates exposure, the homeless are exempt from the inconvenient restrictions
that inhibit movement, cancel events, crash the stock market, eliminate jobs, devastate small
businesses, and force social distancing. Following Debord ([1967] 1994), the quarantines,
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closures, and policy of “social distancing” are only official expressions of a growing
alienation that has been at the core of existence for decades—a necessary component of
technological and economic structures. These postmodern arrangements “are based on
isolation, and they contribute to that same isolation. From automobiles to television, the
goods that the spectacular system chooses to produce also serve it as weapons for constantly
reinforcing the conditions that engender ‘lonely crowds’” (20). In other words, social
distancing, a nominally new concept, is, in fact, a reiteration of an already existing condition:
not a cluster of ad hoc measures but a fancy term for a chronic reality that relies on
alienation, isolation, and loneliness in order to successfully market fashionable, must-own
products such as high-definition flat screens, noise-cancelling earphones, digital dating
services, one-click shopping platforms, and other options that further distance us from human
contact and the physical world. In separate little bubbles, the moral dilemma that is
embedded in an actual encounter with an other in a shared space in real time is suspended
and disabled, rendered unnecessary.
After weeks and months of closures, lockdowns, social distancing, and quarantines,
the attempt to stop the spread of the pandemic is only marginally successful. Ambiguity
persists, and infection rates are still on the rise. Like terrorism and other unwanted
disruptions to the convenient routine, the virus is understood at large not through direct
experience, but through mediated abstraction. The spontaneous eruption of grand-scale
annihilation, a global catastrophe that destabilizes all man-made systems and defies
containment, could serve as a mirror, but it is one we are not prepared to look into. In truth,
we may be unable to consider what is being reflected, because it resides just outside the
frame of reference of the presumed superiority of our species. Is it possible that as the human
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race moves towards a more fragmented, insulated form of existence, its presumed superiority
is gradually declining, giving way to the rise of machines of various kinds as the dominant
force on a degrading planet? Could it be that those machine, their elaborate networks, and
their endless circulation of information and entertainment are having a debilitating effect on
our capacity to consider not only long histories of atrocities and destruction, but present
deteriorating realities as well? Are the mechanisms of simulation as benign as they appear to
be, or do they promote, by their very nature, a state of mass amnesia that makes it harder and
harder to engage with the parts of physical phenomena that do not lend themselves to the
representational dominions of symbolic exchange?
“Whenever we hear the promises of tech being extolled,” writes Ruha Benjamin
(2019), “our antennae should pop up to question what all that hype of ‘better, faster, fairer’
might be hiding and making us ignore” (48). Benjamin’s recent work on algorithmic
computations and the perpetuation of conventional racial divides in digital media calls
attention to the unprecedented cultural reliance on machines. In truth, the term “culture” can
no longer be separated from the mechanized apparatuses that produce or document it, and yet
the devices and procedures upon which culture now depends can be easily-dismissed as
negligible features. Nevertheless, they do merit acknowledgement as critical factors in
contemporary mimetic practices that obfuscate unwelcomed discrepancies between the real
and the hyperreal.
The threat of a novel virus is alien, terrifying, and impossible to comprehend not only
because, like terrorism, it is dynamic, adaptable, and unpredictable, but also because it
emerges from the uncharted territories that lie outside the screen. The fraying real, which is
where disease, decay, and death occur, is getting more and more remote, difficult to access

112
because we no longer know how to consume and digest an open narrative that does not
conform to the familiar formulas of mediated historical narrative and commercial
storytelling. The approach of death, writes Levinas ([1947] 1987), “indicates that we are in
relation with something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a
provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as something whose
very existence is made of alterity” (43). The debilitating totality of such a threat is an
adamant question mark that demands attention, but currently we are all a little busy
uploading ourselves onto the high-resolution monitors of cybernetic existence.

Figure 4. A Police Car Passes Homeless People in Los Angeles After Covid-19 Restrictions
Went into Effect. Photograph by David McNew/Getty Images.
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Chapter Four
Cyborgs

While following pandemic-related orders and retreating into domestic isolation, the screens
that surround most individuals, at least in the wealthier parts of the world, ensure that we stay
properly occupied with streaming films, television shows, music to fit any mood, podcasts,
and of course the constantly updated news. Social media allows us to feel well connected to
the intricate web of the communal hyperreal, where all professional and personal
relationships transcend the limitations of time and space by cyber optic technology, while
physical bodies remain securely seated in the same spot, safe from the raging threat of the
virus. Although the “shelter in place” order did not introduce any new technologies, it did
elevate internet-enabled work duties, social interactions, commerce, and communication to a
default status, turning high speed Wi-Fi into an elementary necessity, along with a good cell
phone plan that includes enough data to facilitate a virtual connectivity. When the Pew
Research Center started systematically tracking internet usage in the U.S. in early 2000,
about half of all adult Americans were already regularly connected to the World Wide Web.
In 2021, the percentage has risen to 93%. In headcount terms, that is still less than the
numbers recorded in India and China (Pew Research Center,
www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband). According to a 2013 report in
Forbes Magazine, more people have mobile phones around the world than have access to an
indoor, flushing toilet (Worstall 2013,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/03/23/more-people-have-mobile-phonesthan-toilets/?sh=65315ba76569). Given that the water closet was invented several centuries
ago and cell phones are only about 30 years old, the statistics are certainly alarming when
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considering glaring inequalities in living conditions, and yet clearly reflect the prioritized
prominence of portable, cordless communication devices. And while these trajectories have
been steadily solidifying over the past two decades, the COVID-19 global crisis has brought
them into a clear focus, as actual outings must be drastically reduced to a minimum, and
face-to-face encounters that are not absolutely essential gradually seem increasingly
outdated, awkward, time consuming, logistically inconvenient, and of course extremely
unsafe.
This chapter contemplates the increasing cultural and social dominance of digital
technologies, along with the growing human dependency on the internet, screened devices,
and image-based information. In this exploratory study I examine correlations between
artificial intelligence and human cognitive processes, suggesting that the constant exposure to
streaming information might be altering human experience to the point of changing modes of
producing, receiving, and processing knowledge. The similarities are evolving not only
because computer programs are designed to imitate human mental faculties, but because
these very programs then become models that set standards for human functioning,
prescribing calculated manners of thinking, behaving, and relating by repeatedly
demonstrating efficient and precise coding and decoding practices. I continue the
examination of rhetoric and imagery related to the COVID-19 pandemic, looking at how
representations of the emerging catastrophe position the “knowing” self in relation to the
unknown other. In the midst of a global crisis, local upheavals erupt, attempting to contest
and upturn systems of discrimination, and yet under the prescribed instant appropriations of
mass media, which rely on spectacle, shock value, and prospective marketability, even
spontaneous outbursts of resistance, it appears, are subject to the laws of simulation and cash-
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nexus, as the mechanisms of the hyperreal quickly devour the contents of radicalism,
highlighting the drama of struggle and diminishing the potential for an actual destabilization
of social and political power structures.
Contemporary subjectivity, writes Colin Koopman (2019), is an informational
subjectivity, contingent on the amassing of personal data: the methodical buildup of
information that now precedes the person. Starting with our birth certificate and continuing
with our school records, medical records, driver’s license, bank accounts, work performance
reports, insurance policies, retirements plans, and all the various profiles we might create on
work, business, or commercial websites, not to mention social media, this representation of
who we are in the form of collected data will outlive us long after our death certificates are
properly processed through the official channels. Building on Foucault’s genealogies of the
biopolitical and disciplinary subject, Koopman tracks the shift that began in the early part of
the 20th century and continues today, a procedural systematizing of all possible human
activities for the purpose of compiling enough data to assess, by means of algorithmic digital
data managing, a person’s place within scales and measurements of categorized population
subdivisions that include race, class, gender, age, ability, productivity, and monetary net
worth. At some point in the past few decades, through the accelerated rise of technologies of
tracking and chronicling, information began to define human life. It is now possible for
information systems to draw up persons, in vivid detail that includes facts, figures, pictures,
and videos, as if from out of nowhere. From the cradle to the grave, human lives are being
recorded and uploaded into databases that are not restricted by the physical space old file
cabinets required, and that are not subject to the natural laws under which human bodies still
decay, wither, and die (Koopman 6). To legitimize existence, the life of every registered
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citizen in any region on the planet is now digitized, neatly and safely stored in hard drives
and accessible clouds, where it can also be dissected and processed for the purpose of
determining the correct placing and potential value of each individual.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought this digital authentication of human life to a
clear focus. Strangely, after a while, the “new normal” does not seem that new after all. The
transitioning from the physical to the virtual has started long before the lockdowns. The
American higher education system, for example, has already been investing more and more
in developing online courses that successfully compete with traditional face-to-face
offerings. “Between 2015 and 2016,” writes Hyungjoo Yoon (2019), “among about 20
million American students (17 million undergraduates and 3 million graduates), 6 million
students took more than one distance course, and approximately half (2.2 million
undergraduates and 0.8 million graduates) were exclusively online learners” (65). The Covid19 closures and the shift to online educational modalities highlight the many alreadyestablished advantages of the virtual campus: students from all over the country and the
world can have access to college education, instructors and administrators can work from the
comfort of their private homes, expenses go down when classrooms and study halls remain
unused, and unlike janitors and maintenance crews, IT personnel can be outsourced,
eliminating the need for proximity and actual presence. Similarly, online shopping, which
was also already creating dramatic changes in consumption habits, now simply becomes the
safest and easiest way to purchase just about anything, making even the most loyal customers
of certain chains wonder about the immense space and enormous resources taken up by real
stores, not to mention the hassle of driving and parking, and of course the high risk of
contracting disagreeable diseases.
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The news reports that are being updated daily (if not hourly), struggle to accurately
depict a living creature that does not easily lend itself to mediated representation and yet
possesses incredible multiplying powers, replicating itself and traveling to all corners of the
world at an astonishing speed. As people are instructed to shelter in place, quarantine, or selfisolate, communication and information technologies—when these are available—enable the
continuation of common life functions such as employment, schooling, shopping, and getting
together with colleagues, family, and friends. As all of these assume their virtual form, a
semblance of normalcy is maintained, contingent upon access to good Wi-Fi and a
dependable interactive screen. The web-enhanced conditions created by the contagious virus
may have further muddled the boundaries between the real and the virtual, but they did not
invent the blurring of the lines. The technological infrastructure was laid out long ago, and
the system of the hyperreal has been in full operation for several decades now.
The changes introduced by media—by the distortion of scale, pace, and meaning—
suggest that as a species we might be moving toward a different kind of existence, one that
correlates with machines in an ever-tightening interdependency, and one in which method
directs all thought and perception. Rationality and logic, Marshall McLuhan (1967) argues,
are equated with linearity, continuity, and uniformity, and are thus contingent “on the
presentation of connected and sequential facts and concepts” (45). As the real is increasingly
confused with its simulated and mediated depictions, everything must be performed and
understood in the shorthand, universal language of ordered visual signs; outlines that we can
process quickly and efficiently, as machines do, by simply decoding information spreads
according to the grids and frameworks of a uniformly programmed operation system.
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For example, the news portals all feature charts that update daily and report, with
great presumed accuracy, on the trajectory of the COVID-19 curve. The tracking of the
infected, the dead, and the recovered, and the graphs that illustrate the virus’s advancements
eerily resemble stock market boards that trace, moment by moment, the ups and downs of
economic trends. The figures and the arcs are essential for identifying patterns, and as
viewers and readers of the information the media presents to us, we have no choice but to
process the information according to the method of presentation, by focusing on numbers,
measurements, and calculations. The mechanism, as McLuhan (1967) argues, transforms the
user so that nothing is left untouched: all environments and experiences are perceived and
experienced differently as humans necessarily conform to the system’s modus operandi.
“Information pours upon us, instantaneously and continuously. As soon as information is
acquired, it is very rapidly replaced by still newer information” (63). In terms of cognitive
processes, “our electrically-configured world has forced us to move from the habit of data
classification to the mode of pattern recognition” (63). As computer programs take over the
tasks of collecting, sorting, and arranging quantifiable data, humans are guided towards
seeking recognizable and repeatable formulas, ones that will provide a measure of order and
a sense of control over the unknown.
The constantly updating COVID-19 charts relieve the uncertainty of an impending
apocalypse by the controlled detachment with which the daily reports are presented. On
television, internet news portals, and phone apps that flash with updates every few minutes,
the information highway races along its unseen tunnels and overpasses in a massive flood of
facts and figures, analysis and commentary. In charting the progress of the dreaded enemy,
the “curve” has become a visual symbol of the virus’s vigor and stamina, a sign of
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catastrophe. And since a direct battle with an invisible opponent is not an option, the goal is
to “flatten the curve,” because curves, as we know from lessons in economics, are only
productive within limited allocated margins. Small ripples are fine, but big waves indicate
disaster. An occasional bump here and there can be controlled, easily absorbed by the surface
appearance of equilibrium, but tall waves are unwelcomed because, like the other, they stand
out in their alterity, in their menacing, subject-negating totality. A representative of the
tenacious microorganism, the curve is the postmodern Grendel we must destroy, deploying
the best technologies of the hyperreal, namely a collective retreat into controlled
environments where the screen orders us to await further instructions.
Religiously tracking every minor shift, we, the viewers, operate like morgue room
statisticians as the dead, conversely, become individually insignificant compared with their
numeric representations, and with the global obsession with flattening the curve, which
would symbolize, in the universal language of colorful diagrams, victory. It is likely that in
the future, after the virus is defeated, narratives will emerge, in the form of historical
documentaries or fictional horror movies, that will attach names, faces, and identities to the
quarantined and the infected, the observers and the observed. For now, however, the
terrorizing alterity of the virus is neatly contained in columns, maps, and grids, as our
scientific reasoning finds reassurance in carefully administered configurations, even—or
perhaps especially—if so far those configurations might indicate catastrophe.
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Figure 5. Going South: New Confirmed Covid Cases by Region, ʼ000: Seven-Day Moving
Average. John Hopkins University CSSE, June 2020.

Figure 6. S&P 500 with Moving Average. Pippa Stevens, CNBC, October 2, 2019.
To accompany the computation techniques of aggregated data, the media also offers a
seductive spectacle of the plague in numerous, repetitive pictures of the doctors, nurses, and
patients, all faceless and nameless as well under the mandatory surgical masks. The images
complement the charts in their elimination of the subject, portraying well-sanitized hospital
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rooms where the infected lie under bright neon lights, hooked up to ventilators, tubes, and
monitors—a clean and controlled scene supervised by astronaut-resembling health care
providers encased from head to toe in protective gear. If the detailed graphs tracking the
COVID curve are reminiscent of stock market reports, the photographs represent the virus
within the same familiar visual framework of science fiction movies, where the sets, the
lighting, and the props signify a terrifying threat, panic, and catastrophe. Here again, the
simulation predates the real, and distinctions between the two are unclear. Much more than
an organic, naturally-occurring disease, the virus has assumed monstrous proportions as it is
cast in the role of the menacing invading alien, an abomination that must be contained and
destroyed by the best means available to the human species: the sterilized detachment of the
scientific method and the representational technologies of the media.

Figure 7. COVID-19 Patients in China. Video, Reuters, February 2020.
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Figure 8. The First US Deaths Related to Coronavirus Might Have Occurred Weeks Earlier
Than Previously Thought. Photograph by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty, April
2020.
A fast-moving, life-threatening, invisible microorganism easily complements the
media’s familiar terror-producing formulas. As Alien (1979) director Ridley Scott explains in
an interview with Variety’s reporter Susan King (2019), the best horror and science fiction
movies are those that reveal as little as possible and imply—rather than expose—the
presence of an unfathomable otherness. “The best screening room in the world,” he suggests,
“is the space between your ears, which is your brain. So, it’s learning to tap into the human
brain to show just so much. Let the brain do a lot of the work. That’s where you start to tap
into people’s anxieties.” What generates profitable suspense in Alien, especially the first film
in the series, is the imagined, not the seen. Slow cinematic pacing, prolonged shots of empty
corridors, murky lighting, suggestive dialogues, and lengthy silences all contribute to the
claustrophobic tension and the building terror of what is hidden, what is unknown. So it is
with the information about the Corona virus: the scientific attempts to analyze, predict, and
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contain the threat leaves us baffled, worried, plagued with disturbing uncertainty when the
virus continues to spread, suddenly erupts, or quietly mutates.
As we study the daily charts tracking the virus, what we would really like to see is the
recognizable formula of the best-selling narrative arc of all popular culture, be it the latest
blockbusters, our most cherished television shows, good old superhero comic books, or the
trendy short stories in the New Yorker. The tried-and-true recipe rarely deviates from the
normative method of exposition, rising action, climax, falling action, and resolution. While
the virus is raging in exciting places like New York, Los Angeles, London, and Paris, we
become the loyal audience to a narrative that is presented to us in the most familiar of terms.
The “action,” so to speak, rises along the colorful lines of the graphs, and although there are
discouraging, unnerving delays, the upward climbing arc can inherently only lead to a final
spike that will signal the turning point and the satisfying culmination of the episode. It is not
the content, but the simplicity of the mode of presentation itself that provides comforting
reassurance, even when what is being depicted is utterly unpredictable.

Figure 9. Standard Narrative Arc. Image by Jeff Manghera, April 2020.
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In many ways, the original 1979 Alien provides a curious symbolic precursor to the
2020 virus invasion. First, there is the prophetic positioning of the computer as the surrogate
director, the artificial overseer of all human activities that has become so much part of our
reality we no longer pause to question it. In the film, the spaceship’s navigation system,
maintenance, and proper operation are completely dependent on a central computer the crew
members fondly call “Mother.” This simulated supervisor is what wakes up the crew after a
long, prescribed hibernation, and is responsible for the well-being of the astronauts who,
upon awakening, discover that something went wrong while they were sleeping. Problems
begin when the humans, out of uncalled for comradery, disobey Mother and break her strict
quarantine orders, thus allowing the parasitical alien to infiltrate the vessel. After
disappearing into the dark mazes of the ship’s engine and storage chambers, the creature
grows, evolves, learns the ways of the humans, and mutates accordingly so it can
successfully prey on them.
The film, as Barbara Creed (1993) observes, presents a visual expression of
humanity’s primal fear of the unknown and unknowable. The threatening unknown, she
suggests, is semiotically feminine in nature, as it points to an ahistorical life force that is
symbolized in Alien by various means: the repeated retreat of the creature into the dark
tunnels of the spacecraft, its erotic physicality, its flexibility and adaptability. The
shapeshifting creature, then, is a fetishized rendition of a primal feminine energy that has the
ability to produce, out of the formless void of the womb, a living being. “The central
characteristic of the archaic mother,” Creed writes, “is her total dedication to the generative,
procreative principle. She is the mother who conceives all by herself, the original parent, the
godhead of all fertility and the origin of procreation” (27). Such an energy is indiscriminatory
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in essence; destructive as much as it is productive. Like nature itself, it is outside morality,
law, or any dualistic distinctions between good and evil. Beyond the terrorizing
entertainment it offers, the speculative value of the film suggests that the slow killing of the
crew members is random but not necessarily senseless. From the alien creature’s point of
view, which is the fetishized point of view of nature, death is neither good nor bad, but
simply a necessary component of life’s creation process. Why, then, should human life
(ironically already governed by the biomechanical mother computer) be worth more than that
of the mother creature, who remains unseen throughout the film, but who protects her
offspring and guards her eggs as fiercely as any other mother?

Figure 10. Nurses Attend to a COVID-19 patient at the Pope John XXIII Hospital in
Bergamo, Italy. Photograph by Marco DiLauro, April 2020.
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Figure 11. Ridley Scott’s Alien, 1979. In Wired, June 2020.
Because we have the ability to discern and differentiate, categorize and catalogue,
condone or condemn, a volatile interaction with a nondiscriminatory creature—be it a
fictional monstrous alien or an actual (but invisible) virus—is a threat to the notion of human
superiority, which we never stop to fully question. On Earth, this notion is undebatable,
which is why science fiction often takes its speculative inquiries to outer space, where the
perspective is expanded enough to reconsider the very foundations of human existence:
moral principles, government, law, science, culture, language, religion, interpersonal
relationships, and the unspoken anthropocentric belief that, despite Galileo, not only the sun
but the whole universe revolves around us. Away from our home planet, all that we take for
granted becomes subject to interrogation, including our obsession with method. In Stanislaw
Lem’s (1961) Solaris, generations of scientists who attempt to study the apparently conscious
plasma that covers the distant planet Solaris become living (or dying) testimonies to the
limitations of method. Libraries filled with records, charts, measurements, calculations,
dissertations, encyclopedias, volumes upon volumes of neatly filed observations and
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hypotheses are eventually abandoned, as the foreign and formless substance refuses to follow
any predictable patterns. It does respond to experimental provocations, but not consistently,
and not in any way that makes sense. After years and decades of elaborate research, the
scientific community has as little understanding of this alien entity as at the time of the very
first encounter.
On the abandoned space station floating above the ocean that can shape itself into
many unfathomable, both spectacular and grotesque forms, a handful of defeated researchers
are left to face not the uncooperative other, but their own forgotten demons. The mysterious
forces on the planet are able to produce living replicas of people with whom the crew
members have had a significant history, and who have left disturbing imprints in their
psyches. These haunting, impossibly materialized apparitions too are studied, to no avail. The
station’s researchers lock themselves in their private quarters in an attempt to deal with the
terror of the fleshed-out manifestations of their respective dark secrets. All try to kill the
“visitors,” but the uninvited guests magically reappear as new within a few hours, and with
no recollection of the murder attempt. In a virtual conference call on their computer screens,
the three remaining men discuss their observations and pose their theories. The main question
is, what are these creatures? “They are not autonomous individuals,” observes one of the
scientists, “not copies of actual persons. They are merely projections materializing from our
brains, based on a given individual” (Lem 1961, 102). But what is the motivation for
constructing such unsettling figures for the facility’s crew? “It is natural enough to assume,”
the improvised symposium continues, “that we are the subject of an experiment. When I
examine this proposition, the experiment seems to me badly designed. When we carry out an
experiment, we profit by the results and, above all, we carefully note the defects of our
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methods” (103). But the shapeshifting, reactive plasma of Solaris does not conform to
familiar protocols. When the creatures are destroyed and disposed of, they reemerge exactly
as they were, with not a single detail modified in any way. The preciseness of the model and
the lack of alterations lead the researchers to the question not only of motive but of
individuality, of which, they agree the ocean has no comprehension. All of its activities,
including these cruel experiments on the humans, are not premeditated, and have no
malicious premeditation behind them.
Left with no explanations, no rational course of action, and no choice but to face the
pestering terror of their cloned guests, the scientists, one by one, must admit the failure of
their prescribed methods of knowledge production, and ultimately the collapse of knowledge
itself. While the artificial replicas that appear on the space station demonstrate a range of
human traits and emotions such as rage, suspicion, vulnerability, playfulness, shyness,
dependency, joy, and despair, the humans adhere, at least at first, to the cool, calculated,
reserved manner of impartial scientific research. Like many other speculative narratives
involving robots, clones, or cyborgs in human form (a few popular examples include Blade
Runner, Terminator, and Battlestar Galactica), Solaris engages with the age-old Promethean
question: What makes a human human? What differentiates the master copy from its
mechanical reproductions? As the façade of stable objectivity deteriorates, and as the
presence of the visitors leads to increasing exhaustion and repeated mental breakdowns, the
scientists are no longer able to rely on objective, measurable facts. Within the parameters of
unresolved doubt and unpredictable subjective experience, moral dilemmas become open to
new interpretations. Under some circumstances, they discover, lying is the only conceivable
option, and the same applies to stealing, manipulating, killing, or, when all else fails,
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committing suicide. There are no unbreakable rules or universal truths. Away from planet
Earth, as science and its methods deteriorate to the point of futility, ambivalence,
unreconcilable contradictions, and uncertainty emerge as the predominant properties of
existence.
In many ways, the reality of the 21 st century has surpassed the speculative
premonitions of the best science fiction productions of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. “Am I a man
or a machine?” asks Jean Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) rhetorically, because in truth “this
anthropological question no longer has an answer” (57). In the conflating of the real and the
simulated, subject and object, and cause and effect, a blending of the physical body with the
devices that surround it occurs as well. In an excessively visual culture, even looking itself is
not the independent act of an autonomous subject—it is a function that is guided by and
repeatedly directed toward the screen, readily mediated by the lens of the portable camera
that leaves nothing outside its scope. Every instance of looking, then, becomes gauged by its
usefulness in relation to the screen; to the inputs and outputs of circulated information. Thus,
although sight has become the disproportionately dominant sense through which we
experience the world, vision is in fact increasingly limited, reduced to the parameters of our
electronic devices, applied according to the technical dictates of computer chips.
The obsession with image, with sight as the ultimate instrument of cataloguing,
organizing, and ordering, makes us into walking computers that are programmed to register,
process, and taxonomize information by merely glancing at something. In fact, we rarely
actually look anymore; glancing is more than enough to fit the visual signs into their proper
place in the grids and charts of our methodical interpretations. And while extraterrestrial life
forms may throw us off, we were especially skilled at processing visual data when it comes
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to other members of the human species. This is one reason why after decades and centuries
of reputable scientific evidence to the contrary, skin color still plays such a major role in the
human fixation on divisions of “same” and “other.” What is most visible is what holds
signifying power, and it only takes a split second to process images of humans according to
racial distinctions.
In the midst of a global pandemic that resembles a science fiction movie, another
form of exciting action—much more human and ordinary—sweeps over the U.S. as race riots
flare up in various cities after a white police officer restrained a black suspect in the streets of
Minneapolis by pinning him to the ground and forcefully pressing his booted foot on the
man’s neck. The unarmed, fully surrendered black man dies. After weeks of prolonged
quarantine, angry protestors abandon precautions and pour out of their homes in order to
show solidarity with the grieving and outraged black community in Minneapolis and all over
the U.S. The protests quickly turn into violent clashes in which fires burn, people are injured,
and many get arrested. All of a sudden, attention shifts from the obscure, novel virus to the
more common, visible, and recognizable form of alterity: the African-American Other. The
media celebrates this orgasmic release of tension with repeated footage of demonstrations
that start out as peaceful, nonviolent gatherings à la Martin Luther King’s sit-ins and
marches, but quickly escalate into a war zone of enraged crowds, burning dumpsters, torched
buildings, looted stores, tear gas, water hoses, beatings, shootings, and arrests.
Social media explodes with more of the same: posters, slogans, photographs, and
video clips all documenting the new social movement that is intent on eradicating, once and
for all, racial inequality and all other forms of discriminatory practices. Minority groups form
Zoom-enabled alliances, and every supporter quickly proclaims heartfelt encouragement
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through enthusiastic social media posts advertising the movement’s trendy catchphrases:
“Black Lives Matter,” “White Silence is Violence,” or “I Can’t Breathe,” which becomes an
ironic pun when coupled with the mandatory face mask. No longer interesting, no longer
new, the global virus is thrown off the stage in favor of a widespread virtual uprising intent
on reinstating justice. In the age of the hyperreal, and of course during the pandemic, one is
not required to actually march the streets with the angry crowds or even leave the house at
all. Joining the movement is made easy by attaching the right hashtags to Facebook and
Instagram posts, donating to the cause (the Black Lives Matter website accepts all major
credit cards as well as PayPal), and buying the official merchandise, which includes T-shirts,
sweatshirts, tote bags, coffee mugs, yard signs, bumper stickers, baseball caps, and—of
course—face masks. In addition, to be an antiracist, one is expected to shop at businesses
owned by people of color and catch up on appropriate entertainment by choosing to watch
social-justice-themed films and television shows (Netflix immediately started advertising
special lists of recommended must-see productions).
The appropriation and commodification of black lives and the visual representations
of social struggle are not a new phenomenon. Leigh Raiford’s (2011) examination of
photography as a tool of resistance used by grass roots African American movements reveals
the uneasy dynamics by which self-defining images intended to challenge the dominant order
are taken up, publicized, and commercialized by the very mainstream culture they originally
attempt to counter. Photography, Raiford argues, was used with careful intention by early
twentieth century anti-lynching campaigns as well as the civil rights and the black power
movements to mobilize participants, define goals, narrate histories, and construct visible
identities for marginalized individuals and groups marked for racial exclusion. While visual
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self-representation “offered activists a seemingly democratic and versatile medium through
which they could visually reference, reframe, or reject dominant political categories” (9), it
only partially succeeded in reclaiming and remaking black identity. Because, as Roland
Barthes ([1957] 1980) suggests, the subject in a visual representation merges with the object
that is the photograph and becomes one with the medium, the distinction between signifier
and signified becomes unclear. The human eye perceives things as they appear in their
simulated depiction, and as the medium itself (of photography or any other visual recording)
does not offer or encourage critique, it is the viewer, the observer, the interpreter, who must
subvert the convincing façade of mediated documentation. Following Barthes’ commentary
on photography’s stifling, fixing quality—the “death mask” that images carry as they
suspend subjects in time as unchanging presences—the pictures, video footage, manifestos,
merchandise, and catchy slogans of social movements appear to emancipate as they
simultaneously capture and pin identities, reinforce racial hegemonies, and hold subjects
imprisoned in history and memory. Within the contradictory tensions between liberation and
entrenched captivity (now aggravated and accelerated by digital media), the struggle itself
seems to collapse into a vortex of endless regurgitation of defunct verbal and visual
information that advertises resistance, protest, or dissent, but ultimately fails to achieve
lasting change.
According to the logic of advertising and consumer culture, the self-congratulatory
actions of purchasing politically correct products, flaunting the right gear, and planting the
appropriate sign in the front yard are apparently sufficient to end centuries of racial
inequality and move on into a bright and promising future. “Now We Transform,” as the
home page of the Black Lives Matter website declares. In the society of the spectacle,
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enhanced by the wonders of technology and the confinements of the pandemic, theatricality
seems to be the only currency that holds value. “Since it is no longer possible to base any
claim on one’s own existence” writes Baudrillard ([1990] 1993), “there is nothing for it but
to perform an appearing act without concerning oneself with being.” The main thing about
social change in the postmodern era, according to the logic of the hyperreal, is the
appearance of the change; the ability to promote, advertise, endorse, and consume justice as
a fetishized commodity. When manufacturers of fashion accessories equate advertising as
activism, customers are taught to recognize and purchase popular products that will allow
them to build, in their own homes, ready-to-wear, made-in-China, one-size-fits-all antiracist
ideologies and identities.
In her critique of white liberals who take it upon themselves to represent and speak
for the marginalized other, Gayatri Spivak (1988) questions the motives and forces behind
such rescue missions. What drives the elite left, for example, to fight passionately alongside
the downtrodden proletariat? “The link to the workers’ struggle,” she proposes, “is located in
the desire to blow up power at any point of its application” (67). Such solidarity, then, has
less to do with the specific, everyday conditions and hardships of the actual working class, as
those remain securely removed from the experience of the upper-class activist, and more to
do with elegantly jumping on the rolling wagon of resistance. Thus, as this joining of forces
“is apparently based on the simple valorization of any desire destructive of any power” (67),
in this meeting point of objectives the subaltern’s authentic longing for the end of suffering
becomes a conduit for the generalized liberal’s ideological desire to overthrow the
government. And while on the surface there is nothing wrong with such a merging of
aspirational forces, the actual result is a perpetuation of the victim role the marginalized are
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expected to perform, and a full endorsement of what Spivak terms “strategic essentialism”—
the political deployment of reductive group identities as a means of mobilizing a resistance
movement. Black Lives Matter is a contemporary case in point, as it loudly calls attention to
the very visual racial distinctions the movement proclaims to adamantly oppose. Through the
technologically-enhanced emphasis on appearance, spectacle, and the drama of protest, the
non-white other ceases to exist as an individual as it is elevated to a symbolic level,
becoming—willingly or unwillingly—a recruited representative of the oppressed. Depending
on the context, the shell of symbolic representation can signify suffering, rage, defiance,
martyrdom, etc., and the particular lives of individuals matter only to the extent that they lend
themselves to the symbolic functions of both injustice and resistance.
At a time when a novel virus, a colorless and color-blind microorganism that kills
without discrimination, that, like classic science fiction aliens, does not differentiate or
prioritize its killing, the resurgence of racial upheaval is, perhaps, a comforting familiar
alternative. To bring the focus back to the human other may be an understandable reaction to
the terror of more radical forms of alterity. The color line, after all, has been around much
longer than the Corona virus, and it is where the human species gets to exercise discernment,
categorization, and calculated taxonomies of visual difference—powers the novel virus does
not possess. Like the monster in the original 1978 Alien movie, the Corona virus is, as the
admiring android scientist, Ash, observes, “the perfect organism. Its structural perfection is
matched only by its hostility… A survivor ... unclouded by conscience, remorse, or delusions
of morality” (1:26). It is precisely its purely utilitarian, undiscriminating nature that makes
the alien creature, as well as the virus, into a form of alterity so incomprehensible it is,
apparently, intolerable. If attention is directed to clearly visible, tried and true racial divides,
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the new resistance movement seems to say, then there might be hope for subverting the
equalizing threat of the virus and regaining control over the question of difference. Once
more the human other is absorbed into an efficient system of representation that diffuses its
potential ethical inquiry. Black Lives Matter rises as a promising insurgent force in cyber
space, takes social media by storm, and people respond with all the excitement of new hope
for change. And then, just as quickly, the riots are quelled, the gatherings disperse, and the
noise subsides. The medium has absorbed the message, devoured and neutralized it, and the
world goes on with its racial structures intact and uninterrupted.
Online, on the attractive websites of the resistance and on social media, justice seems
attainable, solidarity feels radical and hopeful, and a colorblind society appears like a
plausible prospect, provided all white folk commit to the correct rhetoric of antiracism. With
their reliable objectivity, equal access to all, and their unbiased operation systems, the virtual
realms of advanced technology offer a convincing vision of a better future, one in which
visual differences no longer matter. However, as Ruha Benjamin (2019) demonstrates, that
premise might be a disappointing illusion. In response to Mark Zuckerberg’s vision of AI
development as the modeling of machines after what users are interested in and are most
likely to respond to, Benjamin asks the pertinent question: who are these users? (53). The
current trends in the programming of AI, she argues, are predisposed to racial biases,
favoring certain dominant modes of thinking that reinforce white, male, heterogenic
preferences and values. This is true in both profit-oriented and nonprofit websites, social
media platforms, and every application that utilizes advanced algorithms to engage its users.
“Racist robots,” as Benjamin refers to these AI systems, “represent a much broader process:
social bias embedded in technical artifacts, the allure of objectivity without public
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accountability” (53). The presumed neutrality and scientific precision of computers, then,
successfully masks the creation of a virtual social order that is just as hierarchical and
discriminatory as the “real” system from which it emerges. The danger with racist robots,
however, is that they don’t (yet) have an identity, and cannot be accountable for the
inequality they might produce. Without a body, a face, or a personality, machines—perhaps
like viruses—represent the detached, reliable objectivity of pure science, the transcendent
impartiality of method.
On a semiotic, symbolic level, antiracism is just as fixated on seeing and accentuating
difference as racism, and just as obsessed with regulating and directing the melodrama of
otherness. “The political and ideological critique of racism,” as Baudrillard ([1990] 1993)
argues, “is purely formal in that it tackles the racist obsession with difference without
tackling difference itself qua illusion” (131). A mutating virus, however, intent only on selfpropagation, sees through the illusion, and disregards difference altogether. To its blind
survival instincts, there are no preferences: any human host is as good as any other. But
seeing racially is so ingrained, so habitual, and so intrinsic to the human mind and especially
to the American national identity, that it takes on a life of its own, not unlike a defunct
computer program that runs its repetitious computations in endless loops, albeit with
occasional slight variations. When antiracism suddenly rises as the new fad for the
progressive left, Spivak’s question of true motive must be applied, lest more epistemic
violence is unleashed by well-meaning defenders of black lives. As Baudrillard ([1990]
1993) points out, “the risibility of our altruistic ‘understanding’ is rivalled only by the
profound contempt it is designed to conceal. For ‘We respect the fact that you are different’
read: ‘You people who are underdeveloped would do well to hang on to this distinction
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because it is all you have left’” (132). What would be left of America if the racial distinctions
were indeed suddenly eradicated? Who would people of color be as individuals, without their
symbolic value of visible otherness? What would identity look like without the fanatic
fixation—either discriminatory or celebratory—on conventional visual difference? As a
species that relies so heavily on ordered taxonomies, we are at a loss when encountering the
utterly arbitrary killing of the alien virus. Its inability to see color, its unpredictability,
invisibility, and unknowability are better left safely contained within the mediated virtual
realm, and accessed only through the screen, as thrilling science fiction movies rather than a
catastrophic reality.
In the original Alien movie, the pedantic scientist, Ash, turns out to be a Trojan horse:
an infiltrating robot with deceivingly human looks and manners who poses, in some ways, a
bigger threat than the monster itself. He is the one responsible for letting the alien life form
on board the ship to begin with, and eventually reveals his secret mission, known only to the
mother computer, to bring the creature back to Earth. The crew members, to him and to the
computer, are dispensable, and human life is not a priority. Perhaps in 1979, an android
passing for human may have been an entertaining, if terror-inducing, concept, and audiences
were surely relieved as Ash the traitor machine was gruesomely destroyed by the
wonderfully human Ripley, the brave heroine who fights the alien with all her might, and
even manages to rescue the spaceship’s cat—a symbol of the victorious human spirit, which
can be ruthless when it comes to monsters and robots, yet compassionate and merciful with
snuggly pets. Forty years later, however, Ash becomes a mirror we adamantly turn away
from, refusing to look at our own cyborgian reflection. Even the obsession with racial, ethnic,
or gendered differences is governed by technology, dictated by computerized calculations,
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and of course projected onto mediated platforms. Subjective perception, or the
phenomenology of “being,” as Baudrillard refers to it, is essentially obsolete, because in its
individuality it does not stand a chance against the growing power of mass trends and mass
movements. Similarly, the particular, which is always in flux, cannot compete with the
assured fixity of method and seeming solidity of statistics, charted data, and expert analysis,
which these days are all, of course, computer-generated.

Figure 12. Everyone: Are Race Relations Generally Good or Bad in the U.S.? Image from
University of Connecticut, July 2014.
We see difference because we are programmed to look for it, and we tackle inequity
in the same way that we attempt to tackle an economic crisis, a natural disaster, or a global
pandemic: there are graphs and diagrams, there are procedures and predictions, scripts,
codes, and formulas; there is a method by which we must perceive, assess, calculate, think,
and act. When in doubt, check the daily updated charts, the operation manuals, and the list of
commands, and then make sure to follow proper conduct by uploading the appropriate
commentary onto social media portals.
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If artificial intelligence was (and still is) the great fascination of science fiction, as
James Barrat (2013) argues, it is now the farthest thing from fiction we can imagine. Our
whole existence, in fact, depends on it, from the monitors that every woman in labor is
hooked into in hospital delivery rooms, to those that track a dying person’s departure. Search
commands, voice recognition, computer sensors, digital vision, and affinity analysis are but a
few familiar examples of common, daily AI applications that we all depend on without even
noticing. “Not so long ago,” says Barrat, “AI was not embedded in banking, medicine,
transportation, critical infrastructure, and automobiles. But today, if you suddenly removed
all AI from these industries, you couldn’t get a loan, your electricity wouldn’t work, your car
wouldn’t go, and most trains and subways would stop. Drug manufacturing would creak to a
halt, faucets would run dry, and commercial jets would drop from the sky” (203-204). Over
the past 30 years, slowly but surely, AI has taken over every possible aspect of human life,
and our reliance on it is taken for granted. Rarely do we stop to ponder what life would look
like should glitches in our advanced technological system increase, or should the system, for
some unforeseen reason (say a particularly resilient virus), collapse altogether.
Algorithms not only control the infrastructure and arrange our surroundings but
dictate internal processes as well. Affinity suggestions on Google, Amazon, Netflix, and all
social media, employment, or dating sites direct us towards choices that penetrate the most
intimate chambers of our existence: what we wear and eat, how we bathe, who we interact
with, what career path we follow, who we marry, how we raise our kids. We assume that
technology is there to serve us, that we are the masters of our various electronic devices.
However, as Barrat (2013) suggests, “the endgame for first creating smart machines, then
smarter-than-human machines, is not their integration into our lives, but their conquest of us”

140
(30). Until not very long ago, as the great works of science fiction demonstrate, what
scientists and philosophers alike were preoccupied with was the question of self-awareness:
would supercomputers become so advanced that they would develop human-like
consciousness? Free will? Autonomy? This scenario still evokes numerous speculations and
concerns. After all, it wasn’t until Frankenstein’s monster saw himself as a monster that he
began to behave like one, and it is impossible to predict what machines might do if and when
they reach that point. This hypothetical question, however, is no longer relevant. Singularity,
according to Barrat, should be redefined in alignment with the recent paradigm shifts that
have accelerated technological advances to the point of no return, and rather than sometime
in the projected future, that point is in fact already behind us. The following graph shows the
exponential growth of AI function rates over the past century:

Figure 13. An updated version of Moore’s Law Over 120 Years (based on Kurzweil’s graph).
Graph by Steve Jurvetson, 2016.
It is interesting to note that Moore’s “law,” as R.W. Keyes (2006) explains, is not
exactly a law, but an observation-based prediction which tracks the exponential increases in
the number of transistors in integrated circuits. According to the general prediction, that
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number doubles about every two years, as transistors get smaller and smaller, and as
semiconductor design improves. What this means for technological applications is that
artificial intelligence becomes faster and more productive, and electronic devices get smaller
at the same time that their functions and capacities increase. As transistors get smaller and
more efficient, the price of production goes down as well, making advanced technology more
available and affordable to the general public and allowing for sophisticated AI applications
to be implemented at any given level of human existence, from remotely guided weapons of
mass destruction to auto-correct apps that complete words and sentences as they are being
typed on a computer or smart phone.
The speed leaps in calculation and communication capabilities are staggering. What
would the robots do once they surpass us in cognitive functions and efficacy, and once they
gain consciousness? It may be, however, that this classic question itself is outdated and in
need of revision. “While superintelligent machines can certainly wipe out humankind, or
make us irrelevant,” he says, “there is also plenty of fear from the Ais we will encounter on
the developmental path to superintelligence” (Barrat 2013, 31). In other words, it is not the
future that is disconcerting, but the present; not the speculated horror of sudden AI revolt, but
the gradual permeation of partial autonomy, which is already operating all around us and
growing daily, and which is not only efficiently replacing human functions, but restructuring
them at their core.
Digital technologies, algorithmic robots, and a data-dominated culture raise
epistemological questions not only in regard to knowledge production but to the very nature
of knowing, especially, it can be argued, knowing the self. As Sun-ha Hong (2020) asks,
“What does it mean to ‘know myself’ if that knowing is achieved through mass-produced,
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autonomously operative devices?” and “What kind of relationship to knowledge is produced
when machines communicate ceaselessly with the body and with each other along channels
that my conscious reflection cannot ever access?” (7). Data-driven consciousness, Hong
argues, is not about empirical knowledge, experience, or truth-seeking, but about aggregated
information that convincingly passes as “real.” The massive databases and the tools and
formulas they rely on—calculations, informed predictions, unlimited cross-referencing,
diagrams, graphs, and charts—generate a culture not of knowing but of speculating. The
illusion of order and stability, however, seduces users into a relationship of complete trust in
their machines, an unconditional confidence that far exceeds any possible reliance on another
human being or, for that matter, on the self. Continuing Baudrillard’s posthumanist vision of
the hyperreal, Hong demonstrates how traditional social and political ideals such as factbased media, objective information exchange, transparent governments, and well-informed
publics dissolve and lose their meaning in the face of impervious and complex technological
systems that operate beyond the reach of human scrutiny. Within this impenetrable matrix,
human empowerment, self-sufficiency, and authorship may be outdated concepts as well.
The traditional relationship between man and machine, as Baudrillard ([1990] 1993)
observes, is marked by alienation, by the cold estrangement between workers and the
machines they operate. The new technologies, on the other hand, those with user-friendly
interfaces, interactive features, and hyper-responsive touchscreens, are of a different order.
The configuration of this new order “is one of subordination, not alienation—the structure of
the integrated circuit. Man or machine? Impossible to tell” (58). Despite maintaining
illusions of species superiority, control, mastery, and knowing, the merging of individual
minds with computer processors and artificial intelligence is the reality—or, more accurately,
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hyperreality—in which users are programmed as much as they program. On every level,
from the most basic cell phone to the most advanced networks, humans adapt and conform to
the ways of the machine, developing a symbiotic relationship of increasing dependency and
subservience.
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Chapter Five
The Curse of Method

In popular rhetoric, the term “knowledge” carries connotations of an in-depth inquiry that
unfolds along three plains: the experiential, the analytical, and the ethical. In biblical
etymology, knowledge indicates a profoundly intimate, unmediated connection with and
familiarity with an other, represented by the union of sexual intercourse. On an ethical and
spiritual level, it signifies a conscious ability to discern good from evil, as epitomized by the
tree of knowledge in the Old Testament, a symbol that repeats in various traditions, for
example in the image of Yggdrasil in Norse mythology, the Ashvattha tree in Hinduism, or
the Bodhi tree in Buddhism. The philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1966) argues that
definitions of knowledge changed drastically with modernity, which saw the rise of the
scientific method to a position of authority which diminished the importance of both the
experiential and the ethical. A formalized process, broken into a set of prearranged
procedures, became the focus of inquiry, and knowing became synonymous with the
systematic gathering of data, a logical assessment of information, and the foregrounding of
detached objectivity. “Method is projected as a form of the process of knowledge,”
Blumenberg writes, “which is separable from the concrete reality of the individual thinker
and researcher, and which can be indifferently carried over from one to another, from
generation to generation” (444). The Eurocentric, modern ascendance of a prescribed system
of knowledge production assumes a universal form of reasoning that disregards individual
histories, experiences, or abilities, thus risking reducing the subject from a full participant to
an impassive observer. In search of repeatable designs, scientific operations also tend to
discount the particularities of the studied object, favoring instead the focus on exhibited
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similarities and recognizable patterns. Method, then, changes the early definition of
knowledge from one that depends on direct encounter and moral evaluation to one in which
the epistemological apparatus itself takes precedence over both subject and object, rendering
both peripheral.
This chapter reflects on the role of method in academic knowledge production, and
the call made in recent years in American studies for an awareness of changing practices both
within institutions of higher education and outside of them. Considering the undisputed
validity of conventional academic protocols of data collecting, decoding, and interpreting,
my aim is to examine the pronounced trajectory of radical opposition in American studies
scholarship that seeks to subvert hierarchical constructs of self and other and make room for
the previously silenced voices of marginalized populations. On the one hand, this innovative
vision indeed gives rise to many important viewpoints that tend to be suppressed or
subsumed by mainstream conversations. On other hand, it seems that even the most radical
“pedagogies of dissent,” to quote Kandice Chuh (2018), can still revert to formulaic divisions
of subject and object when they adhere to the conventional demands of academic expertise.
Asking what alternate pedagogies might look like, the study explores the meaning of
“knowledge” in light of technological advances that reinforce rules of computation,
precision, and pattern recognition. Within these scientific rationales of observation,
controlled research, structural taxonomizing, deductive reasoning, and the dialectic subjectobject dynamics, is it possible to examine constructs of identity and alterity outside familiar
categorical allocations based in differences of race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, ability, or
sexual preference? What complementary discursive practices might allow for otherness to
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emerge as an unclassified totality, an independent manifestation of a mystery that resists the
mastery of “knowing”?
To see how the representational practices that the above and many other American
studies scholars challenge can be limited and reductive, it might be helpful to consider the
properties they share with the principles that govern mass media and technology. Like
academic knowledge, mediated technology emerges as an apparatus of great “objective”
conviction whose mode of operation, according to Marshall McLuhan (1967), is more
important than any ideas it is designed to circulate. The same can be said about academic
pedagogies that assess the value of knowledge according to strict guidelines focused on form
of presentation rather than content. All topics are equal to the process of knowledge
production, as in mediated simulations all replicated signs are stripped of their subjective
significance: their origin, their particular histories, their incoherencies and inconsistencies. In
this way, knowledge becomes equated with information, and is evaluated by the efficacy of
its distribution; by volume, speed, and popularity rather than by depth, weight, or lasting
effect. If the scientific method ushered a separation of subject and object, mass media and
technologies of simulation obscure direct contact between the two even further, eliminating
the subject as an active factor in the acquisition of knowledge. On the information highway,
as in academic circles, subjectivity is a hindrance, countering the desirable objectivity that
makes substance interchangeable and therefore often inconsequential.
Spiraling away from the regimented reason of modernity, postmodern logics revolve
around fast-forward movement, fragmentation, pastiche, and oversaturation. The excessive
reproduction of all original forms, the dissecting and piecing together of replicas, and the
voiding of signification may be the results of rapidly evolving technologies, but they may
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also indicate the historical aftermath of modernity’s victory of permission in every sphere. In
this sense, they correspond to the “orgy” of various spontaneous revolutions; the thrill and
ecstasy of social and political movements that promised to change the world, and have either
achieved their goal or have failed and dissolved. The freedom vision of emancipation
movements has become so ubiquitous that its meaning is in danger of becoming lost in its
ever-growing iterations: postcolonial independence; women’s, gay, and queer liberation; civil
rights reforms; free markets; free love; free speech; free Nelson Mandela, Tibet, or Palestine.
“We have pursued every avenue in the production and effective overproduction of objects,
signs, messages, ideologies, and satisfactions. Now everything has been liberated, the chips
are down, and we find ourselves collectively with the big question: WHAT DO WE DO
NOW THAT THE ORGY IS OVER?” (Baudrillard [1990] 1993, 3). Because true liberation
has not been achieved yet, what we do is try to revive the revolution, rekindle the fire under
the fight for freedom, and search for the “real” in the overload of the hyperreal.
In the simulated realms of digital technology and mass media, everything that has
been liberated enters a state of circulation. The cinematic documentarian, fact-driven
restaging of past revolutions has no more or less value than contemporary fictionalized
drama, fantastical science fiction sagas, or the latest news. Time has no meaning on the
screen, and faraway galaxies are just as tangible as this particular planet. The postmodern
hyperreal, by way of supply and demand calculations and the supreme powers of electronic
transmissions, aspires to transcend the laws of physics. What was previously bound to time,
space, and finality can now be reproduced indefinitely, preserved forever not in the human
brain’s memory cells but in hard drives and flash drives, in digital repositories and cloud
archives that have attained immortality. This is technology’s equivalence to religion’s
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promise of eternal life, a quelling of man’s fear of death, complete with a disabling of an
awareness of his own transience. Furthermore, mechanical reproduction not only supports
immortality, but polishes it to perfection. Long after the flesh returns to dust, the hologram
lives on, a projection of fragmented images released from the constraints of atrophy,
deterioration, and death.
Perfect separation occurs, Guy Debord ([1967] 1994) argues, when “images detached
from every aspect of life merge into a common stream in which the unity of that life can no
longer be recovered. Fragmented views of reality regroup themselves into a new unity as a
separate pseudo-world that can only be looked at” (12). This process of continuous
fragmentation and regrouping is not a theory, nor is it a passing phase, but an inevitable
evolution that follows early modern developments such as electricity, industrialization, mass
reproduction, photography, cinema, and long-distance communication technologies. It is a
living demonstration of Marx's notions of commodity fetishism and alienation, which now
apply to much more than manufactured objects, as the natural world, animals, people,
history, events, ideas, and ideologies can all be fetishized, removed from their origins and
turned into a marketable attraction. “Understood in its totality,” as Debord writes, “the
spectacle is both the result and the project of the present mode of production. It is not a mere
supplement or decoration added to the real world, it is the heart of this real society's
unreality. In all of its particular manifestations—news, propaganda, advertising,
entertainment—the spectacle is the model of the prevailing way of life” (13). Paradoxically,
however, the perfecting of separation between sign and referent does not sharpen the
distinctions between existence and nonexistence but instead blurs them. When the media
dominates being and the displayed representation can no longer be told apart from the
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authentic, critical distinctions between cause and effect, active and passive, or subject and
object disappear as well.
All mass media, and the entertainment industry in particular, operate through an
irresistible allure that allows the subject to escape the conscious awareness of its limitations,
and reinvent itself as something else, new and improved, different, free of the tethers of its
materiality. Within the operative seduction of simulation, both identity and alterity enter the
realm of symbolic exchange in which, in accordance with the logic of consumer culture and
the society of the spectacle, they must perform as desirable commodities. In the trading
circuits of representation, otherness too becomes a sign without a referent, removed from its
material origins, without a past or a future and stripped of its ethical question. A harmless
figurative object that can be carefully examined from a safe distance: “the other is no longer
there to be exterminated, hated, rejected or seduced, but instead to be understood, liberated,
coddled, recognized” (Baudrillard [1990] 1993, 125). When all moral decisions have been
made by executive producers, commercial visual representation can profit from emphasizing
difference while conveniently eliminating the conditions of differentiation, creating a
familiarity that flattens both subject and object, a convincing illusion of knowing that
assumes the objective truthfulness of the consumed mediated information.
In this way, following Baudrillard’s notion of the hyperreal as the generator of the
real, the map is seen as preceding the terrain. In New York, Paris, or the deserts of the
American Southwest, everything that was once “authentic” has been tamed, domesticated,
and neatly reproduced in textbooks, travel brochures, or Hollywood movies, so that nothing
is left for the traveler to discover. The images endlessly repeat familiar landmarks, cuisines,
or cultural events. The Empire State Building, the Eiffel Tower, or the Grand Canyon,
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delicatessens, bistros, and cantinas, the music, the accent, the vibe—all of these fabricate a
self-reproducing representational collage that makes a place, a culture, a people so familiar
there is not much left to be experienced in person that cannot be experienced on the screen.
What is not included: poverty, unemployment, and crime, the extreme heat of summer and
deadly cold of winter, pollution, dog poop, homeless people, cockroaches and bedbugs,
raging fires, seasonal flashfloods. In other words, the discarded vestiges of the real that are
useless, for now, to the commodification strategies of the hyperreal.
The same is true for alterity. Little is left outside the circuits of representation, and
what is left out can generally be discerned as unwanted, unforeseen, or unprofitable.
Freedom, justice, and the plight of the marginalized Other are no exception. On the screen, in
films, television shows, the news, or social media, identity politics are all the rage, turning
minority groups into trendy hot commodities. What remains of the materiality of otherness,
of its returned gaze, now that the troubled histories of blacks, Asians, Indigenous nations or
Latinos in the U.S. are turned into dramatized spectacles that celebrate inclusion,
multiculturalism, and diversity? “Otherness denied,” Baudrillard ([1990] 1993) notes,
“becomes a spectre and returns in the form of a self-destructive process” (122). To refute
alterity, then, leads not to reinforcement but a negation of subjectivity. For Baudrillard, the
elimination of otherness is a characteristic of the pervasive postmodern mode of operation
that seeks to reproduce, expose, name, package, and sell anything that will lend itself to the
laws of market exchange. Regarding what is not yet known, either as a curious marvel or a
dangerous threat (and often both), this mechanism insists on mass-disseminated simulated
representation as a reliable manifestation of truth. The result is an impression of signification,
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a conflation of information and knowledge, generated by data overload and an unprecedented
dependency on visual “evidence.”
Not unlike in the mass-mediated realms of entertainment, minority representation has
become a profitable trademark of liberal progress in institutions of higher education as well.
Designated ethnic studies departments or specialized courses in English and history
departments proudly stress cultural diversity—a fashionable catch phrase that celebrates
inclusion at the same time that it leaves existing hegemonic paradigms intact. Following the
Civil Rights era and its growing social and political unrest, hyphenated populations have
been finally granted permission into the guarded walls of academia, where they could be
properly represented under the caveat that they remain outside the established canon, safely
removed from what is agreed upon as the acceptable foundations of the dominant culture.
Aesthetic and stylistic literary distinctions, for instance, became selling points that market
Hispanic-American magical realism, African American vernacular, or Native-American
shamanism as exotic marginal decorations to the center piece of Eurocentric genres that are
considered the “norm.” Thus, through the policy of diversity, any threat such
“nontraditional” forms or their host grassroots movements posed to the political and social
order was efficiently deactivated, without any need for violence. In the formalized context of
the university, difference becomes an undisputed fact, and otherness is again disabled by
annexation, commodification, and presumed knowledge. What does knowing the ”reality” of
the other mean now that anyone can take a course in ethnic studies and become versed in the
theory of hyphenation? What impact does the face of the other have, now that it is replicated,
dispersed, and used to promote the university’s progressive curricula, anti-racist policies, and
commitment to diversity?
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Humanity’s growing dependence on machines and pre-programmed operating
systems sheds light on these questions. In Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the
Politics of Technological Futures, Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora (2019) examine the
various ways in which machines are replicating and replacing human functions. From factory
labor to stock market brokerage, from military drones to the self-charging, automated
vacuum cleaner in suburban homes, machines are taking over jobs in every possible realm of
human life. AI is now capable of conversing and responding to questions and commands
much in the same way that a good friend would, and sex robots are becoming increasingly
popular alternatives to sex workers among those who can afford them. Interrogating the
notion of technoliberalism, which they define as "the political alibi of present-day racial
capitalism that posits humanity as an aspirational figuration in relation to technological
transformation,” Atanasoski and Vora demonstrate a dramatic recent rise in the use of
machines that operate as surrogates to humans in all spheres of life, enabling greater
efficiency while “obscuring the uneven racial and gendered relations of labor, power, and
social relations that underlie the contemporary conditions of capitalist production" (4).
Higher education, its output, and modes of production operate under the same conditions.
Like advanced technological apparatuses, the well-oiled academic procedures of
systematized observation, data collection, standardized decoding, objective presentation of
findings, informed projections, and resolute conclusions preside over any experiential or
ethical knowledge, obscuring the materiality of the object of study.
When it comes to the relationship between identity and alterity, a common notion in
academia, including in American studies, is that the latter defines the former, giving it
substance and cohesion by negation. The self, in other words, derives its meaning from what
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it is not, and otherness functions as a validating force that confirms the self’s superior
position in an imaginary hierarchy. This common interdependence can be applied to personal
encounters as well as collective ones and, as Stuart Hall (1997) stresses, takes on an
important political significance on national and international levels. To establish and
maintain a national identity, a solidarity must be created among the citizens, and that bond
tends to rely on negation: the English are English not because of specific shared traits, but
mainly because they are not French, and the French, in turn, are proud not to be English, or
Algerian, or African, or—God forbid—American (22). Constructed negation defines not only
whole nations but various groups and individuals as well. To take a common example from
American history, for many centuries now the black population in the U.S. serves as the
ultimate Other to white domination, which was first established through the institution of
slavery and continued to evolve and transform well after the Civil War, taking on new
manifestations and disguises, including the current rhetorical celebration of multiculturalism
and inclusion. This is not to dismiss the great progress toward equality achieved by the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s but to emphasize that white supremacy in the U.S. is on the
rise, and the country as a whole is far from being the color-blind society it pretends to be.
Since the 1990s, American studies as a discipline has been increasingly dedicated to
scholarship that is attuned to social struggle in the context of neoliberal policies, and to a
fierce critique of the American Empire and its increasingly globalized oppressive structures
of domination. George Lipsitz (2001) describes American studies as an unusual field, one
that “enjoys both institutional and extrainstitutional life” (32), a unique positioning that calls
for a pronounced focus on the dynamics of power, which in turn requires heightened
awareness of scholarly practices. In light of the development of the neoliberal state, explains
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Lipsitz, overarching concerns in the field center on the transformation of industrial
economies to information-based systems, increasingly open global markets, migrations that
create new political subjects, altered relationships between place and culture, and the
relentless dissemination of American ideologies in international circles. Drawing heavily on
his own experience as an activist in the 1970s, Lipsitz sees American studies as responsible
for theorizing and interrogating these processes and their impact on marginalized
populations, while also reaching beyond academia to connect with grassroots movements and
radical leftist organizations dedicated to social justice.
As an academic discipline, according to Lipsitz, American studies has always been in
conversation with crisis. The field’s whole trajectory, since its emergence in the
economically turbulent 1930s, through its engagement with the dramatic political, social, and
cultural changes of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, to its present-day preoccupation with the
continued struggles of minority groups, has evolved as a response to the “crisis of
representation” (Lipsitz 2001, 95) and has been grounded in the fight for equity and
inclusion. Centering the transformative political mobilization of the 1960s, as well as the
ensuing radical shifts in race and gender positioning in the following decades, Lipsitz
emphasizes the need to stay as connected as possible to the revolutionary spirit of the civil
rights era. “Oppositional movements,” he stresses, “ask people to take risks, to imperil their
security in the present in hopes of building a better future,” and this is what American studies
scholars must do as well. “Building insurgent consciousness entails speaking back to power,
subverting its authority, and inverting its icons as a means of authorizing oppositional
thinking and behavior” (173). In academic terms this means closely examining the discourses
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of nation, empire, and identity formations, contesting the familiar popular narratives that
circulate in a variety of public sites, and aspiring to reframe and re-envision these narratives.
The reconfiguring of national and imperial paradigms with a focus on social justice
struggles has gathered new momentum in the past two decades, as evidenced by the many
publications that circulate in the field, as well as in the vision of several presidential
addresses of the American Studies Association annual meeting. Matthew Frye Jacobson’s
2013 address, for example, calls for creating alliances with other disciplines as well as with
non-institutional social movements in order to counter oppressive neoliberal agendas. Within
the academy, the urgent need to fight for “a social vision beyond the market” (287) means,
among other things, paying careful attention to the practices of knowledge production
frameworks, and a pronounced emphasis on understanding all U.S. history as a history of
empire, which consequently implies that American studies must devote itself to a critical
engagement with empire. As Meg Wesling (2013) elaborates:
From settler colonialism to the dispossession of Native peoples, the recruitment of
Asian laborers, the importation of Africans in chattel slavery, and the partial and
always selective incorporation of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and others
whose lands were annexed but “unincorporated,” this is a history that scholars of
American studies have become adept at bringing to the foreground, revealing the
complex layers of political, ideological, and historical contradiction that set the
conditions for our contemporary understandings of national identity, as well as of
race, of gender, of personhood itself. (291)
The focus on empire and the plight of conquered, exploited, and discriminated minorities has
led, over time, to a shift from the initial notion of interdisciplinarity in the field, which was
based in the search for overlaps of literature, art, anthropology, geography, history, law, and
political science, to championing the seeking of intersections between the various branches
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of ethnic studies, and emphasizing their conjunctions with gender, sexuality, and queer
studies.
In the 2016 ASA annual meeting, Robert Warrior notes, the conference program
included “83 sessions in African American studies, 52 in gender studies and 23 in women’s
studies (many of these overlap), 52 in queer studies (including 7 in transgender studies), 41
in Indigenous studies and 20 in Native American studies, 34 in Chicana/Latino studies, 23 in
Asian American studies, and 18 in disability studies” (2017, 205). For Warrior, the centering
of Indigenous studies is particularly significant in the revising of national narratives and the
fight for justice and fair representation. For Lisa Duggan (2015) it is queer people of color
who hold a previously dismissed key to the transformation of theory, methodology, and
social structures. Kandice Chuh (2018), on the other hand, draws attention to the important
contributions of Asian-American studies to the growing umbrella of American studies. In
2019, Roderick Ferguson revisits Lipsitz’s articulation of the discipline’s deep connection to
non-institutional movements, centering in his address the black community’s continued
struggle for equality and the instrumental role past and present civil rights organizations play
in the ongoing fight for social change.
From a more philosophical, existential, and relational perspective, however, otherness
is not simply a negation that can be used to either reinforce or contest dominance. The more
complex function of alterity is not necessarily the dismantling of political and social orders,
but the destabilizing the self. In a personal encounter—even an academic one—to study and
know the other must involve recognizing the self’s limitations and blind spots. As an ethical
inquiry, the face of the other “opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation”
(Levinas [1961] 1969, 201). Beyond any exchange of words or expressions, what the face of
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the other communicates by its very existence is the simple commandment “though shall not
kill.” Rather than a request, “there is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a
master spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the
poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all” (Levinas [1961] 1969, 89). The threat of
the other, accordingly, is never on the level of the physical, political, cultural, or religious—it
is a much more fundamental possibility of destruction through seeing moral truths and
accounting for them.
The technological advances made in the second half of the 20th century offer new
solutions to the discomfort that otherness causes and the potential threat it poses. Without
resorting to physical removal, mediated channels as well as formal studies allow for a
flattening of alterity through the seemingly benign practices of representation, by which
everything becomes an attractive, colorful show, an orgy of differences based primarily in
the ascendence of the spectacle. Despite a strong illusion of a coherent and cohesive
understanding, human cognition is altered, as McLuhan (1967) suggests, when information is
organized solely according to codes of visual stimulation. “The rational man in our Western
culture is a visual man,” he writes, “and the fact that most conscious experience has little
‘visuality’ in it is lost on him” (45). The superiority of systematic modes of representation is
established by the fact that they have no need for coercion strategies—they govern by
seduction and diminish lived experiences by overloading one sense at the severe expense of
the other four, so that perception becomes increasingly myopic.
Following McLuhan and Baudrillard, in the semiotic context of the implosion of
meaning in the media, whatever is revealed becomes immediately obscured, so that whatever
the viewer perceives as “knowing” is diffused by the added functions of the mechanism
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itself: the mesmerizing screen, the passive absorption of endless streams of information, and
the deactivating of critical thinking, or, perhaps, of any thinking at all. Circumventing the
relational, mediated simulation suspends cognitive faculties that depend on actual
interactions, so that “by hypertrophying thought as an operational process it frees us from
thought’s ambiguity and from the insoluble puzzle of its relationship to the world”
Baudrillard [1990] 1993, 58). Direct experience is no longer an option; everything is
processed through electronic devices, and it is the human that depends on the machine, not
vice versa. The suspension of conscious inquiry, along with the sameness fabricated by the
screen, facilitate the paradox of falsified inclusion by which foreigners, minorities, and
marginalized populations become more and more familiar at the same time that they become
less and less consequential. Losing their ambiguity and insolubility, they are conveniently
neutralized. In this voyeuristic celebration of structural variances, surface differences
multiply ad infinitum, while true alterity is castrated and disposed of.
As the face of otherness dissolves into pixelated, mass-disseminated visual
representation, difference can now be celebrated as a fashionable garment, an attractive
accessory designed to add color to the drab monochrome of sameness. This is another
effective mode of postmodern appropriation, a classic maneuver of commodity fetishism by
which the strange, the foreign, and the potentially dangerous is repackaged and marketed as
“cool,” “hip,” and “rad.” Through simulated transformation, racism lives on, thriving on the
accentuating of meaningless differences that become endowed with value by the
“psychodrama of perpetual introjection and rejection of the other” (Baudrillard [1990] 1993,
129). By clinging to surface marks, the racial reference (now politely termed “diversity” or
“multiculturalism”) remains as clear as ever, selling products, cuisines, clothes, accessories,
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lifestyles, and of course entertainment that highlight difference in the service of wiping it out,
stripping away the history, the depth, and the mystery of otherness, along with its announcing
of the unraveling of the subject.
The systematic production of otherness, Edward Said (1978) emphasizes, is not
limited to political rhetoric, mass media, or profit-generating popular culture. Academia, he
demonstrates, plays a major role in the construction of categorical hierarchies, and it is a
dangerous fallacy to assume that formal knowledge production, even in the seemingly neutral
and benign humanities, is devoid of political aligning. All academic knowledge is political,
whether or not scholars are aware of it, and whether or not their work intentionally serves—
or contests—imperialist agendas. To bring awareness to the positioning of academic
authority, Said centers two methodological devices. The first, strategic location, draws
attention to where scholarly authority situates itself in relation to the object of study. The
second, strategic formation, highlights the momentum through which groups of texts build on
one another to gain mass recognition, validity and referential impact (20). As these modes of
analysis reveal, the academic production of alterity emerges in the intertwining of knowledge
and power, and establishes authoritative influence through processes of repetitive circulation
and cross-referenced accumulation of weight. In this sense, it is not so different from the
reinforcement of stereotypes in television, films, or digital media, where representational
molds become standardized by endless replication and “updated” reiterations.
In institutions of higher education, however, the process of debilitating alterity by
appropriation manifests in more subtle and discreet ways than in mass media. On the surface,
when examining the methods of knowledge production, things like research, analysis, and
expertise are associated with ideals of originality, creativity, direct inquiry, and moral

160
integrity. However, much like popular culture, academia as well thrives on repetition,
constriction of perspective, and a dangerous conflation of knowledge with massive amounts
of information. As Mark Hewson (2018) points out, much of academic discourse derives its
validity not from its content but from adhering to customary manufacturing methods. The
very term “knowledge production” indicates factory-like strategies—volume, speed,
efficiency, proper packaging, and fitting products into potentially profitable marketing
niches. In fact, as Baudrillard ([1970] 1998) argues, knowledge no longer exists outside the
logic of cash-nexus, which is the driving force of all postmodern systems. “Our society,” he
writes, “thinks itself and speaks itself as a consumer society. As much as it consumes
anything, it consumes itself as consumer society, a” idea" (193). This devouring is the
inevitable effect of industrialization, surplus, and mass distribution. The mechanisms of
institutionalized knowledge productions are intimately linked to those of globalized
capitalism—open markets, international exchange, communication technologies, accelerated
processes, excessive visual stimulation, advertising, and commodity fetishism. No longer tied
to place, history, ethics, or phenomenology, the value of knowledge is translated into the
language of production and consumption, where profit, rather than insight, is the ultimate
aim. Instead of deep investigation, knowledge is assessed according to considerations of
costs and benefits, so that what can be understood is replaced by what can be gained, whether
in terms of money, status, prestige, or popularity.
In order to comply with the trends of globalization, formal knowledge production
underwent a profound structural rearrangement, as it now must compete with the portals of
mass media—the real instructional agencies that deliver information in much more appealing
forms than a drafty classroom and a cracked chalkboard. To reinvent itself, the university, as
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the central generator of “knowledge,” had to shift its modes of operation to better fit with the
contemporary demands of the business world. To say that the university resembles a
corporation, argues Bill Readings (1996) would be inaccurate, because the fact is the modern
university is a corporation, and should be regarded as such (22). The public university,
therefore, must be understood as an independent bureaucratic organization that is no longer
invested in progress, culture, ethics, or character-building, but mainly struggles to promote its
own growth and longevity. What this transition means is that in order to survive, the
university advertises itself through the vague sign of “excellence,” which could stand for
both high standards of education and desirable achievements such as a marketable degree,
social status, and financial growth. Like any other business, the University of Excellence
must adhere to traditional laws of economics: supply and demand, costs of production, profit,
and competition. Furthermore, to sustain itself in a globalized arena, the university must cut
its local ties and be open to far-reaching exchanges. Foreign students are encouraged to
apply, and athletes from other states win generous scholarships that have nothing to do with
intellectual merits. Standardized accreditation allows for credit transfer that eliminates
possible discrepancies between universities located in Massachusetts, California, North
Dakota, or New Mexico. There is, in fact, little difference between universities located in
England, Hong Kong, or Lebanon. Standardized curricula, established canons, and
formalized accreditation in every discipline are similar across the board, and identical
procedures of evaluation ensure that the method is recognized universally as what determines
the “worth” of knowledge.
“Like a great weight descending,” writes Nick Sousanis (2015), “flatness permeates
the landscape” (3). This flatness is an idea of “knowledge” as the formulaic assemblage of

162
information in which the individual subject’s critical faculties are funneled to the specific
requirements of method. This reduction of the subject into the agent of method may have had
its roots in the industrial revolution, the Enlightenment, and science’s rise to power, but it is
certainly exacerbated by the postmodern mechanisms of globalization, mass media,
consumer culture, cybernetic communication, and computer programming. Academic
knowledge production, then, has become similarly automated, and similarly designed for
profit. Confined to neatly arranged levels, labels, categories, and protocols, the world of
education is defined by its ruled and regulations, standardized evaluations, and prescribed
forms of research and presentation. A student in this institution of learning enters a twodimensional world that blots out the most vital components of knowledge: curiosity,
experience, discovery, contrast, roundness, depth, and moral assessment.
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Figure 14. Jsmall-Sequence-Steps1. Drawing by Nick Sousanis, 2012.
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Following a business model and resembling a mechanical assembly line, knowledge
production does not encourage direct encounter or unsupervised exploration. The expected
end result is a neatly packaged bundle of information, collected and analyzed according to
strict guidelines, and much like the incessant stream of media-generated messages, the
content of the parcel of “knowledge” is irrelevant compared with its form and functions of
the mechanism itself. Elaborate networks of mediated symbolic exchange create an illusion
that information is meaning, and we are conditioned to believe that aggregation, repackaging,
and redistribution of discourse facilitate knowing. Such notions are so ingrained that it seems
as if the very foundations that hold our current global society depend on them, and would
collapse without formal education, communication technology, and mass media. What we
fail to see, though, is that it might be already collapsing. The methods of knowledge
production, like the prescribed operations of advanced technology, narrow our perception
and erode our meaning-making capabilities, leaving the subject in a state of voided, deferred
existence.
Is it possible to examine questions of identity with a clear awareness of the void left
by the elimination of subjectivity? How can we write about alterity and yet allow the other to
remain remote, unique, peculiar, and impenetrable? As knowledge becomes more and more
dependent on method, there seems to be less and less room in academic discourse for selfreflexive inquiry and the mystery of otherness. Scientific principles grounded in systematic
ordering, repeatable patterns, resolute analysis, and objectivity may limit the impact of the
“pedagogies of dissent” that Chuh (2018, )calls for. In an attempt to figure out what that
would mean in practical terms, Lisa Duggan (2015), for example, advocates an “intellectual
antiparochialism that refuses ‘aboutness’ and its practices—the adding of populations to
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classrooms and topics to syllabi without any fundamental reconstruction of our knowledge
projects” (285). If Chuh focuses on Asian American studies as an opening through which to
interrogate whiteness, assimilation into the progress narrative of modernity, and current
trends in the circulation of capital, Duggan emphasizes queer studies as a parallel
augmentation of American studies that shares a similar refusal of identity politics. Rather
than serving as a representational token of institutional policies of minority inclusion, queer
theory engages instead with “historical political economic forces and political aesthetic
questions” (285). In his 2012 American Studies Association presidential address, Matthew
Frye Jacobson (2013) points to the problematic links between the history of empire and the
history of higher education. It is essential, he argues, “to think about the dynamic relationship
between the history we inhabit and the knowledge we produce” (269). “For scholars who
have long been interested in the imperial politics of education,” adds Wesling (2013), “it has
been particularly disheartening to witness the steady disarticulation of the public university
from a notion of the public good and the democratic possibilities so radically fought for in
previous decades” (293). Untangling the ideological intersections between nation building,
imperial expansion, and academic curricula, then, appears to be a pronounced goal of
American studies, and that goal entails continuing to reassess the lenses, spectrums, and
methodologies the discipline utilizes.
Strong ties to noninstitutional social change movements present a predominant
avenue for self-reflection. However, the activist, altruistic, idealist vision advocated by
Lipsitz and his successors may raise its own unforeseen challenges. Such connections,
despite the seemingly radical pedagogies they endorse, place American studies scholars in a
problematic position that can be traced back to Gayatri Spivak’s 1988 essay “Can the

166
Subaltern Speak?” In her examination of institutional scholarship engaged in postcolonial
discourse, Spivak’s main concern is that as institutional scholarship sets out to support and
“empower” previously or presently colonized peoples, they in fact, by virtue of working
within prescribed recognized research systems and methodologies, reaffirm oppressive
legacies of Eurocentric political and cultural domination. Spivak considers the ways in which
theory and criticism in the U.S. and in Europe are entrenched in a male-dominant, superiorly
positioned epistemology that is not self-aware enough to avoid classifying and analyzing
subaltern populations using the same tools and procedures of the very imperialist regimes the
scholarship attempts to unsettle. What are some alternatives, then, to the inadvertent
discursive silencing of marginalized peoples? How do we allow for and linger in the empty
spaces created by past and present histories of subjugation, exploitation, and dispossession?
An intense emphasis on group identity, as Viktor Frankl (1946) warns, can easily
create false assumptions and unwarranted condemnations. Recounting his experiences in four
different Nazi concentration camps, Frankl stresses the uncomfortable fact that the
boundaries between groups in the camps were always overlapping and never as well-defined
as an outsider might imagine. “The mere knowledge that a man was either a camp guard or a
prisoner,” he writes, “tells us almost nothing” (93). There was no uniformity among the
prisoners, Frankl reveals, not by the fact of their Jewishness and not by the extreme suffering
they endured. Within the daily realities of camp life, “it was a considerable achievement for a
guard or foreman to be kind to the prisoners in spite of all the camp's influences, and, on the
other hand, the baseness of a prisoner who treated his own companions badly was
exceptionally contemptible. Obviously, the prisoners found the lack of character in such men
especially upsetting, while they were profoundly moved by the smallest kindness received
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from any of the guards” (93). So moved were the prisoners, Frankl recalls, that after
liberation, as the Grand Alliance forces were hunting down and capturing Nazi officials,
several young Jews hid a particularly caring SS commander in the Bavarian woods,
eventually turning him in to the hands of an American liberation unit only after being given
formal reassurance that no harm would come to the man (93). Once again alterity has little to
do with collective demarcations and everything to do with the ethical question it brings to the
fore. The distinct singularity of each situation, each incident, each individual, in Frankl’s
view, carries much more weight and meaning than any generalized patterning, as justified as
it may initially appear.
Explaining the principles of logotherapy (meaning-focused therapy), Frankl discusses
individual as well as collective pathology, suggesting that in both cases the road to
overcoming debilitating neuroses might be smoother and more productive if it refrained from
pattern-seeking and from excessive intention invested in fixing the problem (1946, 126−127).
Paradoxically, acceptance of and even a good measure of detachment from the affliction, its
origins, and its professionally-administered cures have proven to be much more effective in
delivering long-term results. When applied to problems of social inequality in the U.S., this
principle might explain the well-meaning attempts—academic or activist—to heal the mass
pathology on which race, gender, class, or ability differences are constructed. The need to
dissect the problem and bring it to the center of attention is understandable and admirable. At
the same time, it is possible, as Riley (2014) suggests, that this intense focus does not
actually help but in fact might hinder an actual overcoming of the problem?
Moving away from external efforts to liberate the oppressed, John McWhorter (2006)
redirects the social justice conversation to the internalized victimhood that often underscores
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the cultural and rhetorical paradigms of non-white struggle for justice. The efforts that began
with civil rights activism in the late 1960s, he argues, have evolved into a collective popular
and popularized identity that is defined by defiance, filled with empty gestures of speech and
vocabulary, music, fashion, body language, attitude, and many self-destructive ways of being
in the world, from broken families and domestic violence to widespread drug abuse, crime,
and gang violence. Antagonistic blame and the ethos of victimhood keep the problems
growing and fuel a vicious cycle of self-sabotage. At the core of this cycle are the
extravagant expressions of therapeutic alienation: “alienation unconnected to, or vastly
disproportionate to, real-life stimulus, but maintained because it reinforces one’s sense of
psychological legitimacy, via defining oneself against an oppressor characterized as eternally
depraved” (6). Ironically, this psychological mechanism of opposition, which is often quite
theatrical and purposefully provocative, was not invented by non-white or otherwise
marginalized communities. It can be, McWhorter notes, as white as Masha in Anton
Chekhov’s The Seagull, or the pigs in George Orwell’s Animal Farm. The attention-seeking
enactment of alienation and resistance has nothing to do with race: it is a universal feature of
human social interactions.
But again, to critically reconsider the efficacy of the empire saga and its alluring good
vs. evil simplifications is to risk the end of the fight and the dismantling of several identities:
the non-white victim, the liberal social justice activist, or the radical intellectual dedicated to
an altruistic cause. Could it be that there are other avenues from which to examine questions
of inequity? That the dogmatic rejection of anything that might move the conversation away
from race could be too limiting and oppressive in its own way? That the prescribed academic
modes of inquiry, grounded as they are in the seeking of recognizable patterns, historical
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“truths,” and system-focused solutions, could be expanded to include a greater range of
approaches? Even (or especially) in higher education, argues Adam Grant (2021), the
clinging to certain ideologies and habitual practices can be detrimental to creativity and
innovation. Updating beliefs, trying different viewpoints, and acknowledging that which is
uncertain, according to Grant, are difficult things to do in any given situation, but an
academic setting makes them even more challenging. When knowledge and expertise are
constantly assessed and rewarded, so are lasting convictions in ideas, beliefs, and causes.
Convictions make for a stable world, and, much like therapeutic alienation, provide a sense
of confidence and security. The problem, however, according to Grant, is that “we live in a
rapidly changing world, where we need to spend as much time rethinking as we do thinking”
(16). Working with not knowing, then, from the place of inquiry rather than conviction, could
be a useful tool not just for adjusting to the novel developments of accelerated technological
advances, but for tackling lingering problems of a social or political nature.
Three overlapping forms of expression, Grant (2021) suggests, dominate current
human expression: that of the preacher, prosecutor, and politician. Each has its own function.
The preacher comes out when we sense that our beliefs are threatened. To defend our values
and advocate our principles we then turn to didactic, self-righteous lectures. The prosecutor
is employed as a way to point out faults in other people and prove them wrong. And because
most of us still need approval and recognition, we turn to the politician for some diplomatic,
surface-level negotiations (21−22). These three modes of communicating leave little room
for self-reflexivity and for questioning the validity or efficacy of what we hold to be true, and
Grant proposes a return to the pure objectivity of the scientific method, which is indeed built
around an uncompromised openness to new possibilities and unforeseen developments. As
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noted earlier, however, this objectivity carries its own set of confines, because it too searches
for answers in method, in routine and repetitive procedures that tend to reject anomalies,
paradoxes, and non-rational incongruities.
As method and discursive conventions devour both identity and alterity by creating a
sameness based in differences, alterity is in effect contained and flattened by “knowing.” On
the surface, with the post-revolution establishment of departments and specialized courses
dedicated to fair representation, victory was declared, and progress was achieved. This
resolution of the crisis, however, did not lead, as was expected, to a deconstruction of
hierarchical race, class, and gender orders. What happened on U.S. college campuses, just
like in the media, was a rhetorical shift in which pronounced antiracist language and policies
proved to be successful means of quelling the unrest while maintaining white centrality. This
is poignantly illustrated in Alice Walker’s 1973 short story “Everyday Use,” in which a
young African American woman living in New York pays a visit to her mother on a little
farm in the rural South. At the end of the awkward visit, the daughter, now educated,
liberated, and proud of her African roots, asks to take a couple of handmade quilts with her
back to New York. The mother has a hard time understanding how these used old quilts,
which had been in the family for generations, have suddenly become “folk art”—valuable
displays of black heritage to hang on a wall, use to educate people, or possibly, eventually,
sell to a museum or a wealthy collector. As differences are put on display, repackaged, and
properly studied in accredited institutions, they are not only safely contained, but efficiently
commodified and marketed as African American history, Native American literature,
Chicano culture, the Asian American experience, and so on and so forth—trendy products
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that by the authority of representation are carefully amputated from the material realities of
racial inequalities.
The historical rejection of the demoted other and the self-congratulatory embracing of
difference are, essentially, two sides of the same coin. Once the biological theories were
conclusively disproven, racism shifted its focus to cultural variances, surviving in opposing
fronts on the same shallow grounds. The problem is, no one stops to question the validity of
the very term itself, and the assumptions on which it is based. Its meaning has collapsed and
dissolved into void. Until difference itself is tackled as an illusion, as a relative and evershifting signifier, all critiques of racism amount to no more than vain discourse. “There is no
such thing as the proper use of difference,” writes Baudrillard ([1990] 1993), “a fact revealed
not only by racism itself but also by all anti-racist and humanitarian efforts to promote and
protect differences” (131). Blind to their own failure, anti-racist efforts still fall in the trap of
defining alterity along embarrassingly Eurocentric lines, when it was European colonialism
that initially established difference as a tool of domination.
The double bind of rhetorical inclusion is that regardless of the content, the message
of the method stays the same; it is a mechanism designed to disregard both subject and object
while still maintaining uneven hierarchies in which Eurocentric epistemology presides over
the process of knowledge production. The terminology might change, multiculturalism may
seem like a major advancement toward social change, but as long as individuals are
subsumed by generalizing categories and taxonomies of difference, not much is actually
changing. As Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) points out, the idea of culture operates just like its
predecessor, race, in that it enhances differences for the purpose of cataloguing and
organizing human populations. The term does have some advantages, as “it removes
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difference from the realm of the natural and the innate. Whether conceived of as a set of
behaviors, customs, traditions, rules, plans, recipes, instructions, or programs... culture is
learned and can change” (55). Herein, however, is also the problem: although the intent is to
avoid essentializing, the underlying question behind “culture” is this: if it is learned, why
can’t it be unlearned? If all those differences are not innate, why can’t they be more like us?
One possibility for moving away from the confines of structural method might be to
shift the emphasis in research and writing from neutral, scientific patterns to the relational
and the random, or, put another way, from the spectacular to the particular. A deliberate
resistance to systematic evaluations could, potentially, reinstate the subject as well as the
object as equally engaged participants in a collaborative project. Whether such complete
reestablishment of subjectivity is indeed possible in the postmodern hyperreal remains
questionable, as the pace in which the system is propelling itself keeps accelerating, and
signification practices keep mutating to fit with the flatness created by mediated
representation. Nevertheless, by opposing the epistemic violence of terms like “culture” or
“race,” narratives that accentuate the unknowability and inconsistency of otherness may offer
an alternative to the science-based assumption of universal reasoning processes that must
adhere to neat structural process analyses. If nothing else, they can remind us that unlike
machines, “individuals are confronted with choices, struggle with others, make conflicting
statements, argue about points of view on the same events, undergo ups and downs in various
relationships and changes in their circumstances and desires, face new pressures, and fail to
predict what will happen to them or those around them” (Abu-Lughod 1991, 59). Those are
the particulars of the everyday; glitches that do not conform to method and—much like
unpredictable accidents—stand out in their unspectacular, unmarketable grit.
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On television, computers, or electronic devices, as well as in academic knowledge
production, the spectacle of the other enters the private domain in an intimate way, not as a
corporeal presence but as an insubstantial iteration, an apparition. The face, the voice, or the
situation are no longer a moral dilemma but a means to an end that can easily turn into a
caricature, regardless of the seriousness of the production. Staring at animated images, the
self does not encounter another being but a projection, so that “the Other, the interlocutor, is
never really involved… for the screen itself as locus of the interface is the prime concern”
(Baudrillard [1990] 1993, 54). Similarly, when a “culture” is studied in an academic setting,
collective identity always threatens to swallow up the individual, so that the encounter is
always with a concept rather than a presence. Methodically, mediated abstraction disarms
otherness of its gaze, and of any potential that gaze ever had to reach the relational core of
the self. Ethical questions dissolve and melt away. The subject is no longer challenged by the
existence of the other, only by the vague suggestion of such an existence, neatly contained
and under control, more subdued and sterilized than ever. Moreover, that distance is so
effective precisely because it is produced through the illusion of closeness. Through the
confidence of having completed the “special topic” course, and the intimacy of the television
in the bedroom or the smartphone in the pocket, the self comes to believe it can know the
Other, can learn its ways and its history, understand its suffering and its resilience, master its
identity narrative. The method of mediation transforms the process of relating into an
artificial exchange in which identity encounters not alterity but a flat sameness. Dissolving
otherness by appropriation, the process suppresses all disagreements and all possible
conflicts.
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The presumed knowing that this simulated closeness creates leads to a new kind of
eradication of otherness, one that leaves a dangerous sense of uniformity which has nothing
to do with equality, inclusion, or freedom. The body, the face, and the returned gaze of the
other are all gone, effectively defused by representation. The numbers of ethnic studies
programs in universities rise steadily in tandem with trendy films and television shows
depicting non-white or non-mainstream communities acutely demonstrate the danger of
presumed sameness. White viewers watching such productions, much like university students
writing their final papers, believe that they now have a good understanding of what it means
to be black, or Hispanic, or Indian, or queer. The superficial marks of alternative identities
are available to be reproduced, commodified, consumed, and imitated; they are visual and
cultural products completely removed from the bodies and lived experiences of actual
people, not to mention from a long history of oppression whose legacy continues in a present
still plagued with glaring disparities.
In the mediated visual representations as well as in institutionalized procedures of
research and writing, method tends to debilitate the probing nature of encounters with
alterity. As Ferguson (2012) shows, in the 1960s and 1970s, when Civil Rights movements
stirred up unprecedented waves of discontent on both sides of the Atlantic, mass
demonstrations and organized revolts were accompanied by the notion that of all public
institutions, the university was not only capable of but indeed responsible for transcending
the social order within which it operates (25). In the U.S. in particular, Jodi Melamed (2011)
elaborates, the crisis was focused on democratic representation, and public universities,
which until then were largely segregated and housed mostly men, had to transform in
accordance with the loud demands of historically oppressed minorities for cultural visibility.
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Admissions procedures were quickly changed to make room for formerly excluded
populations, and new programs of study were created that celebrated multiculturalism by
creating segmented canons for each ethnic group (95). By the 1990s, however, with
deindustrialization and the rise of the information superhighway, new economic demands
meant a restructuring of academic institutions as well. To meet the challenges of rapidly
changing political and economic climates, “U.S. universities needed to produce knowledge
about racial difference, but not for the same ends as the student movements. Rather, the
essential function of the university in this period was to make minoritized difference work for
post-Keynesian times—to produce, validate, certify, and affirm racial difference in ways that
augmented, enhanced, and developed state-capital hegemony rather than disrupted it”
(Melamed 2011, 95). By formalizing alterity, institutionalized representation objectifies the
other by methodically rearranging it into clearly defined elements that can be understood
according to capitalistic modes of reasoning: orderly classification, commodification, market
value, supply and demand.
With institutionalized cultural appropriation, alterity becomes a fragmented collection
of traditions and artifacts to be bought and sold, a commodity in its own right, an open
signifier floating in the open markets. Hinging on taxonomy and classification, otherness is
reinforced as difference by representational overproduction while simultaneously being
drained of its countering possibilities. Is it possible to tell of a direct encounter with another
without the telling serving as an example of a pattern, suggesting implications, serving as a
case study, or claiming certain knowledge? What is the value of conveying a random meeting
simply for the sake of its passing human connection, poetic value, and ethical dilemma? To
represent any “other” or to study any “culture,” Abu-Lughod (1991) argues, is to risk
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participating in an ongoing colonial project in which academia plays a central role. In the
name of a systematic search for “truth,” traditional institutional research obscures the subject
by claiming objectivity, fossilizes the object by forcing it into fixed preconceived boxes, and
maintains, through the foregrounding of method, a clear position of power. Those who
research, write, and publish their findings, Abu-Lughod suggests, assume expert familiarity
with their object of study, and the uneven dynamics between the producer of knowledge and
the studied specimen contribute to the perpetuation of a long-standing historical hierarchical
structure in which the apparatus of knowledge production upholds the West’s white, often
male-dominant position of authority (56). If according to Eurocentric epistemologies to study
something means to gain mastery over it, to possess and contain it, then when it comes to
representations of otherness, these established methods of knowing carry with them alarming
ethical repercussions. To presume knowledge of the other is, in effect, to strip alterity of its
mystery, of its potential to pose ethical questions for the individual self and the collective
consciousness.
A big part of the Eurocentric authority Abu-Lughod attempts to undermine has to do
with voice, with the assured objectivity in which findings are presented. One of the clear
marks of traditional academic writing is the removal of the researcher’s individual
experience, flare, tone, and style from the knowledge production process. Objectivity is held
in such high regard that it often stands as its own goal, again overpowering the content of the
study. Tracing the historical evolution of objectivity as what defines scientific validity,
Lorrain Daston and Peter Galison (2010) argue that scientific inquiry was not always as
attached to the concept of neutrality as it is today. In the nineteenth century, with the
industrial revolution and the introduction of mechanical precision into the daily lives of
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people in Europe, scientists engaging in recording and documenting their observations began
to yearn for the “blind sight” of machines, an uninvolved exactitude that would, presumably,
reveal absolute truths. “To be objective,” Daston and Galison write, “is to aspire to
knowledge that bears no trace of the knower—knowledge unmarked by prejudice or skill,
fantasy or judgment, wishing or striving” (17). The term itself, Daston and Galison point out,
emerges from an obsession with finding and fixing the “true nature” of the object of study,
and with it the removal of the observer from the process of observing. In different disciplines
and under changing circumstances, the motivation for this removal can vary: “the criterion
may be emotional detachment in one case, automatic procedures for registering data in
another, recourse to quantification in still another, belief in a bedrock reality independent of
human observers in yet another” (29). Over time, these elements came to be fused together
into what is understood as objectivity: a concept as well as a set of specific techniques of
research and of presentation that are rarely examined as potentially problematic.
The confidence and decisiveness of the objective voice bolsters the reliance on
systematic quantifications and qualifications of knowledge, leaving little to no room for what
may be impossible to know, for ambiguity, mixed feelings, indefinite conclusions. “The
artist,” as James Baldwin (1962) writes, “cannot and must not take anything for granted, but
must drive to the heart of every answer and expose the question the answer hides” (18).
Allowing for questions and speculations—rather than truths and convictions—to shape the
process of inquiry may be one way to circumvent the epistemological trap of writing
knowingly about the unknowable other. Several influential texts in American studies have
experimented with this creative challenge in recent years. Tiya Miles’s (2005) Ties That
Bind, for example, is a historical study of 19th century Cherokee life. The project draws
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attention to the overlooked relationships between Cherokee slaveholders and their African
American slaves, and to the consequential changes in racial hierarchies and alliances within
and without Native American communities. In lieu of missing archival records, to contend
with institutional archives that systematically left out accounts of Native or black lives, Miles
constructs a speculative narrative that revolves around one particular African slave.
Imagining the daily life of Doll, the black woman who was the slave and wife of a wealthy
Cherokee man Miles writes:
The ebb and flow of Doll’s days began with nursing her newborn child, preparing the
hearth, and starting a fire with wood that she herself had collected. In the early
morning Doll would have cooked large pots of food for the other slaves and for Shoe
Boots to eat during the day—soaking corn and pounding it into meal for bread,
boiling corn in lye and water and washing it clean to make skinned corn, roasting
pork or deer meat, boiling greens. She also would have worked in her kitchen garden,
tending the vegetables that sustained her small household. When she found time in
the morning or afternoon, Doll would have spun thread and woven fabric, dying it
with Indian mulberry, copperas, and indigo to create brilliant shades of red, green,
and blue. And in the cool of the evening, Doll would have baked pan bread in the
coals of the fire with corn or bean meal, serving it to her family, the other slaves, and
any of Shoe Boots’s visiting relatives. (64)
In the face of severe lack of sources and the limited perspective of traditional
historiography, Miles (2005) turns to alternative writing practices such as comparative
textual analysis, the use of informed inferences, and even fiction. Defying the silencing
apparatuses of recorded history, she uses fiction in order to “bridge the gaps in our evidence
and allow us access to the marrow of human feeling” (60). Rather than a purely factual,
scientific “objectivity,” she demonstrates, it is the creative imagination that makes room for
silenced voices to come forth and speak of unaccounted-for suffering and forgotten
injustices.
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Similarly, Saidiya Hartman’s (2007) Lose Your Mother recounts the author’s travels
in Ghana while interweaving historical analysis and fictionalized narratives. The project is a
uniquely personal attempt to contend with the numerous missing pieces, erasures, and
silenced voices in archival records of the transatlantic slave trade, and to better understand
slavery not as a thing of the past but as a living, dynamic force that still animates race
relations in the U.S. and the collective identity of African Americans. Researching and
writing in a foreign African country, Hartman positions herself as a visitor in a place where
she clearly does not belong, utilizing this positioning to bring to the surface the question of
belonging in the U.S. as well. Obruni, a word used by Ghanaians to refer to a white person, a
foreigner, becomes an ironic facet of the critical inquiry. “Obruni,” Hartman writes, “forced
me to acknowledge that I didn’t belong anyplace. . . . I was born in another country, where I
also felt like an alien and which in part determined why I had come to Ghana. . . . Secretly I
wanted to belong somewhere or, at least, I wanted a convenient explanation of why I felt like
a stranger” (4). Movement, migration, flux, and mobility create a thematic momentum for the
work, and the experience of being an outsider both at home and abroad brings into focus the
ongoing search for home and belonging that is, Hartman argues, a significant part of African
American identity.
Lose Your Mother is an example of a text that foregrounds uncertainly, searching, and
not knowing. Rather than providing conclusive answers, Hartman poses questions and
speculations, resisting the urge to subscribe to one definitive narrative while also refusing to
confine her work to one mode of writing (academic, autobiographical, or fictional). This fluid
approach prioritizes the individual and the particular, making room for multiple perspectives
and possibilities to illuminate the darkness of an unfathomable history. Darkness itself
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becomes a literary motif in the text, used to emphasize the unknown, the unmastered, and the
unpredictable. Walking in Accra during an unexpected blackout, Hartman describes her
experience thus: “Once you left Osu Road, the neighborhood was immersed in shadow and
the streets were pitch-black. It was the kind of velvety black that was rare ever to see in
cities, because artificial light robbed the sky of this jetty density. Walking the streets after
eight p.m., I navigated with a flashlight. I wasn’t afraid that I would be robbed or assaulted,
as I would have been in New York or Oakland” (2007, 175). “My flashlight,” Hartman
admits, recognizing her own limitations as an American scholar, “was a defense not against
dark, dark Africa but against my own compromised sight, my own thickheadedness. I had
been in Ghana nearly half a year and I barely understood the world around me” (175).
In Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments, Hartman (2019) continues to develop what
she herself terms “critical fabulation,” a style of writing intended to “jeopardize the status of
the event, to displace the received or authorized account, and to imagine what might have
happened or might have been said or might have been done” (11). Situating her storytelling
in New York and Philadelphia at the turn of the 20th century, Hartman works with
photographs from that time period, imagining the most intimate everyday affairs of young
black women as they migrated from the South to make independent lives for themselves in
the cities of the North. The scenes of daily movements and encounters about the big city, the
struggles for survival in a promised land of few opportunities, set the foundations for what
would later become the black ghettoes of the large Northern metropolitan areas. But while
these ghettos and their residents are condemned and criminalized by the authorities,
Hartman’s fictionalized close narration creates a counter-perspective that appreciates the
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unconventional lifestyles of urban black women at the end of the 19th century as daring,
innovative, and full of agency.
Facing scant archival materials and large gaps in existing records, Hartman (2019)
reconstructs the lives of so-called promiscuous, unlawful, errant women utilizing creative,
lyrical speculation:
There are no visible signs on doors barring her entrance, just the brutal rebuff of “we
don’t serve niggers.” If she feels brave, she will shout an insult or curse as she retreats
from the shop under the hateful gaze of clerk and customers. She can sit anywhere
she wants on streetcars and in theaters, even if people inch away as if she were
contagious when she chooses to sit next to them, and she can go the vaudeville show
or the nickelodeon on the same day as white folks, although it is more fun and she
breathes easier when it is just colored people and she knows she will not be insulted.
Despite the liberties of the city, there is no better life here than in Virginia, no
brighter future to grow into, no opportunities for colored girls besides the broom and
the mop, or spread-eagle in really hard times. (8)
Through the tapestry of their imagined lives, the young women in the book are
resurrected not as passive, subservient beings, but as animated and vibrant agents of change,
forming a vital precursor to the radical movements that were to follow later in the 20 th
century. The radicality of these women, however, manifests not in their heroic speeches or
their charismatic ability to mobilize masses, but on the contrary: in their daily routines, in
their individual choices, and their very bodies.
These bodies in motion, bodies in action, stand in contradiction to the conventional
methods of academic representation that in their detachment, adherence to facts, and tone of
mastery tend to fix their object of study in a static, inert state. The close descriptions of a
dynamic physical existence are told in a voice that resists authority; a voice of an artist who,
as Baldwin proposes, is more interested in exposing questions than in providing answers.
“How can narrative embody life in words and at the same time respect what we cannot
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know?” (2008, 3), asks Hartman. “How does one recuperate lives entangled with and
impossible to differentiate from the terrible utterances that condemned them to death, the
account books that identified them as units of value, the invoices that claimed them as
property, and the banal chronicles that stripped them of human features?” (3). The narratives
in Wayward Lives do that by insisting on writing from within the circle suggested by the
study, and resisting institutionally-sanctioned procedures such as fact-checking, critical
analyses, or “objective” evaluations. For example:
Most days, the assault of the city eclipses its promise: When the water in the building
has stopped running, when even in her best dress she cannot help but wonder if she
smells like the outhouse or if it is obvious that her bloomers are tattered, when she is
so hungry that the aroma of bean soup wafting from the settlement kitchen makes her
mouth water, she takes to the streets, as if in search of the real city and not this poor
imitation. The old black ladies perched in their windows shouted: “Girl, where you
headed?” Each new deprivation raises doubts about when freedom is going to come;
if the question pounding inside her head—Can I live?—is one she could ever give a
certain answer, or only repeat in anticipation of something better than this, bear the
pain of it and hope of it, the beauty and the promise. (2019, 10)
Such passages are quite reminiscent, in fact, of Baldwin’s 1960 novel Another
County, which, set in the same urban environment about half a century later, depicts an
already established black ghetto in Harlem, but one that has become attractive to a white
crowd of artists, free-thinkers, and reformers. Narrating the experience of one of the central
characters in the novel as he watches white fans entering a Times Square jazz club where he
used to perform regularly before his career and life got derailed by drugs and alcohol,
Baldwin writes:
It made him remember days and nights, days and nights, when he had been inside, on
the stand or in the crowd, sharp beloved, making it with any chick he wanted, making
it to parties and getting high and getting drunk and fooling around with the musicians,
who were his friends, who respected him. Then, going home to his own pad, locking
the door and taking off his shoes, maybe making himself a drink, maybe listening to
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some records, stretching out on the bed, maybe calling up some girl. And changing
his underwear and his socks and his shirt, shaving, and taking a shower, and making it
to Harlem to the barber shop, then seeing his mother and his father and teasing his
sister, Ida, and eating: spareribs or porkchops or chicken or greens or cornbread or
yams or biscuits. For a moment he thought he would faint with hunger and he moved
to a walk of the building and leaned there. His forehead was freezing with sweat. He
thought: This is got to stop, Rufus. This shit is got to stop. Then, in weariness and
recklessness, seeing no one on the streets and hoping no one would come through the
doors, leaning with one hand against the wall he sent his urine splashing against the
stone-cold pavement, watching the faint steam rise. (5-6)
Although Baldwin’s work is labeled “fiction” and Hartman’s “academic,” the
similarities highlight the arbitrary nature of these categorical distinctions. Both depict
tumultuous times in American cultural history, both offer critical commentary regarding the
lives of young black people in urban enclaves, both point to the social and political contexts
of the criminalizing and pathologizing of these lives. Calling into question the arbitrariness of
the strict divisions between “literature” and “research,” authors like Hartman and Miles
propose, in effect, alternate modes of knowledge productions, ones that do not rely solely on
fact-based data collection, calculated observations, systematic evaluations, or objective
conclusions. Instead, critical fabulation, by its very nature, admits to and arises from
uncertainty, from being unable to fully comprehend, know, or master the object of study. The
unique voice of fiction, therefore, is the subjective voice of inquiry, which prefers the
questions to the answers, the mystery of the unknown to the evidential proof of the known.
In the world of higher education, the critical fabulation could offer an opening onto
new epistemologies, ones that are not so limited by rigid methods, strict procedures of
knowledge production, and predictable patterns. As Denise Ferreira da Silva points out, the
critical tools available to scholars are themselves products of the same social and scientific
developments of the 20th century that, despite pursuits of justice, equality, or diversity, have
articulated differences along lines of unbridgeable cultural divides. This has been
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acknowledged and tackled in American studies, and experimentations with enhanced selfreflexivity, non-conformity, and pedagogies of dissent are ongoing. The thought patterns and
modes of knowledge production that are available to scholars can be limited, as they
“rehearse the modern text’s scientific imaging of The World as an ordered whole composed
of separate parts relating through the mediation of constant units of measurement and/or a
limiting violent force” (Ferreira da Silva 2016, 57-58). A complete rethinking of global
social structures is required, then, if the goal is to avoid repeating the violence that American
studies and other ethical-political departments, organizations, movements, and programs set
out to remedy. This, Ferreira da Silva argues, “requires that we release thinking from the grip
of certainty and embrace the imagination’s capacity to create with unclear and confused, or
uncertain impressions, which Kant (1724-1804) postulated are inferior to what is produced
by the formal tools of the Understanding” (58). Letting go of the need to understand, to fully
grasp, to order or reorder the world, would necessarily lead to new ways of conceptualizing
and experiencing the world, and these new perspectives might in turn begin to dissolve the
persistent power of cultural differences to produce fixed, separate, irreconcilable identities.
Breaking through the formal walls of Kantian Understanding, practicing an intentional
loosening of the grip of certainty, and calling forth imagination may rearticulate the
fundamental elements of existence as an oscillating complexity in chaos and movement
rather than a logically-arranged system of classifications and exchanges.
Although the conventional lines between formal academic discourse and creative
fiction writing tend to keep the two neatly separated, these seemingly opposing approaches
may not be as contradictory as they appear at first. As Miles, Hartman, and Abu-Lughod
show, utilizing the personal, the particular, and that which does not fit into an identifiable
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mold is a powerful subjective declaration of uncertainty, and as such it allows otherness to
retain its vitality while the self (of the author as well as the reader) unravels in not knowing,
not mastering, and not possessing. Instead of attempting to provide answers, the language of
storytelling is the language of inquiry; an embracing of ambiguity that honors the mystery of
the other and invites both subject and object to participate in a sort of dance of discovery.
Considering the accelerated evolution of advanced technology and the pervasive
influence of mass media, considering that methodical, formulaic, standardized, detached
procedures now govern so many aspects of knowledge production, this dance of discovery
may possibly be one of the last vestiges of proactive human agency. As of now, even the
most sophisticated AI systems cannot yet invent fictional narratives, do not possess an
elaborate, inquisitive imagination. Despite centuries of scientific advances that rely on
factual, assessable evidence, the exploratory disposition of human imagination is in fact what
drives all progress and is still the main advantage the we have over the machines that
surround us. Deliberately engaging with uncertainty not only destabilizes the political, social,
and institutional orders that generate definitive categories of identity and alterity, but invites
the self to pose ethical questions about its own positioning and conduct. A speculative focus
on the individual and the particular as those things that cannot be contained in fixed
categories and predictable patterns highlights the other as a mystery, impossible to pin down
and fully comprehend. In turn, this unknowable alterity holds the potential to reveal to the
self its own fundamental nature as unfixed, insubstantial, and indefinable.
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Exit Point

At the end of Stanislaw Lem’s novel Solaris, after years of dedicated examination, the
shapeshifting oceanic plasma remains as much of an enigma as when it was first
encountered. What further complicates the studying of the impenetrable planet is the fact that
without exception, all the scientists who travel to it experience severe psychological
breakdowns, and their work is interrupted by unforeseen surges of intense moral dilemmas
accompanied by the most painful of human emotions: grief, guilt, shame, regret, and defeat.
Insomnia, disturbing dreams, hallucinations, and terror-inducing visitations from long-dead
people who represent deep ethical questions threaten not only the wellbeing of the space
station’s crew members, but the very foundations of scientific inquiry. Gradually, all logic,
reason, order, and objectivity deteriorate and lose their hold. The momentous task of
understanding the laws that govern the foreign environment becomes insignificant in the face
of the urgent need to resolve the internal conflicts of the tormented individual soul. It is as if
while the scientists are conducting their research, examining, measuring, and assessing the
planet, the planet in turn is engaged in its own experiments, gathering some of the most
disturbing information stored in the astronauts’ psyches, and reflecting it back to them in
grotesque, nerve-racking ways.
Driven by an obsessive need to learn about, rationalize, classify and categorize,
comprehend, and triumphantly control their object of study, the Solaris scholars return from
their journeys baffled and perplexed. With their spirits crushed and their identities lost, they
face copious amounts of field notes, recorded data, attempted analysis, and endless
speculations, yet no deductions, no recognized patterns, no useful knowledge. The alterity of
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Solaris is so radical, so profoundly incomprehensible, it can only be evaluated by its refusal
to be understood and by the reflection in the mirror it holds up to the inquiring subject.
Like Solaris, on one level this project aims to develop a critical perspective on
mankind’s quest for knowledge, pointing to the limitation of science and the arrogance of
human curiosity, which is always pointed outward, ready to explore and conquer faraway
galaxies while remaining hopelessly ignorant when it comes to understanding its own
makeup. On another level, the dissertation is also a philosophical inquiry into the desire to
know, contain, and possess the other, symbolized in the novel by the logic-defying plasma
and in my work as a fundamental alterity that is so alien, intimidating, and uncooperative that
ultimately all attempts to understand it fail, and its main function becomes to redirect the
scrutinizing gaze back to the observing subject. Like the unsolvable mystery of the strange
planet, alterity raises in front of the curious subject an unwanted mirror into which the self
gazes in bewilderment. Focusing not on distant galaxies in the faraway future but on the here
and now of our own contemporary existence, this project endeavored to shed light on
postmodern configurations of identity and alterity and examine the dynamics between them
in a technology-saturated world characterized by our increasingly mediated lives and the
accelerated speeds of the electronic highways. Contemplating the possible questions
presented by the other, the study intentionally allows for answers to remain inconclusive. A
methodology of organically unfolding inquiry, it suggests, allows for the investigative
horizons to remain open, unconstrained by the finality of decisive suppositions.
But where is the subject who must look in the mirror?
On his coast-to-coast journey through America, in the small town of Porterville, CA,
Baudrillard ([1987a] 1990a) writes: “Without even a bank, an administrative building, or a
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town hall, the town has no coordinates; it is like a plantation. The only sign of life: an
American flag, just alongside the dead centre of the town, the hotel.” In this run-down hotel,
the unkempt manager has a hard time locating the right key to the right room and is not
particularly welcoming to the French tourist. The hotel appears to be mostly vacant, “and yet
in every room, with its sagging mattress and its dusty mirror, the TV is constantly on” (65).
In the rural Californian wasteland, in a nondescript American small town, the screen
becomes the most reassuring sign of life, an indication of human presence as well as its
gradual disappearance. The blue light flickering through the curtained windows becomes,
like the American flag, a suggestive symbol of the very essence of a whole culture. Although
this typical image of the 1980s seems archaic now, it holds a lasting significance in its
aesthetic prediction of the all-encompassing, all-consuming power of the lit monitor. In its
surreal, dream-like, evocative atmosphere, the image encapsulates the logic of simulation in
which human life recedes into the emptiness of passivity while more and more action takes
place on a screen, in ethereal realms that have a life of their own, whether a human spectator
is present or not.
Examining the accelerated technological developments of the last several decades, the
fantastical notion of singularity, which used to belong to the imaginary realms of science
fiction novels, may not seem as far-fetched as it was once thought to be. Although originally
singularity was hypothesized as the point at which the capabilities and performance of
artificial intelligence would surpass those of the human mind, over time the term came to
more generally refer to the unpredictable changes that advanced technology introduces into
our lives, and especially to the merging of human and machine. Overhead satellites,
unmanned drones, military simulation apparatuses, sophisticated surveillance mechanisms,
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high-tech medical equipment (such as remote-controlled cardiac pacemakers, artificial lungs,
and bionic prosthetics), personal computers, GPS systems, self-driving cars, and of course
smart phones: human life all over the planet is surrounded with, monitored by, and often
literally depends on central processing units and fiber optic networks that cover every part of
the inhabited globe. In recent studies, teams of neuroscientists and machine learning
specialists report on the successful initial operation of a “brain-machine interface”: a device
in which brainwaves coming in through electrodes attached to a person’s head are decoded
by trained algorithms that then transform the frequencies and patterns into real-time speech
(Makin, Moses, and Chang, 2020). In other words, this is a mind-reading device that so far is
being used to assist patients with severe speech impediments, brain injuries, or disabilities,
but that holds unprecedented potential for widespread applications. The same device is being
used with paraplegic patients to convert brainwaves into movements and actions: all on the
screen, in virtual form, of course. This is not science fiction; this is a current reality.
In light of these new hyperrealities, new questions emerge. How are various human
subjectivities—or the human subject in general—to be understood? What do familiar
definitions of identity and alterity mean in this changing world? How does the accentuated
visuality of the screen-mediated life alter human perception, and with it the ways in which
we approach categorical differences? With aggregated information circulating all around us
in growing amounts and accelerated speed, what is the meaning and value of “knowledge”?
With the increasing dominance of method—of meticulously calculated programming—how
are we to assess processes of knowledge production? And, within these contexts, how are we
to theorize power, nation, and empire?
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The COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated these questions, as governments, systems,
and institutions find themselves helpless against the continued threat of the microorganism,
which is proving to be much more resilient and adaptive than was thought at first. Even after
a vaccine has been developed and widely administered, new mutations attack the weak and
the susceptible, and the numbers of the infected and the dead are on the rise. Months go by,
and as humans we too adapt to the “new normal,” a transformed social structure that still
requires wearing masks, adhering to careful hygiene precautions, and opting for remote
operations whenever possible. Doctor’s appointments, business meetings, professional
engagements, training sessions, conferences and consultations remain virtual, ensuring the
safety of participants and the general population. Social media and various lifestyle, gaming,
or dating apps soar to new heights of popularity. On university campuses, many courses
continue to be taught online or in hybrid modalities, allowing students to plug in from
various remote locations. Those attending in-person classes can still enjoy all the webenhanced educational features, along with contactless student services and autonomous little
robots that deliver food directly to the dorms.
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Figure 15. On-Demand Delivery Robots on the Oregon State University Campus. Photograph
by Gilad Elbom, September 2021.
The mechanisms of advanced technology, it seems, have dislodged themselves from
any particular geographic location, political or economic entity, ideology, or agenda. Selfperpetuating, independent of the American or any other empire, techno-imperialism is
expanding on its own volition, fueled by its own separate logic of improvement, which
gradually erodes the “real” in favor of celebrating the hyperreal. Rational distinctions, as
Baudrillard points out, carry little weight in this process. Visually seductive and perpetually
mesmerizing, the screen-mediated life thrives on elements of entertainment that obscure
meaning and alter perception. In our digitally enhanced existence, it becomes increasingly
harder to discern a phenomenon from its virtual rendition, the origin from the imitation, the
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signified from the signifier. “The absence of discrimination between positive and negative
effects,” Baudrillard writes, “the telescoping of races, technologies, and models, the waltz of
simulacra and images here is such that, as with dream elements, you must accept the way
they follow one another, even if it seems unintelligible; you must come to see this whirl of
things and events as an irresistible, fundamental datum” ([1987a] 1990a, 67). Propelled
forward as if by its own evolutionary drive, the techno-empire keeps expanding, engulfing an
entire species that is progressively characterized by torpor, by inertia. Humans depend on,
submit to, and interact with machines, but with so little agency that, just like in a dream state,
we are mostly carried away by endless streams and circuits of simulation while our physical
bodies, critical faculties, and independent consciousness are in a state of indefinite
suspension.
The loss of the phenomenological world as it is being reconfigured in virtual
dimensions, in visual media, in the pixels and algorithms of cyberspace, may not necessarily
present a death to be mourned or resisted. It could, on the contrary, be utilized as a generative
gateway from which to explore the meaning and implications of the disappearance of the
“real” into the simulated, and the disintegration of the subject into its projected reproduction.
An example of such an exploratory route, as this project suggests, is the centering of human
imagination as a tool of critical inquiry. As one of the remaining human traits that machines,
as of yet, cannot simulate, imagination pushes against the predictable, repetitious, formulaic
constraints of prescribed method. Countering the increasingly systematized, standardized
modes of knowledge production, engaging in open interpretation, speculation, and close
narration allows for the particularity of alterity to emerge as a presence that is suggestive
rather than ascertained, dynamic rather than fixed, questioning rather than resolved. As such,

193
open-ended narratives can point to new epistemologies that move away from attempts to
know and master the other, enlarging the scope of inquiry to include multiple possibilities not
only for certain groups of people, but for the human species as a whole, its place, role, and
function on a rapidly transforming planet.
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